Kahlon: Key Reversal Announced Not Long After Bad Coalition Deal

Kulanu leader - Moshe Kahlon

It is two for one day on my blog.  Aside from my article about the FIFA scandal and the pending vote over suspending Israel, I couldn't resist adding a second blog.

I wrote about Israeli election results and the "Haredi Coalition" that was formed on May 6, 2015.  As you might recall, I was particularly disappointed with Moshe Kahlon.  Before the election, Kahlon had formed a new party - "Kulanu" ("all of us"), which was dedicated, primarily, to economic issues in Israel.  Its mandate was to lower the cost of living for Israels, break up monopolies and find ways to make Israel more livable.  Kahlon had taken credit for lowering cell phone prices in Israel and was promising to do the same for housing.  Sounds great so far.

But with all of these great ideas, Kahlon's first act was to sign on to a government that was promising to waste billions of shekels - adding cabinet ministers, providing huge payouts to the UTJ and other ultra-religious parties - and pledging funds to a wide range of other expensive programs demanded by the new coalition partners.  The stench was significant.  One was left wondering whether Kahlon was incompetent (i.e. a poor negotiator), stupid or corrupt.  I suggested that just the act alone of joining a government that was prepared to make so many monetary concessions to the ultra-religious would strip Kahlon of the credibility that he had built up.

Now some really interesting news emerged about Kahlon yesterday.  Prior to the Israeli elections, Kahlon had promised to break up the monopoly in Israel over the Tamar gas field, 30% of which is owned by Isramco.  Kahlon is good friends with Kobi Maimon, one of the major shareholders in Isramco.  When asked about this exact issue before the election, Kahlon said that his personal relationship with Maimon was irrelevant and that breaking up the monopoly was in Israel's best interest and that he would do it, irrespective of any friendships he had.

Yesterday, Kahlon stated that he would not be involved in any way in breaking up the gas monopoly in Israel, even though, as Minister of Finance, this would be within his bailiwick.  Instead, he indicated that he was punting the issue over to Prime Minister Netanyahu.  But, in explaining his decision, he noted that he was putting the issue on the back burner specifically because of his friendship with Maimon.  News agencies across Israel were juxtaposing Kahlon's pre-election statements with his diametrically opposite pronouncements made yesterday.  Not surprisingly, many colourful adjectives are being thrown around...

Some of Kahlon's supporters are arguing that it is still way to early to judge his performance and that he is a seasoned politician who knows how to get things done.  They argue that he will fulfill several of his pre-election promises and that over time, these preliminary issues will look very minor.  Perhaps that is true.  I suppose we will have to wait and see.

But I am inclined to be concerned about a pattern that seems far more unsavoury.  Between Kahlon's agreement to dole out billions of shekels to the ultra-religious - and now his reversal on the issue of breaking up the gas monopoly, I would suggest that Kahlon's support across Israeli public opinion is likely to plummet very quickly, which will be good news for Israel's centrists in the next election (which I still believe will be sooner rather than later).

Netanyahu Finalizes His Haredi Coalition

Well, the negotiations are over and we have a new government in Israel.  A razor-thin 61 seat government, led by Prime Minister Netanyahu and his Likud party.  The government includes the UTJ (United Torah Judaism) (an ultra-religious Ashkenazi party), Shas (an ultra-religious Sefardi party, led by a convicted fraudster), Bayit Hayehudi (a religious Zionist party) and Moshe Kahlon's Kulanu party.  This is one big right wing party (or maybe a small right wing party, since it can hardly be described as a broad government).

Zionist Union Party leader Isaac Herzog called it "the weakest, most extortionist, most narrow government in Israeli history."  Yesh Atid leader Yair Lapid called the coalition agreement "a liquidation sale."  Hard to argue with these characterizations.

By all accounts, the concessions given up by Prime Minister Netanyahu to the various coalition partners are excessive and wide-ranging.  The coalition agreement rewards the ultra-religious parties with a veritable reversal of a full range of changes that had been instituted at Lapid's behest in the previous mandate.  I have listed them already in previous blogs.  But "highlights" include:

• Reversing the requirement that the ultra-religious be conscripted to the army, like other Israelis;
• Reversing the requirement that state funded religious schools teach math and science and other secular subjects;
• Reversing the cuts to yeshivas and restoring all funding to all ultra-religious programs to pre-2012 levels;
• Providing the ultra-religious with an effective "veto" over any religion-state issues;
• Installing UTJ Knesset members in some of the most important Knesset roles including Chair of the Knesset Finance Committee;
• Turning over all key Education ministry positions to the religious parties, including responsibility for secular education.

The list goes on and on.  For those who favour religious pluralism, for liberal democrats and those who favour shul-state separation, the list of concessions is stomach churning.  In fact, I'm having a hard time thinking of anything positive to say about the composition of this government, other than, perhaps, the notion that Netanyahu may be the leader most capable of overseeing Israel's military and managing it in the face of a war or other major military event (which could occur at any time).

The "bright light" in the new government was supposed to be Moshe Kahlon, who had been elected to focus on economic issues and help make the country more liveable for the Israeli middle class.  But his opening act in this capacity has been the delivery of a stamp of approval to a governmental arrangement that will take billions of sheqels and pour it into parochial religious programs.  I would have to think that if another election were held today, Kahlon would lose at least half of his seats as a result of this display of a complete lack of judgment.

Perhaps surprisingly, Avigdor Lieberman has kept his rightist "Yisrael Beitenu" out of this unholy coalition.  That may well herald an early dissolution of what is bound to be a very unpopular government.

One would have to think that many Kahlon and Likud supporters will be demanding answers to why their parties felt the need to deliver so many concessions to the ultra-religious to form this government.  I have yet to hear any convincing answers, certainly not from Kahlon.

The big winners are bound to be Yair Lapid, Avigdor Lieberman and the Zionist Union party, all of whom will sit in opposition.  Of the three, it is really only Lapid and Lieberman who Israelis could count on to stand up to ultra-religious demands.  The Israeli Labour party, in the past, has made equally unpalatable concessions to the ultra-orthodox and had signaled a willingness to do so once again if that would have put them in power.  Only Lapid truly stood up to these demands in the previous Knesset and Lieberman has taken a stand this time around.

The good news, if there is any at this time, is that this government is not likely to last.  Netanyahu's coalition building decisions may well mean that his days as Israel's Prime Minister are limited.  There is bound to be a backlash as the government begins to implement this Haredi agenda.

Certainly Conservative and Reform rabbis and their congregations, in Israel and abroad, are likely to begin reciting the appropriate prayer for the speedy demise of this governing coalition and its replacement with one that is more representative, more pluralistic, more transparent and more committed to the rule of law (secular law, that is).  And that is not to mention anything about the prospect of peace negotiations, which are not even likely to make it to the back burner with this governmental configuration.

Looking forward to the next election already....

April 1 2015 - Upcoming White House Seder with President Obama

With the Passover Holiday approaching, the White House has been planning its annual Pesach Seder.  This year, the Seder will feature some new and interesting guests.

President Hassan Rouhani of Iran is expected to attend along with Iranian Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Husseini Khameini.  The Ayatollah will be drinking grape juice rather than wine throughout the Seder (for religious reasons).  However, he is expected to propose a fifth cup to the "destruction of Israel," a theme he outlined in a recent tweet entitled "9 questions about the elimination of Israel."

President Rouhani and the Ayatollah will be seated next to Jeremy Ben-Ami, head of U.S. group "J Street."  They will be discussing the recent Israeli election results.

Canadian Liberal leader Justin Trudeau is planning to attend along with former Canadian Supreme Court Justice Louise Arbour (who has, in the past, repeatedly attacked Israel for alleged war crimes), as well as several other current and former Liberal MPs.  Prominent Liberal MP Irwin Cotler was apparently "unavailable."  Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper was not invited.  He has contacted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and asked if he could join him at a Seder elsewhere.

Some well known entertainers will also be in attendance in Washington.  Trevor Noah, the new host of the Daily Show will be attending.  He has prepared some new tweets for the occasion.  He has not yet tweeted them but he insists that they will be as entertaining and tasteful as his previous tweets about Israel and about Jewish people.  He will be seated with Pink Floyd member Roger Waters, a prominent BDS activist and several other entertainers.  Madonna was reportedly invited but declined the invitation as she will be attending a real Seder in Israel.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was not on the guest list this year.  However, he will be attending an alternate, concurrent Seder in Washington led by Republican House Speaker John Boehner and several Tea Party members.  The Seder will be held a few blocks from the White House.  Speaker Bohner's group did not tell President Obama about the concurrent Seder or about its guest list.  However, they insisted that this was not, in any way, a politically motivated event.  The Boehner group will open the Seder with readings from the book of Revelations (speaking about Gog and Magog and the coming nuclear war) and will be featuring a special fifth cup of wine with the hope of  bringing Iran out of slavery and into a period of freedom. 

Finally, the Chief Rabbi of Israel was invited to attend the Presidential Seder.  He was not able to attend but he did offer a blessing instead:  "May God bless President Obama and keep him far away from the Jewish people."  I guess he had recently been watching Fiddler on the Roof.

Chag Sameach and Shabbat Shalom to everyone.

April 1, 2015

Israel Elections 2015: A Few More Interesting Points

I have written a number of columns over the past few days.  Well, I have to say that there are few things more interesting than a closely contested national election.  If you are one of those people reading this column, there is a good chance that you agree.

So I thought I would put together a few interesting points about the results and the aftermath.  This information is available on YNet, Haaretz and some other news sources - but I have selected a few points that I found notable.

Results By City

I have provided a link to the YNet map of results by Israeli city (and even neighbourhood).  It is in Hebrew but if you have a map of Israel handy, it should be easy enough to decipher.

As with elections in many other democratic countries, voters in large cities tend to vote for more liberal parties.  There are some exceptions, of course, (like if the city happens to be a religious capital) but, not surprisingly, this can be seen to some extent in the Israeli electorate.  So in Tel-Aviv, the Zionist Camp picked up 34% of the vote, followed by 19% for Likud and 13% for Meretz.  In Haifa, the Zionist Camp won 25% of the vote, followed by 20% for Likud and 11% for Yesh Atid.  On the other hand, 24% of Jerusalem voters chose Likud while 21% voted for the Ultra-Religious Degel HaTorah party.  Another 10% of Jerusalem voters picked Shas.

Outside of those three cities, Likud fared quite well in cities of the next tier in size.  Likud wins included Rehovot (27%), Ashdod (27%), Ashkelon (40%) and Tiberias (45%).

Closer to home, 33% of Ra'anana voters cast their ballots for the Zionist Camp while Likud (21%) and Yesh Atid (14%) finished second and third respectively.

Then there is "home away from home"... in Kiryat Eqron, 45% of the population voted for Likud with another 14% voting for Kulanu.  But just down the street from Kiryat Eqron, 32% of voters in the town of Mazkeret Batya chose the Zionist Camp.  

As in any country, the results show that Israel is very divided geographically.  It is beyond the scope of this short blog to discuss the various socioeconomic factors for each area, but there are obviously a wide range of significant differences between the various geographic locations and their populations.

How Many Israelis Does it Take to Win a Knesset Seat?

Official Israeli election results show that 72.3% of eligible voters voted.  All "eligible voters" are automatically registered.  So whereas in some countries, the percentage of voters is reported as the percentage of registered voters who voted, that is not an issue in Israel.  There were 5,878,000 eligible voters in Israel.  4,253,000 of them cast ballots.  43,800 voters spoiled their ballots.

This means that each Knesset seat was worth 33,482 votes.  However, with a 3.5% threshold, a party needed 136,808 votes to make it in to the Knesset.

In case you were wondering, the Green Leaf party picked up 38,264 votes.  Under the old Israeli rules in which the threshold was 1%, Israel would have elected one Green Leaf party member - who could have sat in the Knesset and put forward bills (probably rolled up) sponsoring the legalization of cannabis.  Unfortunately for those voters, it does not look like Israel is about to become the Netherlands anytime soon.  That being said, I am quite sure that there are many places across the country where finding access to cannabis is not extremely difficult.  Worst case, Israelis can take advantage of the El Al seat sale and fly to Amsterdam or they can go a bit further and visit Colorado or Washington State for some drug tourism...

Quickest Revoked Resignation

Meretz chair Zehava Galon resigned on Wednesday after it was reported that her party had only won 4 seats.  After some absentee ballots were counted, Meretz increased its presence to 5 seats.  Galon decided to retract her resignation and stay on with the party.  She noted that many of the absentee ballots were cast by soldiers and she would not want to let Israeli soldiers down after receiving their support.  Continuing to earn an MK salary may also be a factor but she didn't mention that.

Quickest Orwellian Retraction of a Campaign Statement

As the election campaigning was drawing to a conclusion and Netanyahu was worried about the possibility of losing, he decided to try and shore up his right wing base by announcing the he was retracting his support for a two-state solution with the Palestinians.  I'm reasonably sure that this was what he said...and it was picked up everywhere as a "game changer."  Maybe we were all hallucinating?  (Thinking about the Green Leaf party winning a seat...)

After the election, U.S. President Obama promptly suggested that if Israel would not support a two state solution - the U.S. might end its policy of blocking U.N. resolutions that impose a two state solution.

Surprise, surprise - Prime Minister Netanyahu promptly announced on NBC that he was in favour of a "peaceful, two state solution" and he had not really said what was attributed to him (or something like that) - or had not really meant what he had said...  Okay well, we know now that Prime Minister Netanyahu cannot be confused with Horton ("I said what I meant and I meant what I said...a politician is faithful...100%...) (See Dr. Seuss if you missed the reference...).  Naftali Bennett on the other hand, insisted that he would not negotiate to give up even one centimetre of land.

Now this, of course, all raises several interesting questions.

For one thing, given that Netanyahu used this statement to shore up his base and siphon votes from the more right wing Bayit Hayehudi party, how is it that his voters will accept this prompt about face?  More importantly, which members of his right wing coalition will agree to negotiations for a two state solution after he campaigned by swearing it would not happen under his watch?  Will Bennett also retroactively change his words?  That seems unlikely.

While this Netanyahu about-face is certainly a positive development (albeit a small one) for those in the centre or on the left hoping that somehow there will be a negotiated solution with the Palestinians - it is unclear how Prime Minister Netanyahu could possibly negotiate one unless he assembles a national unity government with the Zionist Camp or includes some centrist or left-leaning parties in his coalition.  I don't see how this can happen given the statements he made while campaigning.   He would face a mutiny in his party.

It is much more likely that there will be another election before Netanyahu takes any real steps towards a peace deal with the Palestinians.

So that is my wrap up for now.  I'll take a break for while on election postings and write again about this issue once some type of coalition starts to take shape.

Big Win for Netanyahu: Some Post Election Thoughts

"Reports of my demise have been greatly exaggerated."

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu led his Likud party to a massive and surprising victory on Tuesday.  While pre-election polls had put the Likud in second place with a forecast of 20-21 seats, the party emerged with 30 seats, the largest number of any party and some 25% of Knesset seats.  Netanyahu will still need to add 31 more Knesset members to get to the magic number of 61to form a government.  However, that looks like it will be relatively easy for him this time around as compared to what he faced just after the 2013 elections.  He will have the support of Habayit Hayehudi ("Jewish Home" - Naftali Bennett's party) which was reduced to 8 seats from 13.  He will also have the support of Yisrael Beitenu ("Israel Our Home" - Avigdor Lieberman's party) which won 6 seats.  That brings him to 44.  He will then turn to the ultra-religious and add in Shas (8) and Degel HaTorah (6). With 58 Knesset members and needing only 3 more, he will most likely count on the Kulanu party, led by Moshe Kahlon with its 10 seats to put Likud at 68.  There is a possibility that Yesh Atid (11 seats) will also consider joining but that seems less likely, especially if the government includes Shas and Degel HaTorah.  Even without one of these two parties, the government may be too far to the right for the tastes of the 11 Yesh Atid (Lapid's party) members.

The Zionist coalition finished with 24 seats, 6 behind Likud.  The United Arab List finished with 14 to become the 3rd largest party in the Knesset.  Meretz hung on with 4 and Eli Yishai's splinter party Yachad, which had left Shas did not make it into the Knesset.

This is all not very good news for Israelis on the left or even those in the centre.  Effectively, Netanyahu will have accomplished his goal.  He will have exchanged the "left" constituents of his previous government - Tsipi Livni and Yair Lapid - for two ultra-religious parties (Shas and Degel HaTorah) and Moshe Kahlon's party.  Kahlon was a former Likud MK himself.  Not that Livni or Lapid were really "leftists" but in the Netanyahu government, they certainly were.


As the election campaign was drawing to a close, Netanyahu sought to shore up his right wing support by renouncing his past statements of support for a Palestinian state. Based on the anticipated constituent members of the government that will most likely be formed, it is hard to see how any negotiations will take place with the Palestinians anytime soon.

If the ultra-religious parties are back in the government, as expected, we can anticipate a rollback of some of the changes that Lapid sought to bring in.  A restoration of funding for Yeshivot and other ultra-religious interests.  A pullback on the effort to put the ultra-religious in the army.  Increased power over religious affairs in the state handed back to the ultra-orthodox.  

It seems to me that we can also anticipate a further deterioration in current U.S.-Israeli relations and EU-Israeli relations.  I'm reluctant to go on with predictions of other developments that we are likely to anticipate but they are daunting.

In looking at these results, we can size up the Israeli electorate as follows.  57 out of the 120 Knesset seats are right wing or religious parties.  21 more are centrists or right-centrists.  14 seats are in the Arab bloc.  That leaves 28 seats for the left.  The results clearly show that the Israeli electorate leans, at this point in time, heavily to the right.

There had been a sense of optimism in central Israel that the left and the centre would fare better.  Even the exit polls that were released at 10 p.m. in Israel suggested that the Likud would be tied with the Zionist Union at 28 for the lead.  But when the votes were actually counted and the results announced, Israelis had shown a clear preference to continue on with Prime Minister Netanyahu ("Bibi") as the Prime Minister.

Winners and Losers

Prime Minister Netanyahu was the big winner of the evening with 30 seats, rallying from a polling deficit, a barrage of attacks from the press and a big push by the left to try and remove him from office.  He scored a convincing victory.  If he serves out a full term, he will become Israel's longest serving Prime Minister.

Looking down the list, it is also reasonable to put Moshe Kahlon in the winners group, with his 11 seats.  His party will most likely join the government and will have significant power.  Other winners include Shas, which is also likely to join the government.  The Joint Arab List won a convincing 14 seats.  However, they will sit in opposition and have little impact on the government. Avigdor Lieberman held on to 6 seats and will likely hold a cabinet post. So, on balance, he can also be put in the winners category.

Almost all of the other parties can be put into the "losers" camp.  For Yesh Atid under Lapid, this election meant a reduction in seats from 19 to 11.  Lapid's party is likely to be sitting in the opposition this time around after holding a number of important cabinet posts in the most recent government.  It is hard to paint this as any kind of victory for Lapid.

The Zionist Camp won 24 seats.  While that is a respectable number, the party's goal was to form the government.  That will not happen.  This can only be described as a defeat for that party as well, despite the sugar coating by some of its leaders.

Meretz held on to its status with 4 seats but its leader promptly resigned, early this morning, taking the blame for the party's decline in numbers.  Eli Yishai's splinter party Yachad failed to make the cut off and will not sit in the Knesset.  The election can even be viewed as a defeat for Bennett's (Habayit Hayehudi) party which only won 8 seats.  However, Bennett will play a key role in the new government so it is more of a mixed result for his party.

The 2013 election brought a sense of optimism in some Israeli circles as a government was formed that included Tsipi Livni and Yair Lapid and left out the ultra religious parties. That government made some moves on economic and social issues but approached Palestinian issues through the Naftali Bennett lens.  Now, it is anticipated that the party's "left" will be Moshe Kahlon's party and the party will continue to approach Palestinian issues through a Naftali Bennett lens.  As well, the government will approach many other issues through an Ultra-Orthodox lens.

In the losers category, I suppose I will also have to include my personal election predictions.  I accurately predicted that Yishai would be out and that Meretz would make it in (barely).  My predictions for Yisrael Beitenu, the Arab list, Shas and Degel HaTorah, were all within one.  I was wildly off with the Likud predicting 21- which is 9 less than the 30 that they won.  I overestimated the Zionist Camp (27-24), Yesh Atid (16-11) and Bayit Yehudi (13-8).  Conversely, I underestimated Kahlon (7-10).  On the whole, it looks like a chunk of centrist votes went to Kahlon instead of Lapid - and a chunk of right wing votes went to Likud instead of Bayit Yehudi. 

Conclusion 

What can be concluded? The left and the centre are far from close to forming a government in Israel at the present time.  The electorate prefers a right wing government and has voted heavily in favour of putting one in place.

Israel is surrounded by hostile, unstable regimes.  The threat of war with Hezbollah on Israel's northern border looms large as does the possibility that the Syrian civil war will spill into a conflict that engages Israel.  Egypt is a powder keg and Israel is constantly on high alert at its southern border.  All three of these realities would be unlikely to change irrespective of the type of leadership that Israel had in place.

With respect to the Palestinians, many Israelis fear that the danger of a Hamas takeover in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) would make a two state solution suicidal for Israel at the present time.  Together with all of this, pre-election opinion polls showed that Netanyahu was perceived as the best leader for Israel.  Zionist Camp leader Herzog did not project strength or confidence.  On the other hand, Netanyahu was perceived as a strong, forceful, qualified political and military leader.  For many Israelis, that is the type of leader Israel needs to face the unique range of existential threats that it must constantly address.

One can only up that the day will come when Israelis feel less threatened existentially and confident enough to try a different approach.  These elections clearly demonstrate that this is not yet the case.

I guess for now we will have to go with this line from our daily prayers:

עושה שלום במרומיו, הוא יעשה שלום עלינו ועל כל ישראל, ואמרו אמן

Last Israel Pre-Election Blog 2015 and Predictions

Isaac Herzog and Tsipi Livni

Netanyahu and Bennett

 We are nearing the finish line.  Or perhaps, one could say, we are nearing the starting line, given the Israeli political system.  In some ways the real drama begins when the coalition building starts after the votes are all counted.  But tomorrow is a big day.  Israelis across the country will cast their ballots and it will then probably take quite a period of time to sort out and spin the results.  Students are thrilled - they have a day off school since in Israel, an election day is almost a national holiday.

Under Israeli law, the last pre-election polls could only be published Friday March 13, 2015.  But over the past few days, there has been a flurry of activity from all sides, jockeying for last minute position.  Here are a few last-minute highlights of some of the really interesting things that are going on (in my view anyways).


1.  Netanyahu is in Desperation Mode

Prime Minister Netanyahu is pulling out all the stops in a bid to retain his position.  He attended a large rally on Saturday night in Tel-Aviv with Bayit Hayehudi leader Naftali Bennett.  He has publicly appealed to his constituency by pledging that Bennett will be a key part of his government.  He has attacked Herzog and Livni as "weak" and claimed that they will divide Jerusalem and create "Hamastan" in Jerusalem.  In short, he has made every effort to appeal to his right wing base, seemingly ceding much of the centrist vote on issues involving the Palestinians.  He has renounced any previous speeches in which he indicated that he would be willing to agree to a Palestinian State and he has wooed the right wing and the Israeli religious voters feverishly.  At the same time, he has urged Moshe Kahlon (leader of the Kulanu party) to support him and he has pledged to provide economic assistance to the middle class despite the perception that he has a failed record in this regard.  While Netanyahu's calculation is that the Likud voters will be frightened into bolstering his party at the last minute, there is some danger that this will backfire.  There is a palpable sense of desperation.  The momentum has been moving in the other direction and it is certainly unclear that these desperate speeches and statements will stem the tide.

2.  The Zionist Camp is Feeling Confident

Indications are that the Zionist Camp will win a plurality of seats.  However, it still may not be enough to enable the party to build a viable coalition and form a government.  Nevertheless, the party is also making several last minute appeals, changes and pleas in an effort to shore up its support.  Leader Isaac Herzog visited the Kotel and pledged his support for Jerusalem.  He has attacked Lapid's Yesh Atid Party and urged centrist voters to support his party.  Earlier today, he and co-leader Tsipi Livni announced that they would not go through with their plans to have a rotating Prime Minister's office and that Herzog would be the sole Prime Minister if the party wins.  This was seemingly intended to enable the party more flexibility in coalition negotiations - perhaps even opening the door to a rotation with Likud (which may or may not involve Netanyahu).

3.  Meretz is also Desperate

As I have written previously, the Meretz party, the party of left wing social justice, is flirting with elimination from the Knesset.  Under new Israeli electoral law, a party must win 4 seats to be able to sit in the Knesset.  That total has been increased to minimize the number of parties and limit the ability of extremist parties to win Knesset seats.  Meretz is polling at 4 or 5 seats.  Meretz has stepped up its campaigning with ads everywhere.  It is appealing to voters by claiming that the Meretz party is needed for there to be any chance for Herzog to form a government.  In fact, it has used a stylized "Merzog" graphic to bolster the connection, mixing its party name with Herzog.  But many Meretz voters are moving to the Zionist Camp, hoping that this will finally be an opportunity for the left/centre to form a government.  It could be a very close call for Meretz.

4.  Shas and Yachad

As I discussed previously, the ultra-religious Shas party splintered over the course of this most recent Knesset sitting.  Eli Yishai left the party and formed the Yachad party which is now polling at 4 or 5 seats.  Shas is calling on its voters to "come home" to the legacy of the late Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, its former spiritual leader.  Yishai is flailing around in an effort to reunite with Shas or find some other way to make it into the Knesset.  It would be a huge boost for the Israeli centre if Yishai were to fall short since his 4 seats would be redistributed among the other parties, proportionately.  

5.  Centrist Struggle:  Lapid or Kahlon?

In the last Knesset, Yair Lapid's party Yesh Atid had 19 seats.  The party is now polling at 12.  A new party, Kulanu, led by former Likud member Moshe Kahlon is polling at 8.  A simplistic look at these numbers would suggest that these parties are fighting over the same group of voters - approximately 15-18% of the Israeli public who view themselves as true centrists.  Lapid has edged slightly to the left, indicating that it is now highly unlikely that he would join a Netanyahu-led government (again).  Kahlon has been wooed by Likud but has refused to commit to supporting Netanyahu. These two parties could be the real power brokers and could also wind up with surprising numbers.  It is likely that the two parties combined will wind up in the range of 18-25 seats, which is certainly a force to be reckoned with.

Predictions

It is extremely difficult to predict Israeli election results. Many Israelis continue to declare themselves to be "undecided" to pollsters - whether or not that is really true.  Others are still deciding between one or two or even three parties.  Some may not decide until they are in the polling booth.  But what is a political column like this worth without making an effort?  So here goes, based on recent polls, trends, discussions with others, gut instincts and perhaps, a complete lack of qualifications as an election predictor - here is what I am going with:

Zionist Camp:  27
Likud:  21
Yesh Atid:  16
United Arab Parties: 13
Bayit Yehudi 13
Shas 8
Kahlon 7
Degel HaTorah 6
Yisrael Beitenu 5
Meretz 4
Yachad OUT

If this were to occur, Herzog would have 30 days to try and form a government.  He would be able to count on the support of Yesh Atid, Meretz and maybe Kahlon.  That could get the party to 54.  They would still need seats from the religious parties and/or Lieberman to be able to form a government.  Alternatively, they would try to form a unity government agreement with Likud.  I am having a hard time, based on these numbers, seeing how the Zionist Camp could actually form a government.  I am almost forced to predict that we will see another election within a two year period.

On the other hand, if Netanyahu continued to fight over the initial 30 day period and Herzog could not form a government, Netanyahu would get a chance to try.  He could count on Bayit Yehudi, Shas and Degel HaTorah.  That would get him to 48 with these numbers.  Add 5 for Lieberman.  That is 53.  He would still need Kahlon and Yesh Atid or at least Yesh Atid.  At this point, it is highly unlikely that Yesh Atid will bolster a right-wing religious government, since that would involve unraveling all of the changes that Lapid has pushed for.

This all looks like quite a recipe for a political logjam.

Netanyahu is not about to go quietly.  However, looking at all of these results and possibilities, the most likely of the unlikely scenarios is starting to look like a joint Zionist Camp-Likud government, supported by Lapid, Kahlon and Meretz.  It would be quite a shock but there are Israeli precedents.

The alternative would be a Herzog-led government which includes two of the three - Shas, Degel HaTorah, and Lieberman - as well as Kahlon and Lapid.  I'm not seeing it....

So that is the best I can do.  Stay tuned.  We should have a good sense by Wednesday morning as to how these numbers stack up with the official results.



  

Israel Elections 2015 - Latest Trends

Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu

What to make of the upcoming elections in Israel which are scheduled for March 17, 2015?  According to the most recent polls, Israel's 20th Knesset may well look quite a bit like the current Knesset.  It is likely however that the religious parties will join the government, replacing Yesh Atid, in what would be a more right wing government than the current one.

However, there is a fair bit of time until the election, about 40 days.  Much can change as it often does in the swirling Mideastern winds of an Israeli election campaign.

Over the past week or two, there have been numerous stories in the press about the excesses of the Netanyahu family in the Prime Ministerial home.  One story involved allegations that Prime Minister Netanyahu's wife was pocketing a huge amount of money from refunded deposits on the return of water bottles.  Another story focused on excessive wine consumption in the Netanyahu quarters and a third story questioned a patio furniture purchase that the Netanyahus had recently made.  Listening to the Israeli news broadcasts, one might have thought that the reaction to this accumulation of allegations would be overwhelmingly negative.  But surprisingly, in polls that have come after this media barrage, Netanyahu has emerged, according to the polls with an even higher number of predicted seats than he had before the scandals broke.  The latest polls have put him at anywhere between 24 and 27 seats in the 120 seat Israeli Knesset, which would likely give him enough to have a plurality and have first dibs at forming a government.

Where there was some apparent momentum in the media for Isaac Herzog, leader of the Labour Party and Tsipi Livni (who together have joined forces to campaign as the "Zionist Camp"), the poll numbers do not seem to be reflecting the media enthusiasm.  The latest polls put the Zionist Camp at a similar range - 23 to 26 but the additional questions that pollsters have been asking suggest that the confidence in Herzog as a potential Prime Minister is lacking in the Israel public and that the Zionist Camp numbers may not wind up as high as the numbers that are currently being reported.

At election time, Israel usually winds up with a few new parties.  In this case there is a new centrist party, led by Moshe Kahlon.  The party is a centrist party, focusing on economic issues.  Does this sound familiar?  A look at the pools suggests that they are currently at a predicted eight seats, most of which were probably taken from Yesh Atid, Yair Lapid's party.

Of course many of these numbers could change quite a bit between now and election time.

So far, however, there seem to be few scenarios under which Herzog could become the Prime Minister.  Assuming he obtained 26-28 seats, how could he get to 61?  He could add in 13 seats from Yesh Atid (on a good day), 6 from Meretz and 9 from Kahlon.  So that would get him to 56.  And those are some very flattering and highly optimistic assumptions all around.  He would then need to find 5 or 6 more seats.  One option would be Lieberman's "Yisrael Beitenu" which would bring this coalition somewhat to the right.  Hard to imagine making a successful shiduch out of that arrangement.  Another option would be to add in the religious parties - Shas, United Torah Judaism and "Yachad" - a new Shas splinter group.  That could amount to 10 or even 15 seats but the cost would be the reversal of most of the gains that Israel achieved in the two years of governing without these parties in the Knesset.  It would be very unpalatable for Lapid - unless the Haredi parties greatly toned down their historic demands.  Of course another option is that the "Zionist Camp" could be supported by the three Arab parties - that have now united under one banner.  But how ironic would it be for the "Zionist Camp" to form a government that is held together by 12 Arab Israeli legislators?

On the other hand, if Prime Minister Netanyahu emerges with 25 to 27 seats, his path to a majority seems somewhat less difficult (at least ideologically).  He could add in Yisrael Biteinu with 6, the "Jewish Home" under Bennett with 12. That would put him at 45.  He would now have the possible options of a mixture of Shas/Yachad/UTJ (10-15), Kahlon (8/9), Yesh Atid (9-12), which could get him close to 70.  Even if Lapid chose not to join this unholy coalition, there would likely still be enough for Netanyahu to exceed 62 and form a government.  However, it would be a significantly more right wing government than the one that is currently in place.

A third option would be some sort of Labour-Likud coalition - which Israel has seen in the past.  Hard to imagine as things sit right now.  However, Prime Minister Netanyahu has certainly had his differences with most of his current coalition partners - ranging from Bennett to Lapid.  Perhaps a government with fewer partners would be more manageable?  Not that this would be a "Zionist Camp" fantasy - but it might be preferable, even for Herzog, to the alternative of a few years of a hard right Israeli government or a government that is dependent on the demands of the ultra religious parties.

It is somewhat unclear what Netanyahu's inclinations really would be with these different alternatives.  The easier route for him might be a government with 13-17 ultra-religious seats bolstering his core group.  But the cost would be quite high for Israeli secular society.  I'm really not sure that it is a cost that even Netanyahu is willing to pay, after having been able to see what can be accomplished in a government without the ultra religious parties.  He may have already made some type of deal with Shas (and certainly there have been rumours to that effect).  But until the election results are in and the deal is consummated, nothing is certain.

In my view, a right wing coalition with the various ultra-religious parties and Bennett's "Bayit Yehudi" will create many challenges for Israel, both domestically and internationally.  It would be a coalition that would continue to increase the gap between the rich and the poor in Israel and one that would reverse many of the changes that had been made to secular-religious issues in Israel.  In particular, it is a coalition that would spend much more money funding Yeshivas and new settlements and would halt the very modest trend towards increased religious pluralism in Israel.  And it is a coalition that could lead to the further isolation of Israel in many international circles by taking an even harder line in matters involving the Palestinians.  I find it hard to imagine that a majority of Israelis would view this as the best type of government but I guess that is for Israelis to decide at the polls. 

It should be a very interesting period in Israel as we watch the changing poll results come in and wait to see if any of the parties are able to create some momentum in an unforeseen direction over the course of this campaign.  I'm not betting on it.

Kerry's Peace Proposals - Status of Current Negotiations

It is often said by mediators that a good deal between two sides is one which leaves each side equally unhappy.  That is the essence of a negotiated settlement where two parties have diametrically opposing demands and are trying to find a peaceful way to resolve their differences.  Indications are that U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry is trying to find a way to come to some of these middle ground positions in an effort to present a plan to Israel and the Palestinians that has some chance of acceptance.

Certainly, there is no shortage of naysayers on either side of the conflict.  Israeli cabinet ministers Naftali Bennett and Ze'ev Elkin have been pushing Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to walk away from the talks and reject Kerry's imminent proposals.  Similarly, officials on the Palestinian side of the table, including PLO Secretary Yasser Abed Rabbo have indicated that Kerry's proposals will not be acceptable to any Palestinians. 

At the same time, there are a number of high ranking Israeli cabinet ministers, including Tzipi Livni and Yair Lapid who maintain that a deal that is acceptable to Israel is within reach.  Any such deal, from the Israeli side, could necessitate a change in the current Israeli government.  Given statements made by Minister Naftali Bennett, he and his party would leave the government rather than agree to the type of peace plan being presented by Kerry.  On the other hand, there is significant skepticism in Israel that the Palestinians will accept this type of deal, even if Kerry can get the Israelis to agree.  Moreover, Israelis have real concerns as to whether the current Palestinian leadership could deliver the type of "peace" contemplated by the agreement.  Statements by various Palestinian officials seem to suggest that this type of deal will not be good enough and the Palestinians will reject a U.S. brokered proposal, yet again..  But that remains to be seen.

What are some of the key issues?

1.  Recognition of Israel as a Jewish State and Resolution of the Palestinian Refugee Issue.

In a sense, these issues are very closely related.  From an Israeli perspective, the UN partition plan in 1948 contemplated a two state solution - one state for the Jewish people and one state for the Palestinian people.  There can be little historical dispute that the Palestinians rejected the plan and declared war on Israel.  Over the course of that war, some areas were seized by Jordan and Egypt that would have been parts of the Palestinian state.  Other areas were captured by Israel and many Palestinians fled those areas.  Yet between 1948 and 1967, the Palestinian and pan-Arab animus was still directed at Israel with the goal of eliminating Israel's existence.  Such was the Arab rhetoric leading up to the 1967 war and the 1973 war - and for many years afterwards.  It is still the rhetoric of Hamas.   

The reason that Israel has insisted on recognition of Israel as a "Jewish state" as part of a peace deal is to signify that both sides accept a two state solution as a permanent peace deal.  It is not a stepping stone towards greater conflict.  Israel would recognize a Palestinian state with all of the trappings that a state might have, subject to security considerations.  The Palestinians would be expected to do the same and would agree to Israel's right to exist.  

What does a two state solution really mean?  It means that each side gives up its dream, goal or aspiration of taking over all of the territory held by the other side.  It also means that each side solves its own refugee problems within the borders of its territory.  For the Palestinians, this type of deal should leave them free to bring every single Palestinian refugee, from across the world, to the nascent Palestinian state, if they so choose.  Should that not be the purpose of a two state resolution?  Since 1948, Israel has absorbed millions of refugees, including Jews who were no longer welcome in Yemen, Egypt, Syria, Iran and other Arab countries.  The Palestinians will need to do the same and absorb the Palestinian refugees in their new state.

Most Palestinians have continued to demand the "right to return" to Israel.  This insistence is nothing more than a rejection of Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state and the expression of an intention to override Israel demographically.  It is, quite simply, for Israel, a non-starter.   If, as some suggest, Palestinians continue to insist that a large number of Palestinians be permitted to return to Israel rather than the new Palestinian state, this would be a deal breaker, in my view.

2.  Status of Jerusalem

Under the U.N. partition plan, Jerusalem was going to become an "International City."  It was never envisioned as part of the Palestinian state and certainly not its capital.  Between 1948 and 1967, much of Jerusalem was held by the Jordanians, with little push by the Palestinians to declare it the capital of Palestine.  In 1967, Israel recaptured parts of Jerusalem, including the old city and ultimately annexed most of the city.  Regardless of what some countries in the world might formally maintain, Jerusalem is not "occupied territory" as defined under the Geneva conventions. It was not legally held by Jordan nor was its status clearly defined. Since Israel has controlled Jerusalem, from 1967, the holy cites have been fully accessible to the different religious groups that claim access to them.  The Muslim Waqf has controlled the Al Aqsa Mosque and Christian holy cites have been overseen by Christian authorities. This contrasts with the picture that existed in Jerusalem between 1948 and 1967, during which time Jews were barred from attending the Jewish religious cites in old Jerusalem.

One of the key Palestinian demands is that East Jerusalem, including the Old City, become the capital of the new Palestinian state.  Once again, this is something that is simply not going to happen any time soon.  There would be no political will in Israel for dividing Jerusalem and certainly no appetite for Israel to relinquish the one place in the world that is holy to the Jewish people.  So Secretary of State Kerry has proposed using suburbs of Jerusalem, including Kafr Aqab or Abu Dis and calling those suburbs "Greater Jerusalem" or some other terminology so that "Jerusalem" can still be listed as the Palestinian capital.  While this would be unpalatable to many on both sides, it may be a reasonable resolution of the issue, especially when combined with the fact that Palestinians would continue to control the Muslim religious sites in Jerusalem as they do today, even though the Dome of the Rock sits on the very spot that was once the Holy Temple.

3.   The Settlements, the Border and Security

The United States has proposed a formula involving an approximate total amount of land for each side, equal to the 1967 borders.  The idea of "land swaps" would mean that Israel would keep the largest major settlement blocs while giving up other areas to the Palestinians.  There are certainly many on both sides who oppose this proposal entirely.

Many Palestinians have demanded that Israel withdraw, entirely, from all land that Israel has held since 1967. This would include major residential blocs, some of which were inhabited by Jews before 1948 (such as parts of Gush Etzion).  Some Israelis have demanded that Israel retain the vast majority of the West Bank and refuse to agree to turn over any territory, whatsoever.  Neither side is likely to get everything it is after in a negotiated settlement.

Media reports suggest that the settlement issue would be resolved through a number of approaches.  Under Kerry's proposals, which have not yet been formally announced, Israel would keep or annex the largest settlement blocs, but it would also agree to evacuate some areas of the West Bank on which there are now Israeli settlements.  Palestinians would receive other territory, with the total territory under Palestinian control for the new state the approximate equivalent of the 1967 borders.

The real challenge is security here, particularly security for Israel and even for Jordan.  Israel can ill afford, from a security perspective, to agree to the establishment of another fundamentalist terror-sponsored regime on its borders.  After Israel evacuated Gaza, the Gazan people promptly elected the rejectionist, terrorist group Hamas as its leadership.  Shortly afterwards, Hamas began lobbing rockets at Israel.  A repetition of this, in a different area, would be entirely unacceptable to Israel and would threaten Israel existentially.  Kerry's plans have apparently floated various approaches to address this security concern including a continuing, but gradually lessening Israeli presence in the Palestinian state or some type of U.S. presence.  This could present one of the greatest challenges for Israel and one of the biggest leaps of faith that Israel would have to make to agree to a deal.

Israel has a very small margin of error here the wrong decision or concession on security issues could be suicidal.  That is not to say that this is the plan of the current Palestinian leadership.  But looking at events in Syria, Egypt and other Arab countries in the Middle East, it is reasonable for Israel to insist on security measures that will be honoured and verifiable, irrespective of the type of Palestinian government that might get elected.  Some of these precautionary security terms are likely to be unacceptable to the Palestinians and that is where Kerry is working with both sides to try to find some way to reach a deal.

Conclusion

There are, of course, numerous other issues.  After all, many books have been written about this issue, from various historical, political and other vantage points.  I have reviewed some of them elsewhere on this blog.

The real question is what is going to happen now - and will anything come of this.  Most Israelis apparently remain unconvinced that a deal will be possible, according to recent Israeli surveys reported on by YNet News and Haaretz.  Many Palestinians have signified that they would view this type of deal as a "sell-out" and would reject it entirely.  So it is far from clear that there will be any kind of resolution.  Nevertheless, here are a few possibilities:

1.       Israel could agree to the deal, whether unconditionally or with some reservations.  In order to do this, it  appears that Israel's government would change, at least somewhat.  It is likely that Bennett would leave the government and that Labour, under the leadership of its recently elected new leader Yitzhak Herzog would join.  It is unclear whether some or all of the "Yisrael Beitenu" MKs would leave the government and if they were to leave, whether Netanyahu could still cobble together a majority that would support the deal.  If a Netanyahu-led government were to support the deal, my sense is that a deal could also win support in an Israel-wide referendum, even if the margin of victory was slim.

2.  Israel could agree to the deal, as above, but the Palestinians could reject it, either in connection with the ongoing talks or as part of some form of referendum.  This is probably the outcome that most Israelis anticipate, although there are signs that Abbas may be prepared to agree to a proposed deal, even if he does so conditionally or with some reservations.  It is unclear what the Palestinians will do if these talks fail.  They may look to the world community to try and exert economic pressure on Israel by advocating boycotts and divestment.  Some countries in the world have already been susceptible to these overtures.  Or they may declare a third intifada.  Either of these approaches would likely be disastrous for both Israel and the Palestinians and would probably set back a peaceful resolution by another twenty or thirty years, at least.

3.  The Palestinians could agree to the deal, as above, with some reservations or unconditionally.  However, Bennett could then cause the collapse of the government and Netanyahu could prove unable (or unwilling) to put together a coalition that would support the deal.  This could result in new elections in Israel or it could bring about a new right wing government that includes the religious parties and that has no interest in any type of peace deal.  In this scenario, (i.e. if the Netanyahu government were to fall) my guess would be that we would see a new election fairly quickly, though I am not about to predict the results.  It seems to me unlikely that Netanyahu would cling to power by cobbling together a far right -wing government.  I think he would be more inclined to hold an election. 

Stepping back from all of this, there are many reasons for pessimism and it seems unlikely that we will see an Israel-Palestinian peace deal any time soon. There are so many complicated issues, so much "bad blood," and so much hatred.  Yet, as I have told some of my friends, we are living in an age which has seen the collapse of the U.S.S.R; a peaceful resolution of the dispute in Ireland; the end to South African Apartheid; and many other world changes that people would have believed to be possible in our lifetime.  So maybe, just maybe, a peace deal between Israel, the Palestinians and the neighbouring Arab states will be another one of those historical moments.

It seems to me that both sides need this type of deal if they truly wish to avoid sentencing their children and grandchildren to generations more of bloody conflict.

Peter Beinart: The Crisis of Zionism - A Review

After reading and reviewing the wonderfully optimistic book Start-Up Nation, I decided to "balance" it by reading Peter Beinart's The Crisis of Zionism. Beinart is a self-described liberal Zionist with a serious interest in Judaism and in the future of Israel. His book is an attack on Israeli policies with respect to the disputed territories and a call for action in the form of a boycott of West Bank products. Unlike other members of the anti-Israel left, Beinart calls for those boycotting West Bank products to make an equally vigorous effort to buy products and patronize companies from within Israel's "green line." This, he proposes, is intended to offset the idea that boycotting the West Bank is "anti-Israel."

Beinart's book is well written and interesting but ultimately, somewhat flawed. His view of Israel's role in its ongoing dispute with the Palestinians is either naive or willfully blind in that he seems to place the blame for just about everything squarely on Israel's shoulders. There is little discussion in the book of Palestinian extremism, nor is there any real discussion of a legitimate compromise proposal for ending the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Moreover, throughout the book, Palestinian acts of terrorism are minimized or downplayed. Beinart even finds a way to blame the failure of Camp David and the subsequent 2nd Intifada on Israel, even though he concedes that Arafat does not even appear to have made a genuine counter-proposal in response to the huge concessions that were proposed by the Israelis. Nevertheless, Beinart's focus on the urgent need to reach a peace deal with a two state solution is intended to benefit Palestinians and Israelis and is laudable.

His chapter entitled "The Crisis in Israel," focuses on the discrepancy between Israeli democracy and equality of rights within the "green line" area and the current situation in the disputed territories. There is nothing new here about the idea that Israel is facing an increasingly difficult challenge in trying to reconcile the idea of a "Jewish State" with the goal of a liberal, democratic State, while trying to find a way to resolve the issue of the territories. The current status quo threatens not only the lives and living conditions of the Palestinians but also threatens Israel's condition as a viable liberal democracy. It is hard to disagree with this part of Beinart's analysis and many Israelis, on the left and in the centre of the Israeli political landscape would agree.

Beinart then switches over to the United States, where he paints a grim picture of American Jewry. Characterizing the vast majority of Jews as liberal democrats, Beinart rails against "America's major Jewish organizations" as having lurched to the right. A particular focus of his attacks is Abe Foxman, National Director of the ADL, who is "beholden to no one but the philanthropic dollar." Beinart attacks the ADL and the AJC (American Jewish Committee) for supporting the policies of the Israeli government and for failing to "challenge the occupation." He even manages to defend former President Jimmy Carter, despite the overwhelming evidence that Allan Dershowitz has put forward with respect to Carter's ill-will towards Israel.

In a chapter entitled "Is the Occupation Israel's Fault?," Beinart minimizes the security threat to Israel that an immediate withdrawal from the territories would entail by arguing that Israel is already within rocket range of Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. He suggests that Israel should rely on its "credible deterrent." Of course, this is not been a great success with respect to Gaza from which Israel has faced numerous rocket attacks after withdrawing its forces. Beinart then runs through the peace deals offered by former Israeli Prime Ministers Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert and concludes that these offers were rightly rejected by the Palestinians as insufficient, even though, he concedes, "there is a dispute about whether Arafat made any offer at all." While there were (and still are) clearly disputed issues, including the future of Jerusalem (in particular the Temple Mount), the issue of Palestinian refugees and the exact nature of the land swap envisioned, Beinart seems to suggest that Israel should have fully conceded its position on each of these issues. Moreover, despite the fact that the issue of "land swaps" was supposedly negotiated down to a difference of 4% of the total area of the West Bank (the Israelis proposing to keep 6% and the Palestinians proposing 2%), Beinart also lays the blame for this failure on the Israeli side. From Beinart's viewpoint, the dispute comes down to the disputed West Bank city of Ariel, which Israel refused to agree to dismantle.

Beinart goes on to describe subsequent events when former President Bill Clinton outlined parameters that "went well beyond Barak's proposal at Camp David": "Arafat accepted the Clinton parameters in principle, but then offered reservations that rendered his acceptance virtually meaningless." Beinart paints former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's decision to withdraw from Gaza as part of a "hidden agenda" to allow Israel to continue to hold the rest of the West Bank. By way of contrast, on the Palestinian side, even Hamas gets off lightly. Its charter, calling for Israel's destruction is downplayed and Beinart justifies Hamas' decision to fire missiles into Israel. Again, he concedes that "Hamas had been killing Israelis since the 1990s," but somehow makes the case that if Israel had just lifted its blockade against Hamas and ceased any attacks (including retaliatory attacks), everything would have been wonderful and the Hamas rocket attacks would have ceased. None of this is intended, on my part, to argue that the situation in Gaza is very good. However, I think it is fair to say that if the Palestinian leadership took a different tactic following Israel's unilateral withdrawal, there could have been significant economic cooperation between Israel and Gaza that would have greatly improved the situation for Gaza's Palestinians. Instead, Gaza's leadership focused on amassing weapons, firing rockets and public relations exercises instead of working towards an arrangement with Israel that would have ameliorated conditions for Gazans.

In a chapter entitled "the Jewish President," Beinart reviews President Obama's credentials as a liberal, philo-Semitic president, whose own daughters attended a Solomon Schecter Day School in the Chicago era. Describing Obama as having been influenced by the late influential Conservative Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel (who marched with Martin Luther King Jr.), Beinart also describes the connection between Rabbi Arnold Wolf of Chicago's Temple Solel, who was one of Obama's "earliest and most prominent supporters." Overall, Beinart describes Obama as sharing a liberal Zionist view of Israel with a range of influential Jewish friends. According to Beinart's description, this would include pressuring Israel to make concessions with respect to the occupied territories, but in the name of preserving a liberal Zionist vision of Israel rather than as a way of attacking Israel.

As much as Obama is described in the book as a supporter of everything that is good about Israel, Netanyahu is no doubt, in Beinart's view, the devil incarnate. Describing Netanyahu as an heir to the chauvinistic Jabotinsky school of right wing Zionism, Beinart traces Netanyahu's political lineage from Jabotinsky to Benzion Netanyahu (Prime Minister Netanyahu's late father) to Netanyahu himself. Along the way, he suggests that Netanyahu is a racist, advocates a policy of physically transferring Palestinians out of Israel and the West Bank, and sprinkles in selective quotes from Netanyahu's 1993 book, A Place Among Nations, and its 2000 reprint, A Durable Peace. Overall he describes Netanyahu as a monist Zionist, who "subordinates external moral considerations to Zionism itself." He also reviews Netanyahu's close connections with AIPAC and wonders about the source of Netanyahu's electoral campaign funding. While Beinart may ultimately be accurate in his description of Netanyahu's reluctance to agree to the type of peace deal that Netanyahu's predecessors were being pressured to sign (if only the Palestinians would have also agreed), Beinart omits the massive swing in Israeli popular sentiment that followed the collapse of the peace talks and the onset of a new wave of violence. In a sense, Beinart's book advocates boycotting Netanyahu as much as any given policy. Ultimately, with the recent change to Netanyahu's coalition to now include the Kadima party, it remains to be seen whether there is any accuracy to Beinart's description.

Beinart's antipathy towards Netanyahu comes through even more clearly as Beinart describes the public clashes between President Obama and Netanyahu. Noting that Obama received 78% of the Jewish vote in the 2008 Presidential election, Beinart argues that he and many others were hopeful that Obama could lead a shift in U.S. policy to bolster the liberal Zionist vision of Israel that they shared and bring about an end to the Israeli occupation of the territories. But Beinart goes on to describe a series of confrontations between Obama and Netanyahu and concludes that Obama was completely "humbled" as a result of pressure from AIPAC and other powerful, sometimes unnamed, Jewish and fundamentalist Christian sources. Ultimately, Obama was forced, as Beinart describes it, to back down from insisting on a complete settlement freeze and was publicly embarrassed and humiliated in the process. Of course, another possibility is that Obama began to rethink some of his policies with respect to Israel but that wouldn't fit too well with Beinart's thesis.

Beinart's chapter on the future of American Jewry hits closer to home since his description is also somewhat applicable to Canadian Jewry - and even Israeli Jewry. Jewish families who send their children to Jewish day schools are the ones who are continuing to carry on Jewish traditions and minimize the likelihood of intermarriage and assimilation. These families, especially in the United States, but in other areas as well are predominantly Orthodox. This means, in Beinart's view, that the number of actively involved, liberal, non-Orthodox Jews is steadily declining, relative to the overall population of committed Jews. Since these liberal Jews are the people who would share Beinart's view of a liberal Israel, their influence is steadily waning in the Jewish community. I have to note that this is also the case in Israel, which provides full state support for Orthodox schools but does not have a sufficient number of liberal, Jewish schools in which children can learn about and practice liberal Judaism. For Beinart, the net result is a prediction that the major American Jewish organizations will come to be dominated increasingly by Orthodox Jews with an illiberal agenda. This type of change is also occurring in Israel and has led to many different challenges pitting Orthodox Jews against others who advocate an egalitarian, democratic agenda. The ultimate result, if Israel does not save itself now, according to Beinart, would be a lurch towards a non-liberal version of Jewish Zionism at the expense of the liberal Zionist vision that many of the founders of Israel originally shared, and which included principles of democracy and equality for all Israeli citizens.

Beinart's solution to all of this is to propose a modified version of the "Boycott, Divest from and Sanction" ("BDS") campaign. He calls for people to refer to Israel as being divided into two parts - "democratic Israel" and "non-democratic Israel." He also calls for a boycott of settlers and their products while tempering that with an "equally vigorous embrace of the people and products of democratic Israel." He proposes that East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights not be included in the definition of "non-democratic Israel" since the Palestinians in those areas can actually obtain full Israeli citizenship.

If the only existential issue that Israel faced was dealing with the territories, Beinart's analysis might make some sense. But he dramatically minimizes that true existential threats to Israel. He barely mentions the 2006 war with Lebanon, the Iranian nuclear threat, the ongoing missile attacks from Gaza and the other threats that Israel faces. In short, he has a very rosy picture of how Israel might defend itself from attacks that would emanate from very close range following a full withdrawal from the territories. Moreover, given the fact that he has shifted the blame for the failure to reach a peace deal to Israel, almost entirely, he implicitly absolves the world from the need to pressure the Palestinians equally.

With the two sides, according to Beinart, having come as close to a deal as he describes, one would think that it would make sense to pressure both sides. For example, it seems quite unrealistic to expect that Israel will accept a "right to return" for the Palestinian refugees. Most Jews living in surrounding Arab countries left or were expelled following the establishment of Israel. Moreover, one state was designated as a Jewish state and the other as a Palestinian state. Sure, the Palestinian state should be entitled to offer an unlimited right of return for Palestinians from anywhere in the world who wish to return to the area and live in the Palestinian state. But to this point, even as Beinart describes it, the Palestinians appear to be demanding the right to have refugees return to and live in Israel, while having a Palestinian state that is virtually, if not completely, free of Jews.

Many in Israel, on the left and even the centre of the political spectrum will agree with Beinart's overriding thesis that Israel cannot continue as a liberal democratic country without reaching a peace deal with the Palestinians. And many would like to see that deal concluded as soon as possible and believe that Israel should be willing to make significant concessions to reach a deal. Yet many in Israel, even those on the centre and the left, have real concerns, based on experience from the last go-round, that the Palestinians are not prepared or are not politically able to make corresponding concessions that will be required to reach a deal. The central flaw of Beinart's book is that he downplays this possibility and places virtually all of the blame on Israel, which allows him to advocate joining the BDS crowd, with a modifying twist. A more balanced recount of historical events might have led Beinart to advocate pressuring (or boycotting) both sides in an effort to reach a lasting deal.