Showing posts with label Palestinians. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Palestinians. Show all posts

Friday, December 1, 2023

Fighting Renewed In Israel After 7 Day Pause

After a 7 day "pause,"  Israel's war with Hamas has resumed this morning.  Over the course of the 7 day pause, 110 hostages were released by Hamas including some young children, many senior citizens and several foreign workers (mostly Thai) who were working in Israel.  In exchange Israel released more than 300 prisoners from its jails.  To correct my previous post, some of these Palestinian prisoners were being held under "administrative detention" and my not have actually been convicted in a proper court process.  However, the vast majority were involved in an actual or attempted attack on Israeli civilians or soldiers.  They were released by Israel for civilians who were kidnapped from their homes or from the Nova music festival on October 7, 2023.

According to press reports, Israel was willing to continue the current pause for at least three more days since Hamas had claimed that it still had about 30 senior citizens, women and children that it was willing to release in exchange for 3 prisoners each.  Hamas was required to provide a list of at least 10 hostages that it would be releasing by midnight to ensure another day of pause.  But last night, instead of providing a list of hostages, Hamas sent some missiles.  The Israeli army responded by indicating that operations against Gaza had resumed.

It is very difficult to predict how this war is likely to develop and how or when it might end.  

On the one hand, various countries are making extensive efforts to negotiate further pauses in the fighting to allow for additional prisoner/hostage exchanges and discuss possible conditions for a longer term cease fire.  From my understanding, Israel would be prepared to make extensive concessions to obtain the release of the remaining hostages - approximately 139 of them - according to Ynet News.  In exchange for Israeli soldiers - and other remaining hostages, Israel is apparently prepared to release some of the most hardened terrorists that it is holding - which creates its own moral dilemmas.

On the other hand, after the massacre of October 7, 2023 and the accompanying declaration of war by Hamas, the Israeli government determined that its war objectives included defeating Hamas and eliminating it as the governing power in Gaza.  As well, its objectives included destroying as much of Hamas' underground tunnel network as possible.  If Israel does not make significant progress towards these goals, the war will be seen as a major victory for Hamas.  This would keep all  Israeli border settlements in a state of continued ongoing risk, would create regional deterrence problems for Israel in the region and would leave Israel simply waiting for another attack.  Those outcomes are unacceptable and dangerous.

From reports I have seen on the various Israeli channels, Israel has degraded approximately 20-25% of the Hamas forces, primarily in northern Gaza.  Most of the remaining forces, including two of Hamas' "elite units" are in Jabaliya and Khan Yunis.  I don't expect this war to end without significant fighting in those areas.  This war may take a while.

A Word about Civilians

Before the pause, the "Hamas Health Ministry" claimed that more than 20,000 Palestinians had been killed and alleged that the majority were civilians.  As of now, the same "Ministry" is claiming that just over 14,000 were killed.  That is still a very large number, no doubt.  However, there is simply no reason to accept anything that Hamas says as having even a kernel of truth to it.  As we know from the hospital incident early on, Hamas claimed that Israel had killed some 500 civilians.  It later turned out that it was an "own goal" - a missile fired by the Islamic Jihad - and less than 50 Palestinians had been killed.

More importantly, Hamas has not indicated how many of the alleged 14,000 alleged deaths have been Hamas fighters.  Contrary to what one might read or hear in some western media - including  places like the BBC, the Toronto Star and other illustrious media outlets, Israel is primarily fighting Hamas militants and is not randomly killing civilians.   If Israel were trying to kill civilians deliberately, the death toll would be hundreds of thousands (like what Assad did in Syria).   Instead, Israel urged civilians to leave the north before attacking, which probably allowed thousands of  Hamas fighters to leave along with the civilians.   Based on reports in the Israeli media, it is almost certain that a very  high percentage of the Palestinians who have been killed are Hamas fighters.  

That is not to say that civilians in Gaza are not suffering.  They are and many have been killed.  But it is their government that launched a war and there is a very high level of support for this Hamas war among Gazan Palestinians.  They were cheering and distributing candies when they heard news of the October 7 massacre and now they are reckoning with the consequences of supporting that regime.  People around the world are calling for a ceasefire - which is like people who may have called for a ceasefire during WWII instead of a victory by the allies.  People who really care about the Palestinians should be calling for a Hamas surrender now not a ceasefire. 

Some of the released hostages have been providing information about who was holding them in captivity.  One prisoner was being held in the attic of the house of a senior UNRWA official (UNRWA being a UN funded  organization devoted to continuing Palestinian refugee status perpetually).  Another returned hostage was being held in the house of a Palestinian doctor. There are many similar stories.  In other words, many of the hostages were distributed to and being held by "civilians."

I have spoken to some soldiers who were in northern Gaza going house to house looking for Hamas fighters. They found hidden weapons caches in the vast majority of homes they entered.  In some cases, rocket launchers and rockets. In other cases, Kalashnikovs, grenades and other weapons. Sometimes these were in children's bedrooms, in plain sight or in closets or under beds. Other times, in basements, attics or under trap doors. I saw videos from several of these houses. The soldiers told me that from what they saw (and their video evidence), they entered very few homes of "innocent civilians" who were uninvolved.

Despite all of this, it is clear that a growing proportion of world leaders are beginning to pressure Israel to end this war, using the concern about civilians as the main basis for taking these positions. President Biden and Secretary of State Blinken seem to be moving down this path. But at this point, it seems to me that Israel will have to resist these calls for now - until it is at least able to accomplish some of its primary war objectives.

There is also a question of "what happens next."  On this, I haven't yet heard any sensible and workable proposal from Israel, the U.S., or anyone else. Essentially, Gaza needs some sort of outcome that is comparable to the Allies' defeat in WWII. A complete victory by Israel or a surrender by Hamas.  Followed by a plan to rebuild Gaza, focusing on education, health care and economy - while keeping the area demilitarized.  

One precondition is that Hamas has to be defeated or has to surrender. This could take weeks, months or even longer. But I don't see how Israel can accept anything less than one of these two outcomes.

A second precondition is that the Palestinians  have to be prepared to  live under this type of arrangement. Again, I have no idea how to implement that, who would police it and keep it demilitarized and whether it could even work. But a Hamas government on Israel's border, after the  massacre and all of the other wars is just not feasible.

So for  now, while we may soon see another pause or two - and some additional hostage deals, I expect that we are in for an extensive period of fighting, especially in southern Gaza. The landscape will have to change significantly before a long term arrangement can be reached.

Stories of Captivity

There are so many stories being circulated from the various Israeli  hostages who were  released - and they are available  on many  different sites and publications.

A few items caught my attention  in particular.

The hostages were almost all underfed and undernourished. Not visited by the Red Cross or anyone else.  No one really knew if they were dead or alive. Some released Thai workers said in an interview that they were so hungry they resorted to eating toilet paper.

One hostage, Rony Kriboy, age 25, a dual Russian-Israeli citizen, was taken hostage at the Nova music festival.  Somehow he managed to escape from captivity.  But he had nothing with him.  No food, no money, no phone, no water.  He spent four days trying to get out of Gaza, while  scrounging for food.  Eventually, he was caught by Palestinian civilians and turned over to Hamas again. Miraculously, they didn't kill him. He was released with the reported intervention of Putin as part of one of the exchanges.  

Another released hostage, Mia Schem, had a severe arm injury. Hamas brought a veterinarian to operate on her arm. She is now undergoing treatment in an Israeli hospital. She had been forced to make a video while in Hamas captivity claiming that she was being treated well.

Eitan Yahalomi, age 12, was forced to watch videos of the Hamas massacres over and over while in captivity. He was held by Hamas for more than 50 days.  He was threatened with weapons repeatedly.

9 year old Emily hand was released this week. She returned to her father to learn that her mother had been killed on October 7. She will only speak in whispers now after having been traumatized by Hamas for more than 7 weeks.

Some 139 hostages are still being held by Hamas. Even though it was part of the "pause" deal that the International Red Cross would be able to visit the prisoners, Hamas did not honour the deal and did not allow any visits. We still do not know how many hostages are alive, what condition they are in or how they are being held.  

Israel is still hoping to reach some type of deal to release as many as possible if not all of them. But so far, it has not been able to reach a deal with Hamas through the bargaining agents - Qatar, Egypt and the U.S.

Conditions in Israel

During the brief 7-day pause, many things came back to life in many parts of Israel. Restaurants were full, bars and pubs in Tel-Aviv and other places were bustling - and many soldiers were able to get a bit of a much needed break. We were able to host 7 of them for big dinner earlier this week. Some soldiers had not been home for 30 days or more and had been living and sleeping "in the field."

Of course thousands of Israelis are living in uncertain temporary arrangements since whole communities were destroyed on Oct 7.  Others have been temporarily evacuated from their homes in the north due to the ongoing threat from Hezbollah. Some are staying in hotels. Some are staying with friends and relatives. But there is an enormous amount of work to do to return all of these people to any semblance of normalcy.

We had a few days of very heavy rain but the sun returned and the past few days have been like late August days in Toronto - sunny and beautiful - and during a "pause" - even calm in parts of the country.

But yesterday was anything but calm. Three Israelis were killed and several others injured in a shooting attack in Jerusalem. Hamas took responsibility and that was during the "pause."  

The day before, terrorists had opened fire and killed two soldiers and wounded others.

Even so, people were waiting with anticipation yesterday to see what would happen and whether the pause would be extended. Instead, we woke up to news that the fighting would continue intensely and no other hostages would be released. And we are back to a situation of uncertainty, concern and worry.  As they say in Yiddish - on shpilkes.

We were planning to host some close friends in early January. They have had to cancel their trip.  Understandably.  Cloudy with a chance of missiles is not the best forecast for a vacation. Another friend is planning to come and volunteer in late December. So far, that is still going ahead. And one other friend, with family members living here, arrived for a visit earlier this week. People are still flying to and from  Israel, mostly on El Al.  So our "hotel" is open and you are welcome to visit - even during a war. We have an on-premises safe room (with extra thick concrete walls, designed to withstand a direct missile hit) though we hope that will never have to find out if it actually works.

I have to travel to Toronto again for a short visit. Once again, I will have to mix and match some crazy flight schedules. I have a trip through Amsterdam coming up - with El Al to Amsterdam and then Air Canada to Toronto. I am not looking forward to it after the nasty experience I had on the way to Israel. But I couldn't change it - other than to move the Air Canada leg to a later time to allow more time.

Coming back, I am still looking at options. Considering a change in London, Frankfurt or some other places. I am trying to stick with the Star Alliance as much possible since I get such a great benefit from flying on Air Canada or other partners. But no Star Alliance airline is currently flying to Tel Aviv. So anyone flying to Israel via a Star Alliance flight must switch over to El Al.  

If you don't care about which airline you are taking - the easiest way to  get to and from Israel now from Toronto is clearly El Al from New York with a connecting flight on Delta or American.  One friend of ours recently completed a fairly last minute booking for less than $2,000 (Canadian) (about $1,100 USD) - using El Al and Delta.

Chanukah is fast approaching.  For Israelis, that means eating doughnuts - or Sofganyot, as they are called.  The big fat jelly-filled, icing-sugar-coated calorie bombs.  Personally, they have  never done anything for me.  I always  associated Chanukah with  potato latkes - whether  they were being made by my mother, one of my two dear late grandmothers - or anyone  else.  I still love latkes.  But somehow, in Israel, Chanukah is much more likely to be associated with sofganyot.  Of course, I do my part to swim against the tide.  I certainly plan on making a bunch of latkes - using whatever I learned from watching my two bubbies and my mom.  Not that much healthier than the doughnuts, I suppose, but once or twice a year - I really enjoy having a few....(or more than a few).  

That's about it for now.  It will probably be two to three weeks before I put together  another blog, unless I manage to find the time to put together another one sooner.  For now, I wish everyone a Shabbat Shalom and Happy Chanukah.  We continue to hope  and pray for the safe return of all of the remaining hostages, for the safety of all of our soldiers, security personnel and all of the residents of Israel, across the country.   I probably have to add that we also hope and pray for the safety of Jews everywhere, throughout the diaspora, as we have seen some really crazy threats and attacks on Jews around the world.   Finally, I hope that we will see an end  to the war soon with Israel achieving a significant proportion of its war aims so that we can try to usher in a new period of hope, relative peace, stability and security.  Perhaps that is only a dream - but we have to hope -  and try.




Wednesday, November 9, 2022

Bibi: My Story - A review

 

As you might know Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ("Bibi") released his memoires in the midst of Israel's most recent election campaign.  He wrote the book himself in longhand over the course of the year and half or so of being the leader of the opposition in the Israeli Knesset.  I couldn't resist picking up a copy and comparing it to the other books on Bibi that I have read and reviewed.

As you might recall, I wrote this review of the book "Bibi" by Anshel Pfeffer and this review of Ben Caspit's book The Netanyahu Years.  I have not yet read any other reviews of Bibi's book but I did go back and look at my reviews of these other two books to compare.

For starters, I have to say that I quite enjoyed reading the book.  Netanyahu is a very skilled communicator.  The book flows well, is very readable and contains some very interesting stories and antecdotes.

I would say that it is structured like a legal argument rather than a true biography.  It is presented as an argument for Bibi's legacy.  Netanyahu asserts that he, almost singlehandedly, reformed the Israeli economy from a socialist leaning, old style economy to a modern capitalist society and moved Israel from a developing country to one that is fully developed and closing in on a AAA credit rating.  All of this as a result of Bibi's work as Israel's Finance Minister and subsequently as Prime Minister, where he continued the work that he had started.

A second theme throughout the book is that with Bibi's background, having obtained his undergraduate degree at MIT, he was keenly aware of the power of technology and made technological development a priority throughout the course of his tenure as Israel's Prime Minister, leading to Israel's recognition as a true technological powerhouse.

A third theme is that the key to Middle East peace is bypassing the Palestinians, since they aren't really interested in a deal anyways and developing peace with other Arab countries first as a precondition to resolving the whole of the middle east conflict.  I will come back to this shortly.

A fourth theme is that the focus of Bibi's foreign policy efforts since 1999 or even earlier has been to see Iran as the real threat and focus on containment of Iran and prevention of the Iranian development of a nuclear bomb.

A fifth theme is to raise the profile of his father, his wife Sara, his sons Yair and Avner and brush away or deflect any criticism of any of them.  From the descriptions of Sara that Netanyahu has provided, it is hard to imagine a kinder, more perfect, more gracious, more supportive spouse than Sara.  But,of course, perhaps this is all in response to the various other Bibi books including those by Caspit and Pfeffer that strongly suggest otherwise.

So how does Bibi fare with these arguments?

Interestingly, he starts off by saying that a good lawyer, when appearing in court, often leads by diffusing the strongest arguments that opponents might present.  Bibi's first parts of the book deal with the tragic death of his brother Yoni in the course of the Entebbe raid, his own academic accomplishments, which are indeed impressive, and his analysis of the history of Israel, Zionism and the importance of a strong, militarily capable, home for the Jewish people.  

Bibi puts forward arguments for the importance of a strong free market economy and traces his Zionism back to the Zionism of Jabotinsky and his successors, many of whom became Likud party members, as opposed to the more socialist bent of the Labor party that dominated Israeli political life for so many years.  

Much of this analysis is cogent and convincing.  But these are certainly the strongest points that Bibi would have to put forward and they are what he tackles first.  That might be due to chronology but I note that he starts with his brother Yoni and then goes back in time.  This is a particularly deliberate choice, which partially responds to some of the criticisms made by Pfeffer and Caspit about the cynical use of Yoni's legacy by Bibi and his family.

As the book moves on, a few things became particularly interesting.

One thought I had was that a great deal of the book is "Bibi's spin" on different historical events irrespective of how accurate that spin might be.  The other thought I had was what was left out as opposed to what was included.  This is certainly not a "comprehensive" book even though it is 650 pages long.  

Certainly Bibi's contributions to the change in Israel's economy are significant. Israel has become a booming modern country with skyscrapers galore.  At the same time, the cost of living has skyrocketed, the gap between the wealthy and the poor has increased dramatically, and wealth has become ever more concentrated in the hands of very few.  No comments from Bibi about these issues, other than some platitudes that suggest that everyone is now better off and would not have been if Israel had followed different policies.

Many political figures, industry leaders and others contributed to the change in Israel's economic structure and I am somewhat skeptical that Bibi's role is as singularly definitive as he asserts.

Having read many other books about how Israel has become a technological superpower, I find it very difficult to give Bibi as much credit as he would like to take in this area. For example, steps taken by Shimon Peres to develop Israel's Air Force and other military technology were dramatic as were many taken by Ehud Barak.  Moreover, many different private companies as well as private-public consortiums have focused on technological development.  Although Bibi clearly appreciates all of these developments, I find his efforts to take credit for them less convincing.

Bibi's recount of his dealings with the Palestinians is a whole different story.

I found Bibi's analysis of dealings with President Bill Clinton quite interesting.  Although he recognizes that Clinton was well intentioned, he accuses of Clinton of buying the "Palestine first" narrative and focusing all of his efforts on persuading Israel to accept a deal rather than pushing the Palestinians.  Here, there is a reasonable argument that Bibi's version is sound.  Even Clinton in his later writings noted that despite all of the concessions that he was able to wrangle out of the Israeli side, Arafat was still not prepared to accept the deal.  And that is Bibi's thesis, that Palestinian rejectionism is, primarily, what has led to the current situation.  That being said, this does not, in my view, mean that the resolution of Palestinian issues is of a much lower level of importance, even if it is extremely difficult to attain.

Bibi also spends a great deal of time on his relationship with President Obama.  Bibi is somewhat more deferential than I had expected, particularly given the relationship between these two.  He points out Obama's decision to "recalibrate" the relationship in the Middle East after first becoming President by visiting a host of Arab countries but not Israel.  He also discusses the failed policy of bolstering the "Arab Spring" and the disaster that occurred in Egypt when Morsi took over.  That being said, Bibi outlines some of the differences of opinion and concludes that Obama was probably the "toughest opponent he had ever faced."  In fact, in reading some of the discussions and arguments that Bibi recalls having with President Obama, it is not clear to me Bibi's position is the more convincing one.

Bibi goes out of his away to try and explain away all of the different incidents in which he was accused of trying to embarrass and humiliate President Obama.  Here, I didn't find him that convincing.  Although he claims that it was all about the Iranian threat, the Israeli interests and his commitment to remaining bi-partisan, I just don't think that meshes with the manner in which events really played out.  He highlights that his differences with Obama were all about "POLICY" (which he puts in capital letters).  But in my view, other historical accounts are far more convincing - suggesting that Bibi deliberately set out to humiliate Obama and tilt Israel policy towards the Republicans. 

Moving on to Trump, I would say that, reading between the lines, Bibi is much less complimentary of Trump.  Although Trump was a "committed friend" who was willing to give in to Bibi on a whole range of issues including moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan and putting together a proposed peace deal with the Palestinians without any Palestinian input, there is little true respect shown for Trump, perhaps deservedly show.

The one area where Bibi does show appreciation for Trump is in the development and negotiation of the Abraham accords, though the book suggests that these are all really Bibi's creations, which he was able to foist onto Trump as a priority.  On the other hand, Bibi claims that Trump had promised to recognize Israeli sovereignty over much of the West Bank and has some very harsh words for Trump over the U.S. decision to back out of this commitment, even though some have argued that this was all used as a smoke screen to make progress with the UAE and Bahrain.

Ultimately, even with Trump, Bibi still had to deal with the U.S. (and worldwide) position that Israel needs to come to a political solution with the Palestinians.  Whether it is the Clinton Plan, the Obama Plan, the Saudi Plan, the Trump Plan, or anyone else's, if it is to be a viable solution that also protects Israeli demographic interests, there will need to be a Palestinian State, or some form of separation of the two peoples, with a Palestinian territory being the one that can address any Palestinian refugee claims.  

But Bibi has no time for this argument.  I was waiting to see what he might outline, in the book, as his proposed solution.  What is the Bibi plan? Perhaps, I thought, he was a "Jordan is Palestine" proponent (given that more than 70% of the Jordanian population is Palestinian).  No, he explicitly rules that out as dangerous in no uncertain terms.  Maybe he supports a population transfer and/or incentives to the Palestinians to relocate?  No suggestion of that as a policy, even though he is now entering a coaltion government with 14 coalition members from the Religious Zionist Party that support that approach.  Two state supporter?  Well even though he accepted that in principle after much arm twisting from past U.S. Presidents, he leaves little doubt that he opposes a two state solution in this book.  

Ultimately, the best I could discern, to use hockey terminology - his preference would be to "rag the puck" (i.e. just to kill time).  He favours a continuation of the current status quo with only minor changes to the way things have been going with the hope that one day, the problem will just go away.  This just does not seem like a viable long term solution.  If Israel moves to annex large amounts of Judea and Samaria, as now requested by the Religious Zionist coalition, we will be closer to an apartheid type of regime, unless when Israel annexes these territories it also grants full and equal citizenship for all of the people living in the territories irrespective of religious background.  If it simply de facto annexes these areas, Israel will continue on with a smouldering situation, trying to control a hostile population of millions of Palestinians.  Ultimately, Bibi fails to propose any type of viable solution for the current conflict with the Palestinians and even castigates all of those leaders who have tried to resolve it.

That is not to say that there is an ideal solution.  There is a great deal of historical truth to Bibi's assessments of Arafat and Abbas (both as two-faced liars and terror supporters) as well as his assessments of past U.S. Presidents including Clinton and Obama (both of whom naively thought that the Palestinian leadership would agree to a deal).  However, there is also something to the thesis argued by Caspit and Pfeffer.  Bibi had a golden opportunity with a sympathetic U.S. President in Trump, a powerful domestic political position and even a solid relationship with Putin and other European leaders, while at the same time, developing ties with a range of other Arab countries.  He could have tried to use this position of great strength to come up with a viable solution, even if it would be difficult to sell to the Palestinians.  Perhaps he could have obtained worldwide support to impose a solution.  There is little to show, from Bibi's account, that he made any such efforts or that he has any vision that he is willing to share about how to resolve the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

On the Iranian policy side, Bibi spends quite a bit of time dealing with his battle with President Obama on the COJPA and his fight to stop the agreement or have it shredded.  He outlines many of the flaws with the agreement and it is hard to argue with him that the agreement would have done anything other than delay Iranian nuclear armaments by 10-15 years.  He characterizes this whole issue as existential, perhaps one of the most existential threats that Israel has ever faced.

However, now that he "succeeded" in shredding the agreement, what did he accomplish?  Trump refused to bomb Iran's nuclear program or even threaten to do so.  Iran is moving ahead with its program at breakneck speed.  Perhaps Bibi is simply laying the groundwork for justification of a pending Israeli military attack on the Iranian nuclear program.  I guess we will see.  But from what I have read from various sources, there are a whole host of concerns about that option.  It may lead to large, wholesale war that would cause enormous loss of life in Israel.  The U.S. may oppose this type of attack - as might a range of allies.  Israel may not even have the full military capability to reach these underground nuclear sites and destroy all of them.  And ultimately, this may only set the program back by a short period of time and may lead Iran to redouble its efforts.

Overall, there may well have been other options, including different approachs with Obama and Trump that may have led to a better deal that would have actually stopped the program, with a combination of threats and incentives.

With respect to Bibi's attempts to rehabilitate the reputations of his family members, including Yair and Sara, in particular, his words just don't sound credible, especially given the multitude of stories about incidents involving these two.  For example, he dismisses the fact that Sara pled guilty to criminal charges by arguing that it was all trumped up and the plea bargain was done to end the matter and avoid any further publicity and hassle.  Here, again, the actual facts suggest otherwise.

Bibi devotes a short part of the book to dismissing all of the charges against him as "trumped up," "sewn together" and purely political.  I guess it remains to be seen what will happen with his trial.  Suffice it to say that the initial evidence was deemed as so overhwelming against Bibi at the preliminary stages of these proceedings, that even his political allies refused to dismiss the charges against him.  Of course his new governing coalition may find other ways to end Bibi's trial but that won't really prove that the charges were ill conceived in the first place.  But getting back to Bibi's initial comments, he took the absolute weakest part of his legacy and buried it near the end of his book with a tone of dismissal and indignation, something that legal counsel might do with an argument for which they don't really have a great response.

One other thought I had was that Bibi says very little, throughout this book, of the compromises that he has had to make with the ultra-orthodox to remain in power.  Over Bibi's tenure as president, he has successively provided larger and larger amounts of money to the ultra-orthodox and has granted them with greater and greater power over a range of aspects of Israeli life.  

Although Bibi argues so passionately for the power of education and particularly scientific education, he has presided over the growth of an ever increasing number of religious institutions that refuse to teach basic secular subjects.  Although he argues for the Republican philosophy of "pulling yourself up by the bootstraps," working hard and saving your money, he has presided over a massive growth in the number of Haredi families that look to the state for their income and remain outside of the labour force.  And although he appeals to many aspects of secular culture, including literature and theatre, his deals with co-coalitionists have led to a gradual erosion in the number of public performances and presentations that include an equal gender balance and have led to ever increasing rifts with liberal Jewish communities inside and outside of Israel, including rifts with non-Orthodox Jewish communities which will surely be exacerbated under this new governing coalition.  

Bibi has very little to say about the divisiveness that he has created in Israeli society.  Although Israel has always been a country in which 2 people have 3 different opinions, the ascerbic nature of public discourse has increased exponentially, fuelled by some of Bibi's political campaigns.  He does take credit at points in his book for tactics used in this regard.

Ultimately, this book is well written, entertaining and filled with selected but interesting antecdotes.

But I have many doubts about its veracity and I have arguments with many of the different conclusions that Bibi draws.   I guess Bibi can take notes over the coming four years in preparation for adding a few more chapters.  I suppose that the jury is still out on his legacy.  Perhaps we will have a bit of a better picture when his political life finally comes to an end.



Thursday, September 8, 2022

September 2022: Political Comments, Wineries, Sports, Festivals and General Notes

I am a bit behind getting to my blog but I thought I would throw this one together to comment on a few different  issues.  Maybe I will put together one more just before Rosh Hashanah, which is quickly approaching.

Israeli Politics

Firstly, what  could one of my blogs be without at least some comments on Israeli politics?  As you might know, we have yet another election scheduled - for November 1, 2022.  Former Prime Minister Netanyahu is pulling out all the stops  trying to get himself back into power.  I would say it is going to be very close. According to a few different recent Israeli polls, here is an approximate estimate of where things stand in terms of projected seats by party (poll predictions):

Likud: (Party of Former Prime Minister Netanyahu):           31-33 seats

Yesh Atid (Party of current Interim Prime Minister Lapid):  22-24

National Unity (Party led by Benny Gantz):                         12-13

Shas (Ultra-Orthodox Mizrahi (eastern) Party:                        8-10

Labor (Left wing "workers" party, led by Merav Micaeli):     5

United Torah Judaism (Ultra-Orthodox Ashkanazi party):      7

Yisrael Beytenu (Led by Lieberman):                                        5-6

Religious Zionist Party (Ultra Nationlist - Smotrich/Ben Gvir)  10-13

Meretz (Far left, secularist party):                                            5

Joint List (Arab parties, largely anti-Zionist):                          5-6

Ra'am (Arab party, led by Monsour Abbas):                            4

So if we add all that up - by looking at who could  go with who, we get something like this:  

Netanyahu (Likud), together with the two ultra-Orthodox parties and the RZP is running at 56 to 63.  Obviously, if these parties could put together 63 seats, they would form a far-right wing, narrow government though it would probably be relatively stable for the next 2-3 years.  This would be a government of vengence in my view, which would immediately try to change the law in several areas, especially in the area of religious-secular issues in Israel, budgeting (especially for Orthodox and  Ultra-Orthodox groups) and extensive increased settlement building.  This type of government would try to "roll back" any changes that had been made over the past two years by the current government and would do everything it could to assist Netanyahu in getting out of his legal  problems.

If they fall short of 61, they will try to convince Ganz and his "National Unity" Party to join the government.  Given that Gantz's party could have 10-12 seats, it is definitely a possibility that this could happen though it is unclear who would go first as Prime Minister and what Netanyahu would have to promise Gantz to get him to join the government.  Nevertheless, I don't rule this out especially since Gantz has shown  in the past that he  is prepared to make deals with Netanyahu.  One  would assume that the inclusion of Gantz would moderate the government somewhat but it would still be a very right-leaning government.

On the other side of the ledger, Lapid's "bloc" is running at between 49 and 53, without Ra'am.  If we add back in Ra'am - that would get them to between 53 and 57, still not enough to form a government.  This group would need to make a deal with one or both of the Ultra-Orthodox parties, which seems quite unlikely.  It doesn't look like there are any other potential participants.

Given these numbers, it is possible that there will be another stalemate and that this might finally force Netanyahu to consider resigning from the leadership of the Likud party.  But I wouldn't bet on this.  Unless something dramatically changes, it looks like Israel is heading for some type of right wing government, either with the participation of Gantz's party  or without.  Lapid and his potential coalition partners would all need a big change in the  polling  numbers to be in a position to form a government.  As of right now, that seems unlikely.

I will watch the polls and see if anything interesting develops but with less than two months to go - this is where things seem to be headed.

Israeli TV and Sports

As you may know, the fourth season of Fauda is out and has been airing on Israeli TV, one episode at a time.  The grand finale will be next Wednesday, September 14, 2022.  After that, I understand it will be released worldwide on Netflix.  So if you are a Fauda fan, this season will surely keep you riveted to the screen.  "Fauda" means chaos in Arabic.  This show is definitely chaotic.  Violent, pressure-packed, intense and dramatic, it makes for some very compelling TV.  I would say that the the fourth season has been  one of the best though we are still waiting for the  culminating  episode.

The big news in Sports here in Israel is that the Maccabi Haifa soccer team made it into the European "Champions League."  That is a very big deal for European  and Israeli football (soccer) fans.   Next week, Paris St Germaine will be playing a home game in Haifa - which means that soccer superstar Lionel Messi, among others, will be arriving in Israel for a game.  This is really a huge sports event here and tickets are very hard to come by.  I have no plans to go in person but I will probably jump on the bandwagon and watch it on TV.  Expectations are not very high for Maccabi Haifa against such strong international competition.  But just being there is a big accomplishment for the Haifa squad.

As a Torontonion, on the other hand, I am very excited about the Toronto  Blue Jays this year, who have an excellent (though often inconsistent) baseball team.  When in Israel, this means watching games from 2 a.m. to 5 a.m. (or sometimes longer).  About 20 games left to go in the regular season and the Blue Jays are still in a playoff spot, so I may be keeping strange hours in the coming weeks.  Also quite excited about the Buffalo Bills, who play their season  opener tonight and the Toronto Maple Leafs, who begin the season in about a month.  All of this means keeping a semblance of Toronto hours, while here in Israel - not an easy feat.

A quick musical mention - a blast from the past - the "Counting Crows" are playing  in Ra'anana at the Ra'anana ampitheatre next week.  Not sure I will make it to that but it sounds like it could be fun.  I might go see Tamir Grinburg instead,  winner of last year's "Rising Star" competition on Israeli reality TV.

On my recent  trip back to Israel, on Air Canada, I watched a few Israeli movies on the plane.  Nothing too memorable, but it is worth mentioning that if you look for  these movies in the entertainment system, they are available.

Worthwhile Sight  Seeing Mentions

We  took a few trips  recently to places that we had been to in the past but seemed worth visiting again.  

Photo #3
In late July, we  arranged a tour of the Israeli Supreme Court.  This is a fascinating tour, filled with all kinds of interesting information on the details of the building itself, the history and  role  of the Israeli Supreme Court, and a chance to watch some live proceedings.  It can be arranged in English or  many other  languages - and it is free.  Obviously this is a sight of very high interest for lawyers from around the world, but I think many other people  would also enjoy visiting.

Last week, we  went for a tour of the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament  building.  This is also quite an interesting  tour, which takes about 1.5 hours.  It is free and  can be arranged in English, Hebrew or several other languages.  Like the tour of the Supreme  Court it includes quite a bit of information on the history of the Knesset, the building itself, the Israeli political system and other interesting tidbits.  We had a terrific guide and really enjoyed the tour.

I have included pictures  of the Chagall Art that adorns the Main Knesset entrance and reception hall area.  We spent a significant of time looking at and discussing  these photos.

While in the Knesset, we happen to see a number of current Knesset members wandering around.  One of them was Ayelet Shaked.  Several visitors were stopping her to ask for a picture.  We  didn't.  According to current  polls, Shaked and her  party are unlikely to make it to the Knesset this  time around but she  is still actively campaigning.
Photo #1 (on the  Left)

Photo #2 (Middle)


  





Summer in Israel also features several interesting events and  festivals.  On the liquid refreshment side of things, there are three that I would like to mention.

Each year, the Israeli Museum in Jerusalem holds an annual Wine festival.   It is an outdoor festival at the Israeli Museum grounds, with beautiful views of Jerusalem.  It is usually held in July or August, generally after Tisha B'Av.   There are about 30-40 wineries in attendance.  Guests pay a set admission (120 Shequels this year - or about $40  USD) and receive a wine  glass that they can take  home at the end of the evening.   Guests can then wander around and taste wines from any of  the  different  wineries.   No additional  charges for the wine, though some of the wineries run out of their better wines  early in the evening.  There are also food kiosks selling a wide range  of items - cheese plates, pizza, baked potatoes, sushi.  The festival also includes live music and there was a really fun band playing a wide range of music  - from classic 70s rock to 80s and 90s pop music - to current Israeli music.  On the day  we attended, the band even  played a medley of Jewish Hora music.  Lots of fun.  Our whole family attended and everyone  had a really fun time.  (As crazy as it sounds, everyone is now old enough to drink alcohol legally....)

Next week, there is a Coffee festival in Tel-Aviv, which promises to showcase  more than 50 different  coffee  vendors.  Not sure how much coffee I can drink in one evening - and how long I might have to stay up afterwards until all of that caffeine wears off.  But I suppose, getting back to my sports comments, if there is a baseball or football game to be watched after the event, it may not be so bad.

There is also a beer festival coming up with more than 50 breweries.  I'm not that much of a beer connaisseur but it might still be a fun event.

Israeli Wineries

Speaking of wine, we managed to visit a few wineries over the past few months.

One was "Harei Galil" - the Galil  Mountain Winery.  This winery is in northern Israel, very close  to the Syrian  border.  The winery sits atop a mountain and the visitor's centre provides a beautiful view.  The visitor centre staff were  very friendly.  We arranged a tasting  of six different wines, accompanied by a plate of cheeses, grapes, apricots, dates, olives, breads and other  goodies, all strictly Kosher and  all quite tasty.   The wine itself was nice though not compelling enough for us to load up  with purchases.  Galil is one of Israel's largest wineries, producing more than 1.2 million bottles  a year.  They have some  very nice  high end wines as well as some drinkable mid-range offerings.  It is a beautiful visitor's centre and well worth a stop

Nearby, we also stopped  at one of my favourites, the Dalton  Winery, which produces some delicious wine.  We arrived a bit late so we had a choice of standing  at the bar and tasting whatever they poured us for free - or sitting  down  and ordering a set tasting.  Since  we were running a bit late, we opted  for the bar tasting.  The staff were very friendly and  helpful and poured us a variety of  tastings.  Here we couldn't resist buying  a few bottles though the prices were not really any better than the prices in Israeli wine shops.

We also visited the Tulip Winery which is another  one  of our favourites.  The Tulip Winery invests in and supports a community of adults with special needs, many of whom also work at the winery.  For that reason alone, it is one of  my favourites to visit and support.  We  opted for a 6-7 wine tasting package which also came with a nice selection of fruit, cheeses, breads and other goodies.  Like at the other wineries, the staff were very helpful and friendly.  We sat outdoors on high bar chairs.  It was quite warm but they had fans set up so it was comfortable.  

I will also mention that we visited the Ella Valley  Winery which is much  closer to the  Jerusalem area - located in the Judean Hills.  The tasting here was somewhat  less organized.  We  were served some olives with our wine.  Most of the wines we tasted were not particularly good.  Our guide  was friendly and fun - but not very experienced or  knowledgeable.  We  weren't able to taste the higher  end wines.  Not sure  we will be running  back to this winery for a visit though I have had some Ella  wines that I have quite enjoyed  over the years.

Maybe I am saving the last for the best.  Not far from Ella is the Tzora Winery.  Tzora is more of a boutique winery, which primarily produces  blended wines.  But their wines are all outstanding.  The visitors' centre is beautiful.  We have been there a few times.  On  our most recent vist, we were able to taste 5 or 6 wines and were provided with a wonderful cheese, bread and olive oil platter.  Everyone we were with enjoyed all of the wines.  Of  all the Israeli wineries we have visited, from a taste and experience  point of view, this is definitely one  of the best.

There are somewhere around  300 wineries now in Israel, so this is only a very  small sampling.  We  have probably been to close  to 50 of them but  still a long  way to go.  For any guests who are planning to visit -  we are happy to try and get  to as many  of the  remaining 250 as possible,  although we have visited many of the really good ones so we may have to go back for seconds  to some of those places.

Random Closing Thoughts

With the approach of another Jewish  New Year, Rosh Hashanah,  in just a few weeks, I think I would say  by way of sizing things up that the "State of the Nation is Strong."  Okay, I know I have  stolen that phrase, but I think it is true.   Israel has all kinds  of challenges, including Religious-Secular tensions, serious external threats as well  as sporadic terrorist attacks, ever  increasing cost of living and a variety of other types of tension.  But Israeli recently ranked #9 on a World  Happiness Index, which is quite an accomplishment.  That put Israel higher than Canada or the United States (#16  and  18 respectively).

Sometimes, it can feel like living in a powder keg, not knowing  if hostilities will break out any moment with Gaza, with the Palestinians,  with Hezbollah or with some other party.   And things will  not  really be truly peaceful  here unless and until we  can reach some type of resolution with the Palestinians.  But  Israel has come quite far since its founding more than 74 years ago and certainly seems like  a more stable, prosperous, vibrant - and yes even peaceful place than it  was  in the first  40-50 years of its existence.  Hopefully  we  will soon  find a way to address some of these outstanding  issues and ensure long term peace and stability.

If I  don't  get a chance to write before the holidays, I wish everyone a happy and healthy New Year - Shana Tova u'Metukah.


Sunday, September 5, 2021

The Netanyahu Years by Ben Caspit: A review

 

Over the past week, I read Ben Caspit's book on former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, The Netanyhau Years.  It was a quick and interesting read, primarily covering the time period between 1999 and 2015.

Caspit is an Israeli journalist who writes for Ma'ariv, a slightly right of centre publication.  The book was translated by Ora Cummings.  I would say that the translation was quite choppy at times and probably needs a number of edits.

This is not a classic historian's biography with footnotes, references and details of sources.  Rather there are a great deal of unattributed quotes, anonymous sources and even references to "rumours" and "urban legends."   For  example, after Netanyahu was caught cheating on his current wife, Sara (his third wife), he and Sara lawyered up and reached an agreement on how they would continue their relationship.  According to some sources, there is a written agreement that spells out in detail how everything is supposed to work.  Caspit refers to the existence of the document as an "urban legend,"  though in this case, his assumption is that the document exists. No further sources or details are provided. 

I should also note that the book only covers the period up to the end of the Obama presidency.  There are a good few chapters to write about Netanyahu during the Trump years  and about  the developments with Netanyahu's criminal charges and about Netanyahu's political moves all since 2017, the time of the book's original publication in Hebrew.  

Overall, as someone who avidly follows politics and history, I enjoyed reading the book.  It was at times repetitive, and the organization was a bit disjointed.  Some of it was written chronologically and other parts were written thematically.  So the last two parts of the book include a section on Netanyahu's dealings with the Palestinians and his dealings with Iran.   Earlier, the book flows in a more chronological manner, covering a year or two at a time.  

Caspit covers some of Netanyahu's background growing up, his relationship with his parents, particularly his father, his move to Israel and the devastating  loss of his older  brother Yoni, who was killed in the Israeli raid on Entebbe.  He also covers some of the details of Netanyahu's relationships with his three wives and the impact that  each of these women had on his career, his circle of friends, his motivation and goals.  These parts of the book flowed well and provided quite a bit of interesting background information.

But the majority of the book deals with Netanyahu's relationship with political rivals and friends, at home and abroad and Netanyahu's decision making processes over the years.  Caspit  covers the relationships that Bibi built up with wealthy American and Israeli donors over the years, his close relationship to U.S. republican politicians and influencers, his battles with fellow Likud members over the years and Netanyahu's primary goal of remaining in power at all costs, which is, more or less, one of the themes of the book.

A great deal of Caspit's focus is lost opportunity.  He asserts that Netanyahu had so much popularity for  a period of time, that he could have advanced a joint Israeli-U.S. peace process  with the Palestinians that would have created a  period of medium to long term stablity for Israel vis-a-vis the Palestinians.  Caspit also lays a fair bit of blame at the feet of Abbas, the Palestinian leader, for the failure of the peace process, so it remains unclear how, even if Bibi had made certain decisions, Abbas would have agreed.  Caspit outlines several "secret" tracks of negotiation that were taking place - the Peres-Abbas track, which he maintains was very close to a deal, the "London Track" which was also close to a deal and some other secret initiatives.  On balance, however, his conclusion seems to be that Netanyahu could have made a deal if he had really wanted to do so.  I'm not sure that this is accurate.

Caspit also maintains that if Bibi had taken a different approach with then President Obama, Netanyahu could have partnered with the U.S. to negotiate a much better Iranian deal.   Caspit's thesis here seems  to be that the U.S. was not prepared to create any sort of realistic military option, either its own, or an Israeli option as an alternative to the negotiated nuclear deal with Iran, especially since Israel was not willing to show any flexibility on other policy issues, such as peace initiatives with the Palestinians.  Therefore, the  U.S. was ultimately negotiating from a position of weakness and gave in, unnecessarily, to several Iranian demands  that saw the deal allowing Iran to develop nuclear weapons over a period of 10 years.  Caspit partially blames Bibi for this, since, he asserts, that rather than working with Obama, Netanyahu decided to attack the President at  every opportunity, support the Republicans, even publicly, and make it a mission to try and prevent Obama from winning a second term.  This was obviously a failed strategy in Caspit's view.

That is not to say that Caspit  blames  Netanyahu entirely.  With respect to Obama's mideastern policy, I think it is fair to say that there is little here that is very complimentary of Obama  and his team.  From the beginning of his presidency, Obama sent a very hostile message to Israel by visiting Egypt and Jordan and skipping Israel.  This right away limited U.S. credibility for a country trying to broker a peace deal by being a partial guarantor of Israel's security.  After that, over the course of an 8 year period, there were several snubs, humiliations and questionable political  moves, going both ways. Caspit details many of them. 

With respect to Israel, Caspit has some harsh  words for several U.S. and Israeli diplomats and politicians, including George Mitchell, Hillary Clinton, Martin Indyk, Rahm Emanuel from the U.S. side, Ron  Dermer, Gideon Sa'ar, and a number of others from the Israeli side.  I think it is fair to say that some of his harshest criticism is reserved for Sara Netanyahu.  Given her guilty plea to state criminal charges, her record of scandals and flare ups, much of this may be warranted.  But Caspit spends a fair bit of time covering mistakes and misteps by many political actors, not just  Bibi, that caused such a deterioration in the Obama-Netanyahu relationship, the disintegration of the peace  process and other outcomes.   Overall, there is "lots of blame to go around" and some of Caspit's analysis seems, perhaps, intended to justify some of the positions that Netanyahu took to ward off antagonistic or mistaken policies and proposals advanced by the U.S. that were not in Israel's long term interest.  

Despite these efforts at "balance," Caspit is extremely critical of a number of Netanyahu's moves over the Obama years.  Netanyahu's decision to accept a speaking invitation at the Capitol at the behest of the congressional Republicans and to go ahead and make a presentation there without even informing President Obama in advance was unprecedented and a serious violation of diplomatic protocol.  Netanyahu's decision to announce new settlements just as then Vice-President Biden was arriving in Israel for a  key visit was also quite a poke in the eye.  And the fact that Netanyahu kept President Obama and/or Vice Biden waiting for very lengthy periods for a several meetings was another example of Netanyahu's conduct that  bolster Caspit's conclusion  that Netanyahu went out of his way, on several occasions to try and humiliate Obama and Biden in a manner that was highly unstatesmanlike at best, and thoroughly inappropriate.  

Caspit does a great deal of editorializing.  He tries to write about what Netanyahu must have been thinking, his political and personal calculations, his massive ego, his messianic complex and his enormous sense of self-entitlement.  Those who are supportive of Netanyahu might view much of this as overblown, unsupported and much conjecture.  But since the writing of the book, with political events that  have taken place in Israel since 2017, including developments in Netanyahu's criminal trial, it seems to me that a great deal of  what Caspit has to say is probably not so far off the mark.

Here is Caspit's ultimate conclusion, which is, more or less, the thesis of the book:

"Netanyahu's story  is one of miserably missed opportunity.  Ever since David Ben-Gurion...Israel has never had a leader with the kind of unlimited credit given to Netanyahu....he could have done anything he wanted...."

"As time went by, the real objective of the Netanyahu regime was molded: to remain in power.  He failed to block Iran, he destroyed the peace process, contributed to the growing delegitimizing of Israel in the world, and was forever striving to the right, in a never ending chase  after the mythical electoral "base" that will enable him to remain in power one more  term, another year, longer and  longer...."

"Netanyahu could have gone down in history as a leader who influenced the future of his people, who brought Israel to a new place and burst  through the cul-de-sac into which the Jewish state was forced in the seventh decade of its life.  Instead...he...left behind nothing at all."

Now that last part may be excessively harsh.  There will certainly be those who will argue that Israel's  economy is in a better state than it was  when Netanyahu took office, that foreign relations have improved, especially with peace treaties with some  of Israel's neighbours (although these came into effect after the  book was written) and that there were other successes.  But in other ways, the final four years of Netanyahu's premiership, after the book was written would bolster Caspit's thesis even further.

Between 2017 and 2021, it is quite arguable that Netanyahu's  sole objective was to stay in power and avoid his criminal proceedings.  He was responsible for bringing Israel to the polls on four consecutive occasions and refused to propose or pass a state budget for  more than 2 years.  Few legistlative initiatives were passed or even proposed, other than those that would somehow help or assist  Bibi with his  ongoing issues.  The pursuit of legislated immunity from criminal proceedings seemed to be Bibi's overriding objective, but despite his four attempts, he couldn't seem to muster the majority require to implement it.  By contrast, since  the current  government has taken power, there have been a rash of legislative initiatives in areas including public transportation, the environment,  agriculture and a host of other areas.  

Ultimately,  if and when Caspit decides to update the book and add in a few more chapters, there seems to be very little that has taken place in Israeli  politics that will cause Caspit to change his thesis very much, if at all.  In fact, as the Netanyahu criminal trial continues, and evidence continues to emerge about Netanyahu's involvement in a wide range of very questionable activities, Caspit will probably double down on his thesis.

I plan to read Anshel  Pfeffer's  book as well - Bibi - The Turbulent  Life and Times of Benjamin  Netanyahu.  I would be suprised if Pfeffer's ultimate conclusions are  very different  but  I'm sure it will bring a different perspective.  Stay tuned for my "compare and contrast" blog once I have read that book.   



Wednesday, September 16, 2020

The "Abraham Accords" - Are We Any Closer to Middle East Peace?"


We watched the signing of the "Abraham Accords" yesterday with interest.  It was a big deal for Israel.  After all, any time that Israel can sign peace treaties (okay, normalization treaties) with other Arab countries, that is bound to be a big deal.  The deal and the process have elicited some very polarized reactions so I thought it would be worthwhile to provide a  few comments about this  process.

First of all, I think it is fair to acknowledge that, however we got here, this type  of deal is a favourable and beneficial deal for most players in the region.  Although it may be characterized primarily  as an "arms deal" between the U.S. and the UAE wherein the U.S. will now sell F-35s and other weaponry to the UAE, there is more to it than that.  The UAE and Israel have begun to negotiate deals and arrangements in a wide range of areas including technology, medicine, energy, tourism and, yes, defence.  This type of relationship, if it proceeds, will lead to a much warmer peace than Israel has with Egypt or  Jordan.  If it takes root and develops, it may well lead to a very different Middle East.  Other countries may come along and the peace between Israel and Egypt may develop further.   Israelis may soon find  themselves  visiting more Arab  countries regularly and vice-versa and that is exciting.

At the signing ceremony yesterday, including the accompanying press conferences, President Trump stated that he expected "5 or 6 other countries" to come along very soon.  Apparently, after the press conference he upped this to "7 to 9."   Now, I don't really think, given the track record, that anyone has any great reason to believe very much of what this president promises.  Who knows what these other countries are demanding in the negotiations?   Or how far apart they really are?  Or whether any of these deals can really be closed?  But I will say this - if Israel were to be able to enter deals with 5 or 6 other countries - including some large and significant ones - that would have to be considered a huge step towards Middle East  peace and a brighter future for the whole region.  So far, the names I have heard mentioned include Oman, Sudan, Morocco, Lebanon, and, ultimately, Saudi Arabia.  It would certainly be a huge credit to Trump and Kushner if they were able to close most or all of these deals.

If the other countries do not fall into line as expected, yesterday's  deal may not amount to very much and  may not change much in the region.  Some indications from yesterday's proceedings support a pessimistic view about the  whole ordeal.   Neither Bahrain nor the UAE brought their heads of state.  Instead, each side brought their foreign ministers (secretaries of state, if you will).  For Israel, the Foreign Minister, Gabi Ashkenazi (part of the Blue and White wing of the governing coalition) was left at home and did not attend with Prime Minister Netanyahu.  In fact, press reports here indicate that he wasn't even aware of the contents of the deal.  Neither the Israeli cabinet nor the Israeli Knesset have yet voted to approve the deal and it is unclear that anyone, other than Netanyahu, is aware of its full contents.

Prime Minister Netanyahu and the representatives from the UAE and Bahrain all spoke glowingly about President Trump.  That seems to have been one of the  key terms of the deal.  In fact, Netanyahu did not even acknowledge the foreign representatives from the UAE and Bahrain until later in his speech.  He did  not speak about plans for Israel and the UAE.  One might have thought he could  have publicly invited the UAE and Bahrain leaders to visit Israel during this speech or he could have reviewed some of the hopes and aspirations that citizens of each country might have.  But instead, the focus was on Netanyahu himself as well as Trump.  It is a shame that Netanyahu seems so willing to go  along with turning Israel into a partisan issue in United States politics.  I am not convinced that this is a policy that is in Israel's interests  long term, especially if Trump should lose the  November election.

For their part, the representatives of the UAE and Bahrain also went along with the cue to lavish praise upon President Trump,  repeatedly.  All that was missing was  an official ring-kissing procession.   They both said little about Israel but called for peace across the Middle East.  The Bahraini representative called for a "just  resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian" conflict but really did not discuss what was so great about this particular deal for Bahrain and Israel respectively.  The ceremony, overall, had the feel of a campaign rally for Trump and Netanyahu rather than a key diplomatic event.

Critics of the deal and of the Trump-Kushner approach to the Middle East  have argued that Trump has titled U.S. policy towards Israel and has effectively taken positions that Bibi himself would have put forward.  In some cases, this  is fair comment.  the Trump administration has cut aid to the Palestinians, has recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital and has recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights.  The Trump administration has also put together a "Deal of the Century" proposal for peace between Israel and the Palestinians without Palestinian involvement.  And  yes, it is a fairly one-sided document.

That being said, the Trump-Kushner proposal, does call for an independent Palestinian State, something rejected  by Netanyahu,  his Likud party and the various parties to the right of Likud in the  Knesset.  It does not include all of the territory that the Palestinians would like and  it does  not include a right of return to Israel for the many Palestinian refugees.  But it does include territorial compromise by Israel and  it is a negotiable plan rather than the a bottom line.  It is unclear whether there would be any negotiations regarding Jerusalem.

It is true that  this approach tilts towards Israel.  But it has also true that previous plans including  the Arab League Plan and the Clinton plan tilted, almost  completely, to the  Palestinian side, especially the Arab League Plan which called for a Palestinian state on pre-1967 borders including  the Old City.  Even where Israeli leaders were willing to go along with a plan that included most of these terms (i.e. the Clinton plan in 2000) that was not acceptable to the Palestinians.  I  do think that a Clinton-type plan left the station shortly after Arafat rejected it.  Especially after political changes in Israel that were probably linked, to some extent, to the rejectionist approach of the Palestinians at the time.

For years the surrounding Arab countries have  been willing to support Palestinian intransigence by characterizing Israel as the main enemy and  threat in the  region and refusing to enter into peace and  normalization deals with Israel - for fear of having been viewed as  betraying the Palestinian cause.  But over the course of the past 53 years since the 1967 war and 72 years since the establishment of the State of Israel, this has been a failing policy.  It has led to  a great deal of war and violence, terrorism, perennial refugee camps and has helped bolster dictatorial regimes in the region who have  used the Palestinian cause to suppress their own populations and  downplay  other criticism about how their countries are run.  And it really hasn't brought the Palestinians any closer to their own state.

The current approach led by Trump and  Kushner marks a  significant departure from this failed policy.  On the  one hand, the U.S. has tilted towards Israel in some areas, much to the chagrin of the EU, the "progressive wing" of the Democratic Party, Turkey, Iran and some other countries.  On the other hand, the goal of the policy seems to be to  bring in other Arab nations, to become friends and allies of Israel - but also to help work towards a resolution of the Israel-Palestinian conflict in a way that is more realistic. 

It is noteworthy that Netanyahu has called the deals with the UAE and Bahrain "deals from strength" that trade "peace for peace" rather than "land for peace."  But Netanyahu is being disingenuous.  As  part of these deals, Israel has agreed to refrain from unilaterally annexing any of the disputed territories and has also agreed not to oppose a U.S. decision to sell the UAE F-35s.   

The Crown Prince of the UAE states that he believed that the UAE could be in a much better position to assist with the Israeli -Palestinian conflict if it were viewed with some measure of trust and  friendship by Israel.  The UAE and Israel have taken steps  to build that relationship since as early as 2010.  But this does mark  a new  phase - and concurrently, a potentially new level of influence for the UAE in its dealings with Israel.  By including a requirement that  Israel abandon any proposal  to unilaterally annex land, some of which is earmarked for a future Palestinian state, the UAE has signified that it will take an active role in trying to bring about a resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

That brings us to the current situation.  There are really a few very different routes that  this process may now take.

If Trump and Kushner are correct that this process has the potential to bring about a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians - I believe that Saudi Arabia would be the key turning point.  Saudi Arabia may well have the clout to insist that it will only sign a full peace deal with Israel if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is resolved.  

In this scenario, a proposal or  plan may be developed that is somewhere between the Trump-Kushner plan and the Clinton Plan.  It would result in the formation of a Palestinian State and a full resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian  conflict.  The problem is that it may not be acceptable, initially, to the Palestinians or even the Israelis.  But here the hope would be that the combination of the support  of a large number of other Arab countries, financial, economic and other  assistance for the Palestinians would leave the Palestinians with no other real alternatives.

On the other side of the equation, Netanyahu has actively campaigned against the creation of a Palestinian state and has suggested that he opposes this part of the Trump-Kushner plan.  He stated this repeatedly during the last Israeli election campaign.  But at some  point, if pushed by Trump and  Kushner - and with the possibility of having  diplomatic relations, even  warm ones, with a large number of countries in the Middle East, Israel may also have no other real alternative but to accept the deal.

On the other hand, no matter what Trump, Kushner or Netanyahu do, there will continue to be rejectionists in the Middle East.   Iran, Turkey, Qatar, Hezbollah and Hamas have all registered their strong opposition to this approach and the Palestinian Authority has called the UAE and Bahrain "back stabbers."  If the other Middle Eastern countries will not go along with the  Trump-Kushner approach and if the PA decides to  turn to violence as its response (as it has many times in the past), an Israeli-Palestinian deal may be as far off as it has ever been.

If, in November, Trump is re-elected, he may decide to pressure Israel to accept a plan that he can sell to the other Arab countries - and ultimately try to use those countries to get the Palestinians to agree  as well.  There are a lot of "ifs"  here and Trump is very unpredictable.  And, of course, there is a still a good chance that he will not be re-elected.

If Biden is elected, he will have a difficult decision to make.  If he takes the Obama approach to the Middle East, that would mean trying to open up negotiations with Iran immediately, restoring funding to the Palestinians unconditionally and cooling the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and  others.  This may effectively end the current track of pushing for peace deals between Israel and neighbouring countries as a first step  towards peace.

But if  Biden is elected and  he can be convinced that some genuine progress has been made  - and the U.S. is close to brokering a peace deal between Saudi Arabia and  Israel (that also involves an Israel-Palestinian deal), Biden might even continue a version of this path.  He  will almost certainly restore funding to the Palestinians either way and try to re-open dialogue with the PA.  But he might not tilt U.S. policy back to where it was under Obama.

Overall, I think this is all a great opportunity for Israel.  The Palestinians rejected the Clinton plan in 2000 and lost what was probably the best proposal they might ever get from Israel.  They probably regret having done so even if they will not publicly admit it.  At this juncture, if Israel could reach a deal with the Palestinians, along the  lines of what has been proposed by Trump and  Kushner, it would probably be about the best deal Israel could hope to get even if the final deal involves additional Israeli concessions.  If it is a deal that would also involve full peace deals with most of the  surrounding Arab countries, it would be an opportunity that Israel would probably not want to pass up.  

While President Obama and Netanyahu had a great deal of public  quarrels, the U.S.-Israel relationship remained very strong throughout  Obama's presidency.  This was the case despite some of the steps taken by Obama over the course of his presidency, especially his support for anti-Israel UN resolutions at the very end of his second term and the dispute with Israel over the wisdom of the Iranian nuclear deal.  But at the same time, throughout the  Obama presidency, the U.S. continued to cooperate with Israel fully in  a wide range of technological, military, economic and  other areas despite the often successful efforts of Netanyahu to portray the situation otherwise.  President Obama did not take any significant steps to try and impose a deal on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

If Biden is elected, he may well look at all aspects of the Obama-Netanyahu relationship and find a way to do things a bit differently.  He  may want to restore the public perception of the U.S.-Israel relationship as one that is non-partisan even while repairing the U.S. relationship with the Palestinians.  He will have a challenging  time with Netanyahu in this regard but if the ultimate result is comprehensive peace between Israel and the Palestinians with most other Arab countries in agreement - it may make sense to continue a version of the Trump-Kushner approach even if a Biden vision is viewed as being a bit more balanced.  








Wednesday, March 9, 2016

Latest Terrorist Attacks in Israel and Pew Study Link

We have been enjoying some unseasonably warm weather in Israel while dealing with a spate of Palestinian terror attacks.

Yonatan Azarihab, who was stabbed in a terror attack in Petah Tikvah on March 8, 2016, speaks from the hospital (Channel 2 screenshot)
Yonatan Azarihab
Yesterday, as U.S. Vice President Joe Biden was visiting Israel, Israelis fought back three different terrorist attacks in three different areas.  One attack occurred in Petah Tikvah.  The victim, Yonatan Azarihab, was stabbed several times in the shoulder and neck by a Palestinian attacker.  Though seriously injured, Azarihab pulled the knife out of his shoulder and used the knife to fight off the attacker.  The attacker, a 20 year old Palestinian, died of his wounds.  Azarihab is being treated at an Israeli hospital.


In another attack in Jaffa, a 21 year old Palestinian man ran down a a beach promenade stabbing several people in his path.  He injured twelve people and killed one.  Six of the injured were hospitalized, at least one of whom is in critical condition.  A local busker sprang to action by using his guitar to hit the attacker and slow him down before police arrived on the scene and shot the attacker.  The attacker killed an American student, Taylor Force, a U.S. military veteran, who was visiting Israel.  The Fatah website, which represents one of the strongest factions of the Palestinian authority, praised the attack as the work of a "martyr."

In a third attack, a Palestinian on a motorcycle opened fire on a police vehicle near the Damascus Gate in Jerusalem.  One officer was killed in the attack and a second was seriously injured.  Police eventually caught up to the terrorist and killed him.

The current wave of attacks has been ongoing since September 2015.  Hundreds of Palestinians have attacked Israelis across Israel. Although many of the attacks have been knife attacks, there have also been shootings, car attacks (where the attacker purposely drives into a group of civilians) and other incidents.  Many of the attackers have been killed by nearby bystanders, police forces or others arriving at the scene to fight off the attacks.

The attacks have generally not been condemned by the Palestinian leadership or even by Israeli Arab Knesset members.  Many of the attacks have been celebrated and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas has praised several of the attackers as "Martyrs."

One has to wonder about the end game for the Palestinians.  If they are of the view that the use of this type of violence will push Israel to make significant peace concessions, that would seem to be a mistaken assumption.  If anything, the Israeli political landscape has been shifting to the right as a result of these attacks.

A Pew Research Center study released this week reported that close to 50% of Israelis would now support a policy of transferring Israeli Arabs out of Israel.  To where?   Well maybe that is a corollary of the Palestinian position that the Palestinian state as part of a "two-state solution" should be emptied of its Jews.  If a "two-state solution" means that each people gets its own state, many interesting questions arise.  If each state has a minority of the other state's people - and provides full rights for that minority (as Israel now does for the Palestinian population), then it seems doubtful that many Israelis would push too hard for the expulsion or transfer from Israel of the Palestinians to the nascent Palestinian state.

But if it is a negotiated condition of a two state solution that Israel uproot any Jewish communities in the territory earmarked for the new Palestinian state and provide the Palestinian state with territory completely free of any Jewish residents, it is understandable that many would view the corollary to be a logical extension of the same premise. 

This is the position taken by Israeli Knesset Member Avigdor Lieberman of the "Yisrael Beitenu" party, which is currently not part of the governing coalition.  Lieberman would argue that this is what President Obama has referred to as "land swaps" where Israel would trade areas within Israel that have primarily Arab populations for areas of the West Bank that have primarily Jewish populations.

Funny enough, the Palestinian Authority view is that Israel should empty the West Bank of Jews as part of a territorial compromise and agree to accept Palestinian refugees into Israel itself rather than their new proposed homeland.  Obviously this makes no sense at all.  The whole purpose of a "two-state solution" would be that the Palestinians could resolve, completely, the issue of refugees within the borders of their new state.  Netanyahu and Lieberman have been criticized for taking this position as racist and intransigent.  But it is neither to accept that a two state solution means two states for two peoples.

Some 50% of Israelis apparently reject the premise of a "transfer," according to the study.  After all, Israeli Arabs comprise some 20% of Israel's population and are involved in all facets of Israeli life.  It is probably also incorrect to interpret the poll result as suggesting that Israelis who claimed to support a transfer would want to deport Arab Israeli citizens, proactively, outside of some type of political deal that created two ethnic nation states with a negotiated population exchange mechanism.

But this latest round of violence has impacted Israeli opinion. As the number of terrorist incidents on civilians within Israel continues to increase, Israeli attitudes towards Palestinians, Israeli and non-Israeli, continue to change for the worse.

Perhaps Palestinian leader Abbas figures that this is the way to force Israel into a deal and to gain international support.  But it seems to me that the current round of Palestinian violence has pushed things in the opposite direction. 


Thursday, March 19, 2015

Israel Elections 2015: A Few More Interesting Points

I have written a number of columns over the past few days.  Well, I have to say that there are few things more interesting than a closely contested national election.  If you are one of those people reading this column, there is a good chance that you agree.

So I thought I would put together a few interesting points about the results and the aftermath.  This information is available on YNet, Haaretz and some other news sources - but I have selected a few points that I found notable.

Results By City

I have provided a link to the YNet map of results by Israeli city (and even neighbourhood).  It is in Hebrew but if you have a map of Israel handy, it should be easy enough to decipher.

As with elections in many other democratic countries, voters in large cities tend to vote for more liberal parties.  There are some exceptions, of course, (like if the city happens to be a religious capital) but, not surprisingly, this can be seen to some extent in the Israeli electorate.  So in Tel-Aviv, the Zionist Camp picked up 34% of the vote, followed by 19% for Likud and 13% for Meretz.  In Haifa, the Zionist Camp won 25% of the vote, followed by 20% for Likud and 11% for Yesh Atid.  On the other hand, 24% of Jerusalem voters chose Likud while 21% voted for the Ultra-Religious Degel HaTorah party.  Another 10% of Jerusalem voters picked Shas.

Outside of those three cities, Likud fared quite well in cities of the next tier in size.  Likud wins included Rehovot (27%), Ashdod (27%), Ashkelon (40%) and Tiberias (45%).

Closer to home, 33% of Ra'anana voters cast their ballots for the Zionist Camp while Likud (21%) and Yesh Atid (14%) finished second and third respectively.

Then there is "home away from home"... in Kiryat Eqron, 45% of the population voted for Likud with another 14% voting for Kulanu.  But just down the street from Kiryat Eqron, 32% of voters in the town of Mazkeret Batya chose the Zionist Camp.  

As in any country, the results show that Israel is very divided geographically.  It is beyond the scope of this short blog to discuss the various socioeconomic factors for each area, but there are obviously a wide range of significant differences between the various geographic locations and their populations.

How Many Israelis Does it Take to Win a Knesset Seat?

Official Israeli election results show that 72.3% of eligible voters voted.  All "eligible voters" are automatically registered.  So whereas in some countries, the percentage of voters is reported as the percentage of registered voters who voted, that is not an issue in Israel.  There were 5,878,000 eligible voters in Israel.  4,253,000 of them cast ballots.  43,800 voters spoiled their ballots.

This means that each Knesset seat was worth 33,482 votes.  However, with a 3.5% threshold, a party needed 136,808 votes to make it in to the Knesset.

In case you were wondering, the Green Leaf party picked up 38,264 votes.  Under the old Israeli rules in which the threshold was 1%, Israel would have elected one Green Leaf party member - who could have sat in the Knesset and put forward bills (probably rolled up) sponsoring the legalization of cannabis.  Unfortunately for those voters, it does not look like Israel is about to become the Netherlands anytime soon.  That being said, I am quite sure that there are many places across the country where finding access to cannabis is not extremely difficult.  Worst case, Israelis can take advantage of the El Al seat sale and fly to Amsterdam or they can go a bit further and visit Colorado or Washington State for some drug tourism...

Quickest Revoked Resignation

Meretz chair Zehava Galon resigned on Wednesday after it was reported that her party had only won 4 seats.  After some absentee ballots were counted, Meretz increased its presence to 5 seats.  Galon decided to retract her resignation and stay on with the party.  She noted that many of the absentee ballots were cast by soldiers and she would not want to let Israeli soldiers down after receiving their support.  Continuing to earn an MK salary may also be a factor but she didn't mention that.

Quickest Orwellian Retraction of a Campaign Statement

As the election campaigning was drawing to a conclusion and Netanyahu was worried about the possibility of losing, he decided to try and shore up his right wing base by announcing the he was retracting his support for a two-state solution with the Palestinians.  I'm reasonably sure that this was what he said...and it was picked up everywhere as a "game changer."  Maybe we were all hallucinating?  (Thinking about the Green Leaf party winning a seat...)

After the election, U.S. President Obama promptly suggested that if Israel would not support a two state solution - the U.S. might end its policy of blocking U.N. resolutions that impose a two state solution.

Surprise, surprise - Prime Minister Netanyahu promptly announced on NBC that he was in favour of a "peaceful, two state solution" and he had not really said what was attributed to him (or something like that) - or had not really meant what he had said...  Okay well, we know now that Prime Minister Netanyahu cannot be confused with Horton ("I said what I meant and I meant what I said...a politician is faithful...100%...) (See Dr. Seuss if you missed the reference...).  Naftali Bennett on the other hand, insisted that he would not negotiate to give up even one centimetre of land.

Now this, of course, all raises several interesting questions.

For one thing, given that Netanyahu used this statement to shore up his base and siphon votes from the more right wing Bayit Hayehudi party, how is it that his voters will accept this prompt about face?  More importantly, which members of his right wing coalition will agree to negotiations for a two state solution after he campaigned by swearing it would not happen under his watch?  Will Bennett also retroactively change his words?  That seems unlikely.

While this Netanyahu about-face is certainly a positive development (albeit a small one) for those in the centre or on the left hoping that somehow there will be a negotiated solution with the Palestinians - it is unclear how Prime Minister Netanyahu could possibly negotiate one unless he assembles a national unity government with the Zionist Camp or includes some centrist or left-leaning parties in his coalition.  I don't see how this can happen given the statements he made while campaigning.   He would face a mutiny in his party.

It is much more likely that there will be another election before Netanyahu takes any real steps towards a peace deal with the Palestinians.

So that is my wrap up for now.  I'll take a break for while on election postings and write again about this issue once some type of coalition starts to take shape.