Showing posts with label Benjamin Netanyahu. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Benjamin Netanyahu. Show all posts

Tuesday, November 1, 2022

Big Win for Netanyahu in Israeli Elections 2022 - Apparently

We are still waiting for the actual final results in the 2022 Israeli elections.  But at this point, it appears that former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has won a resounding victory and will be able to form a government with somewhere between 62 and 64 seats in the Knesset of 120 seats.

According to exit polls as well as the real time results that are still pouring in, Netanyahu's Likud party has captured approximately 30 seats or 25% of the eligible vote.  The  number of seats for the Likud is not at an all-time high - but it is the results of  Netanyahu's intended coalition partners that will put him in the driver's seat.

The election appears to have been a major victory for the Religious Zionist ("RZ") party, led by Betzalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir.  This is a far-right party that includes members who were Kahane party members in the past.  At the press conference that Ben-Gvir held earlier this evening, members were chanting "death to terrorists," referring to one of Ben-Gvir's demands that Israel institute capital punishment for terrrorists.  I was listening - and could have sworn I heard the crowd chanting "death to the Arabs" but I will give the crowd the benefit of the doubt and go with the reported chant.  The RZ party seems to be headed for 14-16 seats, a huge number for a party that has never come close to these numbers.   And a frightening number for those who prefer governments without fascist parties.

Another of Netanyahu's partners is the Shas party, the ultra-religious Sephardi party, which is being reported as winning 10 seats.  Shas has been running at 7-8  seats over the past few elections  so this is a reasonably significant improvement for them.  The other ultra-religious party - "United Torah Judaism" is being reported as winning 8 seats.

If we add up these numbers, we arrive at between 61 and 63 seats for Netanyahu and his bloc.  

Netanyahu will not have an easy time responding to the various demands for cabinet posts, huge budgets and and laundry lists  of action items from these three extreme parties.  He will also need to satisfy his own Likud members by showering them with cabinet posts.  I expect that there will be a huge cabinet - with close to 30 members if not more.

Yair Lapid's party, to this point, is registering 23 seats, which is a disappointing result for a party that was hoping to lead the government.  Some people  had expected that Yesh Atid could get up to 27-28 seats, which would have provided the party with a real opportunity to form a government.  If Yesh Atid winds up on the opposition benches for the next four years,  it will need to consider holding party primaries and acting more like a political party than a one-person show.

Benjamin Gantz's party, the National Camp, is running at about 10 seats, which is very low for a party that ran with the slogans "Only  Gantz can do it" and "After Him" (or "Follow Him").   This party is certainly disappointed with their apparent showing.

If the curent results hold up, the other "bloc" members that had worked with Yesh Atid including Labour (5), Meretz (4), and Ra'am (5) will come in at close to the predicted numbers from advance polls.  Lieberman's party is currently running at 5 seats, which is a bit lower than expected.

But overall, no matter how you slice these numbers, Lapid's best case  scenario so far is 52-53 seats.  There just does not seem to be a path to 61, even if some of the results change.

The voting turnout for this election, the fifth election in about three and a half years, was just over 80% of eligible votes, which is quite high for a western democracy these days and Israel's highest turnout since 1999.

One of the big reasons for the current state of affairs is the results among the Israeli Arab population.  In the past several elections, there were three Arab parties running together - Hadash, Ta'al and Bal'ad  These are generally anti-Zionist parties - who have in the past reached numbers as high as 15-16 seats.  Leading up to this election, Hadash and Ta'al began to discuss the possibility of cooperating with a Zionist government.  The most extreme party of the three - Bal'ad - broke off from the coaltion as the prospect of cooperating in any way with a Zionist government was unacceptable.  

Following that break-up - the Hadash-Ta'al coalition of two Arab parties is in line to obtain 5 seats.  But Bal'ad is apparently likely to finish below the required cut-off perentage of 3.25%, which would leave the party outside of the Knesset.  This means that the total Arab representation in the Knesset would only be 5 seats from Hadash-Ta'al and 5 seats from Ra'am.  Ra'am is a party that entered into a coalition agreement in the most recent government.  Hadash-Ta'al and Bal'ad are both groups that generally have no interest in cooperating with a sitting Israeli Zionist government.

According to some reports, Bal'ad is polling at more than 3.1%.  If it gets to 3.25%, it would suddenly pick up 4 seats - and 2 of those seats reportedly could come from the right wing bloc.  In other words, there is a still a chance between now and the end of the week that Bibi's bloc could  be reduced to 60 seats, which would mean a stalemate.   However, the way things are trending at this point, that does not seem likely.

Assuming that these results hold up, this will be the furthest right-wing government that Israel has ever had.  The Shas party has been a government partner several times.  They will insist on increased funding for yeshivas, prefential housing arrangements for yeshiva students  and their families, an end to any discussion of mandatory enlistment to the army for ultra-religious men, and an end to any discussed requirements of forcing the ultra-religious to study secular subjects in their schools and institutions.  They will also ask for huge budgets for their party and their constituency - all  to be overseen by  their leader Aryah Deri, a convicted fraudster.  He previously spent years in prison for bribery and corruption while serving as the Minister of the Interior.  But he made a comeback years later, was re-elected as leader of the Shas party and now has 10 seats or more.

The United Torah Judaism party will make similar demands to those of Shas - though for their constituency.  They  will seek greater power for the rabbinate and will launch ongoing attacks on gender equality as they have in the past.  They strongly oppose LGBTQ rights, gender equality, science (generally) and secular law.  Having sat in the opposition for the past year and half, they are hungry to make up for the lost time and will present Netanyahu with quite a large list of demands.

The largest coalition partner for Netanyahu, the RZ party, has never played  such an active role in the government.  The RZ party has proposed  removing the  offences of corruption and public breach of trust from the criminal code, which would  effectively end Netanyahu's trial.  They seek to appoint a majority  of right wing judges to the courts, to "untie the hands" of soldiers and  police in dealing with Palestinian  and Arab violence and they aim to expend the settlements, provide greater protection for settlers in Judea and Samaria (the "west bank") and take a much harder line towards the Palestinians and Palestinian terrorism and attacks.  Some of the demands of the RZ may conflict with the two ultra-religious parties  since the RZ members do believe in studying secular subjects, they work, serve in the army and pay taxes (unlike many of the ultra-Orthodox).  They have called for the institution of  capital punishment for terrorists, the expulsion of "non-loyal" Palestinians from the country and a range of other far-right policies.

Netanyahu is certainly aware that Israel would face a major international backlash if it were to  implement some  of these policies.  At the same time, he has promised to support these parties as part of his election campaign.  In his speech tonight, he called for the restoration of  "Israeli pride" and claimed that Israel needs to show the world that it is strong and not weak.  Perhaps his partners will insist, for example, on a military attack on the Iranian nuclear program.

If Netanyahu were to implement much or all of this agenda, as demanded by his three coalition partners, the country would start to look like Turkey or even Iran.  Netanyahu is not necessarily interested in going that far and some of his fellow Likud members are also likely to resist some of this agenda.  But it is a rather motley group.  Israelis in the centre  and on the left are not getting a warm and fuzzy feeling thinking about what lies ahead.

If the results hold up and Netanyahu can enter coalition agreements with these three partners, he is likely to have a reasonably stable government for the next 3-4 years, even if it is one that generates lots of negative publicity and makes some very unpopular decisions.  I hope that saner heads will prevail and  that the government will act in a reasonably measured fashion.  if it does not, we may see a tech "brain drain" and enormous damage to the Israeli economy and world image.  

Some are still hoping that, somehow, overnight, the numbers will magically change.  As the  evening progresses, this seems to be less and less likely.  It is far more likely that in the coming weeks, we will see the reinstallation of Prime Minister Netanyahu - a reincarnation that seems likely to  seek vindication, vengance and most importantly, historical rehabilitation.  

I wish Medinat Yisrael (the State of Israel) and Am Yisrael (the people of Israel) the best of luck.





Sunday, September 5, 2021

The Netanyahu Years by Ben Caspit: A review

 

Over the past week, I read Ben Caspit's book on former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, The Netanyhau Years.  It was a quick and interesting read, primarily covering the time period between 1999 and 2015.

Caspit is an Israeli journalist who writes for Ma'ariv, a slightly right of centre publication.  The book was translated by Ora Cummings.  I would say that the translation was quite choppy at times and probably needs a number of edits.

This is not a classic historian's biography with footnotes, references and details of sources.  Rather there are a great deal of unattributed quotes, anonymous sources and even references to "rumours" and "urban legends."   For  example, after Netanyahu was caught cheating on his current wife, Sara (his third wife), he and Sara lawyered up and reached an agreement on how they would continue their relationship.  According to some sources, there is a written agreement that spells out in detail how everything is supposed to work.  Caspit refers to the existence of the document as an "urban legend,"  though in this case, his assumption is that the document exists. No further sources or details are provided. 

I should also note that the book only covers the period up to the end of the Obama presidency.  There are a good few chapters to write about Netanyahu during the Trump years  and about  the developments with Netanyahu's criminal charges and about Netanyahu's political moves all since 2017, the time of the book's original publication in Hebrew.  

Overall, as someone who avidly follows politics and history, I enjoyed reading the book.  It was at times repetitive, and the organization was a bit disjointed.  Some of it was written chronologically and other parts were written thematically.  So the last two parts of the book include a section on Netanyahu's dealings with the Palestinians and his dealings with Iran.   Earlier, the book flows in a more chronological manner, covering a year or two at a time.  

Caspit covers some of Netanyahu's background growing up, his relationship with his parents, particularly his father, his move to Israel and the devastating  loss of his older  brother Yoni, who was killed in the Israeli raid on Entebbe.  He also covers some of the details of Netanyahu's relationships with his three wives and the impact that  each of these women had on his career, his circle of friends, his motivation and goals.  These parts of the book flowed well and provided quite a bit of interesting background information.

But the majority of the book deals with Netanyahu's relationship with political rivals and friends, at home and abroad and Netanyahu's decision making processes over the years.  Caspit  covers the relationships that Bibi built up with wealthy American and Israeli donors over the years, his close relationship to U.S. republican politicians and influencers, his battles with fellow Likud members over the years and Netanyahu's primary goal of remaining in power at all costs, which is, more or less, one of the themes of the book.

A great deal of Caspit's focus is lost opportunity.  He asserts that Netanyahu had so much popularity for  a period of time, that he could have advanced a joint Israeli-U.S. peace process  with the Palestinians that would have created a  period of medium to long term stablity for Israel vis-a-vis the Palestinians.  Caspit also lays a fair bit of blame at the feet of Abbas, the Palestinian leader, for the failure of the peace process, so it remains unclear how, even if Bibi had made certain decisions, Abbas would have agreed.  Caspit outlines several "secret" tracks of negotiation that were taking place - the Peres-Abbas track, which he maintains was very close to a deal, the "London Track" which was also close to a deal and some other secret initiatives.  On balance, however, his conclusion seems to be that Netanyahu could have made a deal if he had really wanted to do so.  I'm not sure that this is accurate.

Caspit also maintains that if Bibi had taken a different approach with then President Obama, Netanyahu could have partnered with the U.S. to negotiate a much better Iranian deal.   Caspit's thesis here seems  to be that the U.S. was not prepared to create any sort of realistic military option, either its own, or an Israeli option as an alternative to the negotiated nuclear deal with Iran, especially since Israel was not willing to show any flexibility on other policy issues, such as peace initiatives with the Palestinians.  Therefore, the  U.S. was ultimately negotiating from a position of weakness and gave in, unnecessarily, to several Iranian demands  that saw the deal allowing Iran to develop nuclear weapons over a period of 10 years.  Caspit partially blames Bibi for this, since, he asserts, that rather than working with Obama, Netanyahu decided to attack the President at  every opportunity, support the Republicans, even publicly, and make it a mission to try and prevent Obama from winning a second term.  This was obviously a failed strategy in Caspit's view.

That is not to say that Caspit  blames  Netanyahu entirely.  With respect to Obama's mideastern policy, I think it is fair to say that there is little here that is very complimentary of Obama  and his team.  From the beginning of his presidency, Obama sent a very hostile message to Israel by visiting Egypt and Jordan and skipping Israel.  This right away limited U.S. credibility for a country trying to broker a peace deal by being a partial guarantor of Israel's security.  After that, over the course of an 8 year period, there were several snubs, humiliations and questionable political  moves, going both ways. Caspit details many of them. 

With respect to Israel, Caspit has some harsh  words for several U.S. and Israeli diplomats and politicians, including George Mitchell, Hillary Clinton, Martin Indyk, Rahm Emanuel from the U.S. side, Ron  Dermer, Gideon Sa'ar, and a number of others from the Israeli side.  I think it is fair to say that some of his harshest criticism is reserved for Sara Netanyahu.  Given her guilty plea to state criminal charges, her record of scandals and flare ups, much of this may be warranted.  But Caspit spends a fair bit of time covering mistakes and misteps by many political actors, not just  Bibi, that caused such a deterioration in the Obama-Netanyahu relationship, the disintegration of the peace  process and other outcomes.   Overall, there is "lots of blame to go around" and some of Caspit's analysis seems, perhaps, intended to justify some of the positions that Netanyahu took to ward off antagonistic or mistaken policies and proposals advanced by the U.S. that were not in Israel's long term interest.  

Despite these efforts at "balance," Caspit is extremely critical of a number of Netanyahu's moves over the Obama years.  Netanyahu's decision to accept a speaking invitation at the Capitol at the behest of the congressional Republicans and to go ahead and make a presentation there without even informing President Obama in advance was unprecedented and a serious violation of diplomatic protocol.  Netanyahu's decision to announce new settlements just as then Vice-President Biden was arriving in Israel for a  key visit was also quite a poke in the eye.  And the fact that Netanyahu kept President Obama and/or Vice Biden waiting for very lengthy periods for a several meetings was another example of Netanyahu's conduct that  bolster Caspit's conclusion  that Netanyahu went out of his way, on several occasions to try and humiliate Obama and Biden in a manner that was highly unstatesmanlike at best, and thoroughly inappropriate.  

Caspit does a great deal of editorializing.  He tries to write about what Netanyahu must have been thinking, his political and personal calculations, his massive ego, his messianic complex and his enormous sense of self-entitlement.  Those who are supportive of Netanyahu might view much of this as overblown, unsupported and much conjecture.  But since the writing of the book, with political events that  have taken place in Israel since 2017, including developments in Netanyahu's criminal trial, it seems to me that a great deal of  what Caspit has to say is probably not so far off the mark.

Here is Caspit's ultimate conclusion, which is, more or less, the thesis of the book:

"Netanyahu's story  is one of miserably missed opportunity.  Ever since David Ben-Gurion...Israel has never had a leader with the kind of unlimited credit given to Netanyahu....he could have done anything he wanted...."

"As time went by, the real objective of the Netanyahu regime was molded: to remain in power.  He failed to block Iran, he destroyed the peace process, contributed to the growing delegitimizing of Israel in the world, and was forever striving to the right, in a never ending chase  after the mythical electoral "base" that will enable him to remain in power one more  term, another year, longer and  longer...."

"Netanyahu could have gone down in history as a leader who influenced the future of his people, who brought Israel to a new place and burst  through the cul-de-sac into which the Jewish state was forced in the seventh decade of its life.  Instead...he...left behind nothing at all."

Now that last part may be excessively harsh.  There will certainly be those who will argue that Israel's  economy is in a better state than it was  when Netanyahu took office, that foreign relations have improved, especially with peace treaties with some  of Israel's neighbours (although these came into effect after the  book was written) and that there were other successes.  But in other ways, the final four years of Netanyahu's premiership, after the book was written would bolster Caspit's thesis even further.

Between 2017 and 2021, it is quite arguable that Netanyahu's  sole objective was to stay in power and avoid his criminal proceedings.  He was responsible for bringing Israel to the polls on four consecutive occasions and refused to propose or pass a state budget for  more than 2 years.  Few legistlative initiatives were passed or even proposed, other than those that would somehow help or assist  Bibi with his  ongoing issues.  The pursuit of legislated immunity from criminal proceedings seemed to be Bibi's overriding objective, but despite his four attempts, he couldn't seem to muster the majority require to implement it.  By contrast, since  the current  government has taken power, there have been a rash of legislative initiatives in areas including public transportation, the environment,  agriculture and a host of other areas.  

Ultimately,  if and when Caspit decides to update the book and add in a few more chapters, there seems to be very little that has taken place in Israeli  politics that will cause Caspit to change his thesis very much, if at all.  In fact, as the Netanyahu criminal trial continues, and evidence continues to emerge about Netanyahu's involvement in a wide range of very questionable activities, Caspit will probably double down on his thesis.

I plan to read Anshel  Pfeffer's  book as well - Bibi - The Turbulent  Life and Times of Benjamin  Netanyahu.  I would be suprised if Pfeffer's ultimate conclusions are  very different  but  I'm sure it will bring a different perspective.  Stay tuned for my "compare and contrast" blog once I have read that book.