Israeli Election 2019 - Some Possible Outcomes

The second Israeli national election of 2019 is due to take place on September 17, 2019.  Since I haven't been writing as much lately, I thought I was overdue to put together some comments about the upcoming election.  In the past I have reviewed the platforms of the various parties and provided some comments.  In this post, I thought I would try to look at some realistic possible outcomes, based on current polling numbers and consider what Israel might face following the elections.  This is certainly not "Torah mi-Sinai," as I have been very wrong in the past when trying to predict Israeli political outcomes.

I figure that there are about 4 or 5 realistic possible outcomes and I will consider them and the implications of these outcomes.

1.  A Likud (Netanyahu) Victory

At this point, with about 11 days to go until the election, I would have to think that this is the most likely outcome.  The Likud party, led by Prime Minister Netanyahu, needs to assemble a coalition of 61 seats to have a majority in the Israeli Knesset and form the government.  Following the previous election, Netanyahu was able to string together up to 60 but not quite enough to form a government.  Once it became clear  that he was unable to form the government, Israeli customary practice would have normally seen the President ask the next party in line (Blue and White) to try to form the government.  But Netanyahu preempted this step and brought a bill to the Knesset to dissolve the Knesset and set another election date. 

So there are now at least two different ways, perhaps even three that the Likud could form a government.

One possibility would be if the Likud and its coalition partners obtain 61 seats or more. 

Current polling from a whole range of different Israeli polls estimates Likud at between 30 and 32 seats, a drop of 6-8 seats.  The two ultra-religious parties, Shas and UTJ are estimated at 8 each, with no change.  The Yamina party, which is a coalition of a number of right wing nationalist parties, replacing Bennett's previous party, and now led by Ayelet Shaked, is polling at between 8 and 10 seats.  So add all of that up, at the high end and you come up with about 58 seats.  If Likud were to pick up 3 more, by itself or if any of its coalition partners were to add seats, Likud could get to a 61 seat coalition without Lieberman. 

A second possibility is a deal with Lieberman (Yisrael Beitenu).  If the Likud is unable to put together a governing coalition of 61 seats without Lieberman's party, it will almost certainly try to negotiate a deal with Lieberman's party.

Following the last elections, Likud was unable to come up with a coalition deal that would have satisfied the ultra-religious parties and the secular nationalist Yisrael Beitenu party.  Neither Lieberman nor the ultra-religious were willing to make sufficient compromises, particularly on the issue of drafting ultra-religious men to the army. 

While it is true that Lieberman seems to  have gained significant public support by demonstrating a willingness to stand up to the ultra-orthodox, his party otherwise shares many of Likud's political positions.  His party is willing to support a retroactive immunity bill that would get Netanyahu out of his various legal troubles.  This would also help other coalition partners who are under investigation.  Lieberman is also willing to support the "attack on the Supreme Court" bill (my description) that would give the Knesset the power to override any decision of the Supreme Court by a simple majority.  This is an important bill for Netanyahu since he knows that the retroactive immunity bill would probably be struck down otherwise as a violation of the principles of fundamental justice.

Lieberman's support for these bills would be life-saving for Netanyahu since it would end all of his legal problems.  Lieberman is certainly not a pushover but Netanyahu desperately needs these pieces of legislation to avoid the possibility of winding up in jail.  I think that there is strong likelihood that Netanyahu and Lieberman will negotiate some kind of deal if Likud cannot otherwise get to 61.

A third possibility for a Likud win is some other type of coalition without Lieberman.  Suppose that Likud and his coalition partners wound up with 57-60 without Lieberman.  They would need to find 1-4 additional supporters from elsewhere.  One possibility is to convince a few right-leaning Blue and White party members to join a Likud coalition, perhaps in exchange for cabinet posts other other attractive offers.  Or perhaps some Labor members or members of the Democratic Union might be willing to make a deal.  I think that these are relatively unlikely scenarios.  I find it hard to see that some Blue and White Knesset members or members of the other parties would agree to the retroactive immunity bill and the court bill to protect Netanyahu.  And that seems to be the number one priority for Likud and Netanyahu.  That being said, in Israel there are always surprises and there is a great deal of horse trading (to put it nicely).  So I don't think that this possibility can be ruled out entirely.

2.  Another Stalemate

This is probably the second most likely possibility after some type of Likud victory.  If Lieberman holds steady and refuses to make a deal that will allow Netanyahu to continue to govern and if no other Knesset members from other parties are willing to defect and join Likud - Israel could see a third consecutive election.  With the holidays and other timing issues, this would likely mean a January or February election.  This could be a big problem for Netanyahu.  If his criminal trial moves ahead and he has not been able to enact an immunity bill to make everything go away, he could be forced to step down at some point to defend against the charges.  This could change the Israeli political landscape quite a bit.  To me, it underscores the urgency of a deal for Netanyahu - with Lieberman or anyone else - at all costs (from Netanyahu's perspective).


3. A National Unity Government

Many people in Israel have discussed this option but I don't believe it is very likely at this point.

On the one hand, if Likud were to have the plurality of seats, Netanyahu would be looking to retain his role as Prime Minister and pass the two bills that his party has been pushing to protect himself.  I find it hard to see how the Blue and White party could agree to a retroactive immunity bill or even the Supreme Court bill.  Blue and White might be willing to agree  to have Netanyahu continue to govern - without these pieces of legislation.  In this case, he would face the possibility of having to resign at some point as the prosecution progressed.  I don't think Netanyahu would agree to a deal without immunity. 

If Blue and White were to win a plurality of seats, they could ask Likud to join a national unity government, with or without Netanyahu - with no immunity bill. Again, this seems quite unlikely to me since the Likud members have shown a willingness to continue to support Netanyahu irrespective of the challenges that he faces.

The landscape would only change if the Blue and White party came out ahead of Likud by 5-6 seats or more and Likud realized that it simply could not get to 61.  In this scenario, Netanyahu would, at some point, be forced to resign and face charges while the rest of the Likud party made a deal with Blue and White.  This seems highly unlikely to me for several reasons.  For one, I don't think that Blue and and White is about to get such a big win at the polls.  They don't really seem to have the momentum and don't seem likely to finish ahead of Likud by 5-8 seats.  Anything is possible but I am not predicting that outcome.

I also think that it is unlikely that so many Likud members would suddenly turn on Netanyahu after so many years of benefiting from his  leadership.  And I believe that with so much at stake, Netanyahu will pull out all the stops to cut a deal with someone to get the immunity bill and stay in power if there is any possible way of doing so. 


 4.  A Blue and White Win

While this is a theoretical possibility, I don't see how the numbers add up.   With a coalition of Blue and White, Labor, the Democratic Union (formerly Meretz) and even Lieberman, the total would come to 50-55.  I suppose that there is a chance that Blue and White could convince the ultra-religious parties to join a coalition - but that would put Blue and White into the same difficulty that Likud has faced - balancing Ultra-religious demands with those of Lieberman (and now the Democratic Union).  This would really require some creative deal-making on the part of Ganz and the Blue and White party.  It is possible that they could get the chance to try if none of the other possibilities reviewed above lead to a government.  Overall, I see this as unlikely but not impossible.

Conclusion

These different possibilities are all based on a review of current projected polling numbers combined with my own gut sense of where things are headed.  But election polling can be off quite dramatically and the numbers may be very different from those in the polls.  Likud could wind up at 37-40 seats, supported by many Israelis who don't really want to tell pollsters that they are voting Likud.  However, these seats would probably come from Yamina (or maybe Blue and White) so it is not clear that even with 38-40, Netanyahu would be able to get to a coalition of 61 without Lieberman.

Watching election results in Israel is very different from watching in Canada or the United States.  The actual polling station reports don't seem to turn up on a regular ongoing basis in the same way.  Instead, the media reports on "exit polling" numbers and uses those reports to predict the election outcome.  But the real results are usually not determined until the next morning - or perhaps even a few days later.  So whereas in Canada or the U.S., most elections are usually decided by 10 p.m. or 11 p.m., the latest, that is not the case in Israel.  We will probably only have a decent sense of the actual numbers by 10 or 11 a.m. Israel time on September 18th, 2019 (3 a.m. on the east coast for those in North America who plan to stay up and wait for the news...).

Even once the actual numbers are known, that will only really mark the start of coalition talks which are almost guaranteed to take a month or two.  So stay tuned for a wild and crazy ride.  It is almost certain that Israelis and Jews around the world will find themselves fasting on Yom Kippur without knowing what kind of government Israel will have for the coming years.  As for  Netanyahu, he may find himself fasting while hoping that he can continue to blow his own Shofar and that any negative decrees (from above, from the Israeli public or from the Israeli courts) can be averted. 

Beyond Burger: Taste Test

Beyond Meat - Kashrut

Back in Israel, I was quite interested in trying a Beyond Burger.  They are, of course, all the rage these days but they are not yet certified Kosher in Toronto.  Sounds like more of a financial negotiation with the Va'ad HaKashrut than anything else - but I have no inside information about that.  I imagine it is simply a matter of time until they are Kosher certified in Canada

In Israel, they are certified Kosher-Pareve (non-dairy) and have supervision from both Circle K and the Chief Rabbinate of Israel.  So that is certainly good enough for us.

It was a bit of a challenge to find them.  Websites indicated that they were available in Rami Levi supermarkets but we had no luck finding them there.  Same for Shopersol.  They are available on-line for door to door delivery - but we wound up buying them from "Nitzat HaDuvdevan" - an organic health food store on Ostrovski Street in Ra'anana.  They cost 33 shekels for a package of 2 which is about $6.00 each in Canadian dollars.  They are sold frozen here.  In Canada, they are apparently sold in the fresh meat section in supermarkets.

As you might know, Beyond Meat has been marketing itself as a meat substitute with a taste that is close enough to meat for people to enjoy a completely plant based burger but not feel that they are missing out.  Ingredients include pea protein, canola and coconut oils and a variety of other chemicals.  In terms of nutritional content, a burger weighs 113 grams.  One burger has 300 calories, 20 grams of protein, 11 grams of carbs, 3 grams of fibre, 20 grams of fat (8 saturated) and 360 grams of sodium.  No sugar.

Beyond Burgers on the grill

So I gather that the fat, sodium and protein contents might be comparable to a 1/4 pound meat burger.  The fibre content would be higher in the Beyond Burger.  The fat content would be higher than some burgers but that might depend on the meat.

The company recommends thawing the burgers before cooking them.  So we did that, mostly.  It then recommends cooking them on a grill or in a pan for about 3 minutes per side.  Since they were not fully thawed, I probably cooked them for about 5 minutes per side on the barbecue.

They do actually look quite a bit like meat hamburgers.  I had heard that they "bleed" on the grill and get very juicy like meat burgers.  I can't say I really saw this when I cooked them but they were reasonably juicy.

But our samplers were impressed.  The verdict was that they were quite close to the taste and texture of a meat burger.  They were reasonably tasty, easy to prepare, Kosher-parve (which means that they can be eaten with anything - depending on how you cook them).  Two tasters were duly impressed and were definitely prepared to try them again.  Admittedly, this was a small sample size.

One member of our group, who does not eat red meat, did not want to try them since they seemed too much like a real burger.  It is certainly fair to recognize that vegetarians who are not looking to replicate a "meat experience" might not be interested in something that is designed to taste close to meat.

Personally, I am not a vegetarian though I try to limit the amount of red meat that I eat, primarily for health reasons.  Every now and then (or sometimes more often), I enjoy a nice steak or a good burger but I do think about it a lot and sometimes wonder whether I should try a vegetarian diet (from the ethical side of things, rather than purely from the health side).

So from a health point of view, I am not sure that these Beyond  Burgers are that much healthier than eating red meat.  They have some fibre but the fat content is quite high as is the saturated fat content.  The sodium level is high but not obscene.  I would have felt a lot better about eating these regularly if the fat content was about half, the saturated fat content about one-third and the sodium content lower.

From a nutritional view point, it might be better to have some fish, some chicken or  a soy based main course.

From an ethical point of view, it is certainly nice to have the option of eating a burger that provides an enjoyable culinary experience while knowing that "no innocent animals were harmed in the process..."

Cooked Beyond Burger

I would be interested in trying some other types of these new veggie burgers from competitors - such as  the Impossible Burger.  There are several different companies, worldwide, who continue to develop all kinds of alternative burgers.  I would think that some of them will soon find a way to reduce the fat and sodium content and perhaps even increase the fibre.

But overall - here is the cooked product.  The verdict was positive and we are willing to try them some more.  At $6 each, they are probably not that much more expensive than buying ready made frozen burgers from our local butcher.  I hope that they will soon be certified Kosher in Canada from my friends and family there.  I am likely to include them as a viable dinner option on either side of the ocean. 

Israeli Election Update - April 9 2019 Elections

Hi everyone.  It has been a while.  I have been quite occupied with a range of other pursuits - including my professional career.  So I have neglected my Israeli-oriented blogging.  But with only one week to go until Israeli elections, I thought an election blog was well overdue.  I was reminded of this recently by a couple of friends and I thought I might have something to add.

In 2013, I put together a detailed preview.  I have referenced that here: 2013 Israeli Election Preview.
So I won't reinvent the wheel.  I would also suggest that you could have a look at this presentation - put together by someone close to me...

But things have changed quite a bit this time around.  There are several new political parties.  Some parties have vanished and others are teetering on the edge of oblivion.  It should be quite an interesting election.

Most polls and surveys seem to be dividing the Israeli electorate into "Right Wing" and "Left Wing" blocs.  The labels are probably somewhat misleading since the parties' positions on particular issues are not always readily discernible.  However, the main reason for the classifications is that Israeli politics is always about coalition building.  In order to form a government, one of the parties will need to string together a coalition of at least 61 seats in the Knesset (the Israeli parliament).  This would give the government a voting majority and allow it to pass legislation.  So if the parties on the "right" are able to cobble together at least 61 seats, they will likely form the government even if the largest party in the coalition is not the party with the most overall votes.  I will explain that as we go along.  I thought I would first look at the main parties, current polling and some of the parties' political positions.

The Likud

The only "major" right wing party now according to most polls and predictions is the Likud, the party led by the current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.  Over the past few months, polls have varied with the Likud winning somewhere between 26 and 32 seats.  Likud currently has 30 seats in the Knesset which suggests that the party is not likely to gain or lose too many supporters.  Since the last Israeli elections, Prime Minister Netanyahu has led a solidly right of centre government in a coalition with ultra-religious parties (13 seats), right wing nationalist parties (13 seats) and a centre-right party (10).  Over the 9 years of his current mandate, in which Netanyahu has won three elections, his party's policies have varied somewhat depending on the coalition partners.  Between 2013 and 2015, the government veered towards the centre as a result of the influence of the Yesh Atid party, led by Yair Lapid.  However, since 2015, the Netanyahu government has undone any centrist leaning policies that were implemented during those years and has moved the government to the right in most areas including social legislation, increased support for religious institutions, supreme court reform and a host of other areas.  By any objective measure, it is clearly the most right wing government in Israel's history.  Some Israelis are obviously quite happy about that while others are frustrated and disappointed.

Prime Minister Netanyahu has also been wrestling with a range of personal scandals, which have resulted in the Attorney General recommending charges in three different cases.  All of these charges are subject to preliminary hearings before proceeding, which have yet to take place.  Other stories continue to emerge about matters for which Netanyahu has not yet been charged.  Although some might have thought that these wide ranging allegations of corruption would have affected Netanyahu in the polls, that does not appear to be the case.  For one thing, none of the charges have actually gone forward and there are many Israelis who say that he should be treated as innocent unless and until he is found guilty of something.  It is unclear what might happen to the charges after the election, especially if Netanyahu wins and forms the government.  He may well escape from any sanctions but that remains to be seen.

Blue and White Party

The big change  for this election is the addition of the Blue and White party, a merger between Yair Lapid's "Yesh Atid" and Benny Ganz's new party "Hosen."  Unlike the characterization in some of the polls and attacks by Netanyahu, this is not a "left wing" party.  Its membership includes former army generals and high ranking offices with impressive military credentials.  The party has indicated that it is willing to renew diplomatic efforts with Palestinians to try and reach some type of peace agreement.  At the same time, it is as willing as the Likud to take strong military action in Gaza or anywhere else to defend Israel against military and terrorist threats.

Economically, the party is probably not that different from Likud in its capitalist outlook although it has proposed some economic policies that may align more with the centre or centre left.  It has also stated a willingness to look at issues of gender equality, religious pluralism, education reform, budget allocation for religious institutions and other domestic issues.  For many Israeli voters, who do not wish to see Netanyahu continue on as Prime Minister, the Blue and White party seems to be the only option and it is currently running neck and neck with the Likud at anywhere from 28 to 32 seats in recent polls.

That being said, even if Blue and White were to capture 30 or 32 seats, it might have a very difficult time piecing together a coalition of 61.  In fact, that might even be impossible, depending on the exact numbers for each of the parties.

One possibility is that Blue and White could win a plurality and offer to run a national coalition government with Likud.  However, it seems unlikely that Likud would agree, especially if Netanyahu continues to lead the party.


Smaller Right Wing Parties

There are four smaller right wing parties running in this election, each with slightly different constituencies and each vying to demonstrate that it is the true right wing alternative to the Likud party.

Yisrael Beitenu, under the leadership of Avigdor Lieberman is currently polling at around 4-5 seats and flirting with falling below the cut off point (3.25%).  Parties that get less than the minimum amount of popular vote do not make it into the Knesset.  Lieberman's party has been in and out of the government's ruling coalition over the years.  He represents a nationalist but not religious constituency, many of whom are of Russian origin.  The party has taken some right wing positions on territorial issues but has, in the past, suggested that it would be willing to engage in land swaps as way of reaching a deal with the Palestinians.  Lieberman has often been at odds with Netanyahu.  There could be a chance that if Yisrael Beitenu were to hold the balance of power and it were to get the right offer, it would join Blue and White as part of a government.  The party would however, in general, be a more natural partner for the Likud party.

New Right

Earlier this year, Naftali Bennett and Ayelet Shaked left "Habayit Hayehudi" ("The Jewish Home") and formed a new party called "The New Right."  In doing so, they seem to have taken about half of their support from the former party.  One might say that they left the Home and took half of the contents....

So the New Right is polling at between 4 and 7 seats.  The remaining members cobbled together another new coalition, now called the United Right which is also polling at 4 to 7 seats.  Neither of these parties seem likely to join any party other than Likud.  Both are committed to opposing any land concessions to the Palestinians and to continuing the status quo or annexing all of the disputed territories.  This looks to be anywhere from 8 to 14 seats that will be "low hanging fruit" for the Likud in any coalition talks.

The other small right wing party is the Zehut (Identity) party of Moshe Feiglin.  This self-described ultra-nationalist, libertarian party has campaigned on a platform of cannabis legalization, privatization of just about everything, annexation of all of the disputed territories and an increased separation between Synagogue and State.  Zehut also favours easing up on Israeli gun control laws and allowing for non-religious civil marriage in Israel, possibly even same sex marriage.  Zehut has apparently picked up quite a bit of support among young voters and is polling at between 4 and 5 seats, with some pundits predicting that the party may get as many as 7-10 seats.  Once again, the party is a more likely partner of the Likud but might be willing to negotiate with the Blue and White party if they could find some common ground.  The right amount of shared weed might make that more of a possibility, especially if both parties can agree on legalizing cannabis.

Some have joked around that Feiglin's supporters might be too stoned to make it to the polls - but the Zehut party seems poised to surprise the electorate and the pundits with a sizable showing.


The Left

According to most polls, the Labour party seems likely to suffer its worst defeat ever.  It is polling at between 8 and 10 seats.  It has played a very small role in public election discourse.  It has suffered from infighting including a disastrous public break up with Tsipi Livni, a former coalition partner.  Old style Labour economic policies do not seem to be appealing to most of the Israeli electorate.  The party recognized this by choosing Avi Gabai, more of a centrist, to lead the party.  However, the Labour campaign, by most accounts, has been a disaster.  Perhaps the numbers will change on election day but that seems unlikely.  A reasonably strong showing by Labour could still be helpful for the Blue and White party since the Blue and White party is the only possible coalition partner for Labour.  If Blue and White could win 32-35 seats and Labour could win 10-12, there might be a chance that Blue and White could form the government, with a prominent role for the Labour party.  If Labour only wins 7 or 8 seats, the party will likely spend the next four years in the political wilderness (i.e. the desert in Israel...)

Further along the spectrum is the Meretz party - a socially activist, proudly left wing party.  Meretz seems to be polling at consistent 4-6 seat numbers.  It could obtain some concessions from Blue and White and form part of the government if the option were available but that would really depend on all of the other numbers.  Like its counterparts on the right, Meretz really only has one available option to be part of the government.  Of course for Meretz that is the Blue and White party rather than the Likud.

The Ultra Religious

The two ultra-religious parties, Shas and UTJ (United Torah Judaism) are polling at a total of 12 to 14 seats.  They have played a key role in the current government and have held various cabinet positions.  The ultra-religious parties extracted significant concessions from Netanyahu and the Likud during the last round of coalition building negotiations.  They obtained massive funding for their Yeshivot (religious educational institutions) and for the ultra-religious infrastructure in Israel. They also succeeded in passing new laws that would keep more retail places closed on Shabbat.  Given what they have achieved with Netanyahu at the helm, it is unlikely that they would join a Blue and White coalition.  At the same time, historically, the ultra-religious parties have shown a willingness to join more centrist parties if they can obtain significant concessions.  If the Blue and White party were to make these far-reaching concessions, that would alienate many of their voters.  I find it hard to see these parties joining Blue and White.

The Arab Parties

There are two Arab parties - Hadash Tal (polling at approximately 6-9 seats) and Ra'am Balad (polling at between 3 and 5 seats).  If Ra'am Balad were to get 3, it would not make it into the Knesset.  So the likely numbers are anywhere from 6 to 14, a wide spread.  The Arab parties are not likely to join either governing group but could bolster a Blue and White coalition by voting with it - or agreeing not to vote against it.

Adding up everything, current polls are putting the right wing parties at anywhere from 62 to 68 seats and the other parties at 52 to 56.

If there is to be a change in government in Israel, the poll numbers would need to change significantly on election day.  That could happen since election polls around the world seem to have become less and less dependable.

As well, some of the "right wing" parties could be enticed into a coalition with Blue and White with the right concessions.

In my view, the Blue and White Party would need at least 35-36 seats to have a chance at forming the government, with the Likud party winning 28 or less.  If the Likud party has 30 seats or more and the Blue and White party has less than 35, the Likud will almost certainly form the government once again and Benjamin Netanyahu will continue as Israel's Prime Minister....for now.

I am looking forward to arriving in Israel just in time to vote and then sitting in front of the TV watching results all night (and maybe for several days afterwards).  That being said, I'll simply add that I am not optimistic that Israel will have a competent, stable or forward-looking government in power over the coming years.  Then again, looking around at what is taking place in so many countries around the world, is this a great surprise?

If you are an Israeli citizen and eligible to vote - make sure to go and exercise your right.  B'hatzlachah to all the candidates and to all of those voters hoping that their party will win.

Rabbi Avraham Feder Z"L

Rabbi Avraham Feder Z"L

It was a difficult day today.  We attended the funeral of Rabbi Avraham Feder Z"L at Har Hamenuchot in Jerusalem.  Rabbi Feder was a great Rabbi - a Rabbi of a generation - a terrific Chazzan and a wonderful man.  He was our Rabbi, teacher and friend and touched the lives of so many people.

Rabbi Feder was the founding Rabbi of Beth Tikvah Synagogue in Toronto in 1967, a Synagogue which later expanded and grew into a shul of more than 1,000 families.  He was energetic and passionate in his approach to Judaism, Zionism, music and social activism, among other passions.  He worked on building a community, not just a shul.  He pushed his congregants towards spiritual growth, greater halachic observance, wide ranging musical experience and Zionism.

I first came to know him in 1979 soon after our family moved to Toronto.  He taught a Pirkei Avot  class to a group of High School Students.  More than 30 of us joined him weekly for an in-depth discussion of a wide range of ethical issues.  He would always arrive early and get to know whichever students had shown up.  He was happy to speak about politics, baseball, ethical issues, or whatever other topic might create some common interest between him and the students.  In class, he would constantly try to find ways to engage each individual student.  Though his expectations were high, he was respectful, thoughtful and, often, funny.

As the congregation Rabbi, he would push congregants to try adding new observances.  For example, he implored more people to attend services for Sukkot - and to try building their own Sukkah.  When he saw that many families accepted his challenge and came to shul on Sukkot, he decided that he had to reward them by making Sukkot the fun and happy holiday that it was supposed to be.  He wanted to make "Zman Simchateinu" a reality - so he told adventurous stories of his heroic cousin who was serving in the Israel Defence Forces.

Rabbi Feder was an ardent Zionist who fervently believed that the mission for the current generation of Jews around the world was to do everything they could to rebuild the Jewish people in the Land of Israel.   He followed what he preached and left Toronto to make Aliyah in the early 1980s.  Some Beth Tikvah families joined him at that time.  Other families came later and still others - children and grandchildren of the original founding families of the shul - joined him in Israel many years later.

Rabbi Feder continued to return to Beth Tikvah each year to conduct High Holy Day auxiliary services at Beth Tikvah.  He had a passionate group of followers.  He led services, as the Chazzan, with beautiful, inspired davening.  The congregants came to know all of his melodies and sang along throughout.  These High Holy Day services were a spiritual treat, intense, uplifting and fulfilling.

He would sometimes bring new songs to teach to the congregation.  One year, after facing down some particularly difficult challenges, he asked the congregation to sing "LaKum Machar Baboker," the classic Naomi Shemer song about waking up to start a new day.  In remembering this type of approach, one person described him today as a "radical optimist."

In his role as the Rabbi at these services, he also delivered lengthy, powerful sermons, sometimes laced with musical interludes in Hebrew, English or Yiddish.  Since he was both the Rabbi and the Chazzan, he knew that the Chazzan would not complain if the sermons were too lengthy.  His sermons were fascinating works.  They touched on a wide variety of sources - the Torah and Talmud and other sources of Jewish law, contemporary and classic literature, current works of fiction and non-fiction, cinema, plays and personal anecdotes.  Some were sewn together meticulously.  Others might wander into unforeseen and provocative areas.  Many of these sermons generated vigorous responses.  But they always left us with ample fuel for discussion over Yom Tov lunch, whether we agreed or disagreed with what he said.

Over the years, we spoke and exchanged emails with him constantly.  He attended and shared "a few words" at each of our kids' b'nei mitzvah in Israel and we got together with him several other times.  He always asked about all of our family members, children, parents, brothers, sisters - he genuinely cared.  He was particularly proud of our children's accomplishments - as bar and bat mitzvah teachers, as shlichei Tzibbur and with their roles in the IDF.

At his funeral this morning - several people spoke.  Family members, friends and others.  If there was a common thread that ran through all of these eulogies - it was Rabbi Feder's passion and his love.  He was passionate about Judaism, Zionism, literature, Music, learning and had many other passions.  But each person who spoke about him - shared the thought that in all of their interactions with him - they always felt love and respect going in both directions.  They all felt that they had a special personal connection with him - and that this special connection touched and impacted on their lives in a unique way. This love of people and ability to connect with them - together with his true menschlikeit was what came through most powerfully from all those who spoke.

Aside from Jewish sources and classic literature (he was a Shakespeare expert), Rabbi Feder greatly enjoyed musicals - particularly classic Broadway musicals.  He would often sing snippets from some of his favourite pieces.  A few of the speakers today recognized this - and alluded to certain pieces - that were some of his favourites.  As much as he enjoyed the "classics," he opened his mind to new music, movies and books. And he continued to try to accomplish as much as he could - reading, writing and exchanging ideas with so many people.

Apparently, he had been working feverishly on a 250 page memoir which he completed very recently.  I have not yet seen it.  But when I heard about it today - I thought about how much he might have enjoyed Hamilton - and its blend of American history, Broadway music, contemporary music and social justices ideas.  And what more apt a line - than a line from Hamilton describing Rabbi Feder's efforts to complete his memoirs...."how do you write when you're running out of time..."  and, from the finale of Hamilton - "time...if I only had more time..."

For many of his - his family members, friends, congregants....we all wish he had more time.

I hope and pray that his legacy will inspire others to emulate many of his examples - whether in the area of yiddishkeit, Zionism, Judaism - or above all else - Menschlekeit.  

Published Announcement for Rabbi Feder Z"L

Memories After My Death: The Story of My Father, Joseph "Tommy" Lapid - by Yair Lapid - A Review

It has been a while since I have had the chance to put together a new post.  Things have been quite hectic, I suppose.  I'm not complaining about that.

I have been meaning to write a review for a while - about Memories After My Death: The Story of My Father, Joseph "Tommy" Lapid, by Yair Lapid.  This was quite an interesting read.

The book as written as an autobiography, yet it was written by Yair Lapid after the death of his father Tommy Lapid.  As Yair Lapid indicates in the acknowledgements, much of the material came from a series of interviews conducted by Amnon Dankner with Tommy Lapid in the last years of his life.

Tommy Lapid was a remarkable figure.  His story of survival from the Holocaust is powerful and chilling.  The book details the incredible sacrifices his parents made and their efforts to keep Tommy alive as the situation became grimmer and grimmer for the Jews of Hungary.  Lapid and his mother were rescued by Raoul Wallenberg and moved to Israel in 1948, while Lapid's father was murdered in a concentration camp.  

The book also traces Lapid's immigration to Israel and the astounding challenges that he faced along with all of the other new immigrants as they moved one from one existential struggle to another.  Through it all, Lapid became a lawyer, a journalist, a politician and a writer.  He wrote for a Hungarian language newspaper in Israel but later became a journalist with Maariv, director of the Israeli Public Broadcasting Authority, founder of the magazine "At" (a women's magazine), a Knesset member and, eventually, chair of Yad Vashem.

The book is an often intimate look at Lapid's life and those around him.  He doesn't shy away from telling stories of romantic and other sexual encounters - along with various stories of his travels and escapades.  From eating shark-fin soup in Hong Kong to meeting royalty in England, Lapid certainly managed to come into contact with many influential figures.  He covered the Eichmann trial as a journalist, he rubbed elbows with Arnon Milchan, Robert Maxwell (for whom he worked) and Ehud Olmert.  Interesting group of characters.  In fairness, he was also close with Ariel Sharon.

Lapid is a controversial figure in Israeli politics.  He was avowedly secular and dedicated to fostering an increased separation between shul and state in Israel.  This caused him to be a lightning rod for ultra-orthodox anger.  Yet, as Yair Lapid tells it, Tommy Lapid's vision for Israel was a considered one.  Here, for example, are some thoughts about his rift with the Ultra-Orthodox:

"a democratic society is not founded merely on rights but on obligations as well.  I have no problem whatsoever with an Ultra-Orthodox Jew who serves in the army, goes off to work in the morning, then studies Torah all night if he wants.  That man is my brother and I love him better than any non-Jew in the world.  He was there with me in the ghetto and on the rickety boat that brought me to Israel, he sat with me on a boulder facing a ruined synagogue on the island of Rhodes when I sobbed at the memory of 500 Jews led from the building by the Nazis and drowned at sea in an Italian ship."

And he goes on:

"The fact that a man wears a shtreimel on his head and grows a beard does not absolve him from the responsibilities carried out by all the other citizens of the state.  It was not with ultra-Orthodoxy that I have a complaint but with the fact that the Ultra-Orthodox turned it into a permit for ignoring all the chores were are obliged to carry out on a daily basis..."

These excerpts provide a window into the ideology of Lapid as well as his son Yair.  While Tommy pushed for the Israeli government to make changes to laws in Israel that define the religious-secular divide, it was Yair Lapid who was actually able to institute some key changes for a fleeting period of two years during which he was Israel's Finance Minister.  Once Yair Lapid was excluded from the government, the changes that had been made were reversed and the religious-secular landscape has shifted considerably with ever greater power accruing to the ultra-religious and the nationalist religious in Israel.

While I agree with Yair Lapid's past approach to these issues, an approach that was more nuanced than the vision that his father apparently espoused, I felt that little other philosophical ground was covered in this book.  That is an ongoing criticism of Yair Lapid in Israel - that he is shallow and often seems more concerned with who he is meeting, where is speaking and how he looks - than the policy content that he advocates.

I was not able to conclude from this book that I had a solid understanding of Tommy Lapid's goals for the country, his aspirations or his dreams.  Certainly I understood that he was successful, bright, engaging and often acerbic and determined.  He enjoyed fine wine, high quality food and many other trappings of his self-described bourgeois life.

Yet I came away feeling that I had missed out on his real goals.  Sure, Lapid was an ardent Zionist who was committed, unconditionally, to the survival of the State of Israel and to doing whatever he could to help it flourish.  I have little doubt that his son Yair shares those aspirations, just as he seems to share, for the most part, Tommy Lapid's outlook on the Ultra-Religious and the religious-secular fault line in Israel.

But beyond that, this book provides little from which one might discern a further understanding of the real aspirations of either the father or the son.  And perhaps that is by design.  Simply a genuine reflection of reality.  That shallowness, if you will, for lack of a better term, may well doom Yair Lapid to a comparable political fate.

      

Doomed To Succeed by Dennis Ross - A Review

I took the suggestion of one of my favourite rabbis and picked up a copy of Doomed to Succeed by Dennis Ross.  The book is subtitled "The U.S. - Israel Relationship from Truman to Obama" and that about sums it up.  Ross has served in senior roles in several U.S. administrations and has played an active part in Arab-Israeli negotiations.  The book traces the U.S.-Israeli relationship at the highest levels from the beginning of Israeli statehood through to just prior to the end of the Obama presidency.  Ross provides an insider's look at the history of the relationship, often through the lens of significant Israeli and Mideastern events.

Ross explains how some American Presidents and their administrations have sought to distance U.S. policy from Israel.  Included in this category would be Eisenhower, Carter, Nixon, Bush Sr. and Obama, as well as others to a lesser extent. Ostensibly, the goal of those administrations was to avoid upsetting the various Arab governments in the region.  Ross also explains that some of those administrations held the belief that if they would only pressure Israel, that would lead to Mideast peace.

Along the way, Ross canvasses some key aspects of those policies.  The Eisenhower administration's refusal to provide military equipment to Israel even in the face of Soviet supply of Israel's enemies. Nixon's refusal to supply Israel with weapons even in the face of an existential crisis during the 1973 Yom Kippur War (until it was almost too late).  Reagan's decision to supply Saudi Arabia with some of the most sophisticated weaponry available, even where that weaponry could be used against Israel. And of course, Obama's decision to skip Israel on his Mideast tour at the start of his presidency to send a message to Israel about the "new Middle East."

There are many other examples and discussions of these various incidents and events.

By way of contrast, Ross looks at the efforts of other Presidents, including Clinton and Bush Jr., who were generally more sympathetic to Israel's concerns and advanced the Israel-U.S. relationship in significant ways.  Some presidents like Truman, Reagan and even President Obama are portrayed has having a mixed record.

Ultimately, Ross suggests that those presidents and administrations who have sought, primarily, to distance Israel from the U.S. have made it more difficult to advance the cause of peace.  If the U.S.suggests that it is prepared to guarantee Israeli security and international standing as part of a peace deal, it is logical to assume that the U.S. would demonstrate to Israel that Israel can count on that guarantee. Otherwise, asking Israel to take significant security risks without appropriate assurances would be suicidal for Israel.

Perhaps Carter was the exception here, in that he managed to arrange a peace deal even while distancing the U.S. from Israel.  To this point, Ross seems to suggest that the Israeli-Egyptian peace deal may have happened with or without Carter, given the significant role that both Sadat and Begin played. While he acknowledges the significant efforts made by Carter and does not downplay that role, he does seem to suggest that Carter may have been able to do more with the other parts of the conflict if he had built up more confidence with the Israeli administration.

Ross also challenges the notion that it has been Israeli intransigence that has caused the lack of a peace deal. He repeatedly cites Arafat and Abbas' espousals of only "maximalist" bargaining positions and their failure to compromise to get a deal.  Even President Clinton, who built up the confidence of the Israeli administration and extracted significant concessions from the Israeli side was unable to obtain sufficiently reciprocal concessions from the Palestinian side.

That is not to suggest that Ross lays all of the blame on the Palestinians.  He suggests in no uncertain terms that Israel would need to agree to a Palestinian state to resolve the current conflict.  He suggests that Israel should refrain from building in those areas of the territories which are not likely to be held by Israel as part of a future peace agreement.  But he also suggests that the Palestinian side has quite a number of issues to address itself.  Those include recognizing that the Palestinians will only be able to solve their refugee problem within their own future state; that they will need to stop inciting and paying for terror attacks; and that they will need to build a culture of peace rather than a culture of animosity if a two state solution is ever to become a reality.

Reviewing the major historical events over the course of Israel's statehood, as Ross has presented it, one is left with the clear understanding that only Israel has been able to guarantee and take responsibility for its own security.  From the early wars of 1948 and 1956, in which Israel scrambled to find weapons suppliers, through the 1973 War, Israel has had to rely on itself, first and foremost.  Even decisions which were opposed by U.S. administrations, from the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor to the bombing of the Syrian nuclear reactor seem, in retrospect, to have been both important and successful for Israel.  In this respect, Begin, Netanyahu and even Shamir are all portrayed sympathetically, at times.

Ross's coverage of the 1973 War may be exceptional here.  His analysis implies that Nixon intended to hold back on resupplying Israel for long enough to ensure that the Arab attackers caused sufficient damage to Israel to restore the "Arab dignity" after their disastrous war loss in 1967.  But Ross's version ignores other historical accounts which suggest that the U.S. only began to resupply Israel after Gold Meir made significant military threats against Cairo in which Israel would use all appropriate means to defend itself.   This account, if accurate, would fit in more appropriately with Israel's record of, ultimately, defending its own interests without really being able to rely on the U.S.

That is not to say that the book does not criticize Israel.  The 1982 Lebanon War is largely characterized as a debacle.  In later years, some of Netanyahu's interactions with Obama and others are roundly criticized. Other Israeli actions are also assessed critically. 

But I think it is fair to say that Ross strongly prefers the view of those who would advocate for a special relationship between Israel and the U.S.  Given that Israel is the only real democracy in the Middle East, that it is one of the only countries, if not the only one, with a truly independent judiciary, a respect for the rule of law, and protection for its religious, ethnic and other minorities, Ross argues that it is very much in the U.S. national interest to foster a close relationship with Israel.  He also argues that there is no evidence that a close U.S.-Israel relationship has damaged the U.S. relationship with its Arab allies.  On the contrary, Ross argues that Obama's efforts to tilt towards Iran and away from Israel and some other traditional Arab allies of the U.S. had significant and detrimental consequences to the U.S. relationship with its Arab allies.  Ross argues that Obama tilted back towards Israel later in his presidency, though the book seems to have been completed before the misguided U.N. resolution at the conclusion of the Obama presidency.

Ultimately, I suppose one must be skeptical about some of what Ross has written.  It is after all the view of someone who was very much involved in the process and there is a natural inclination to smooth over one's own shortcomings.  You would probably need to cobble together at least two or three different accounts of many of the historical events to be able to come to conclusions about what really occurred.  But Ross tries to be reasonably objective and, at times, cites areas of disagreement between himself and others.  In that respect, the book seems to have a reasonable degree of balance.

Overall, as someone with an interest in Middle Eastern history (and history in general), I enjoyed the book. It covers a great deal of ground (disputed territory mostly) and provides much to consider.  We can only hope that the title was chosen for dramatic effect rather than as a statement about the likelihood of a future with a more peaceful Middle East.










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Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow. By Yuval Harari

I enjoyed Yuval Harari's first book, Sapiens (reviewed here), so much that I had to get hold of his second book Homo Deus as quickly as I could.  I finished reading it recently on my plane ride back to Toronto from Tel-Aviv.

Harari's first book, Sapiens, is subtitled "A Brief History of Humankind." It is a broad strokes, wide-sweeping tour de force, which covers thousands of years in a relatively short work.  Homo Deus is quite different.  Subtitled "A Brief History of Tomorrow," this is much more of an essay or even a polemic than a history book.  But it is filled with big, challenging ideas and concepts and provides enough discussion material for a seemingly unlimited amount of time.

Of course, as Harari might point out, we may not have that time.  Things are moving at a lightning pace.  Artificial Intelligence is developing at incredible speed.  Humankind is on the precipice of enormous and dramatic change.  Harari tries to sketch out some of these directions and changes and considers their implications.

The book is not really prescriptive.  It is far more descriptive.  While Harari speculates about future direction in belief, scientific development, genetics, artificial intelligence and other areas, Harari does not propose a belief system or moral framework for these changes.  Far from it.  This book is more concerned with trying to sketch out the what, how and why than to deal with questions of "whether."

Much of the first half of the book is somewhat historical.  It traces different aspects of human history to lay the foundations for the discussions of future trends.  Some of these discussions are covered in the first book.

One area of overlap is religion.  Harari's discussion of religion is fascinating.  He is quite adamant that there is little or no historical basis to most of the world's main religions and is very dismissive of any type of literal or truth-based approach to religious belief.  For Harari, since the world's large religions were developed and gained prominence so many years ago, they are necessarily ill-equipped to deal with the scientific challenges of an entirely different world.  What could agricultural based religions possibly have to say about modern genome discoveries?  or space exploration? Or artificial intelligence?  In some cases, if age old religious dogma is based on demonstrably false conceptions (for example, the case of gender equality or the religious belief in gender inequality), then these religious ideas are clearly outmoded and obsolete.

Yet Harari also acknowledges that the power of myth and religion has served a tremendous function. It is the shared belief in religious concepts that, historically, facilitated mass cooperation and even led, ironically enough, to scientific development.  Call this cognitive dissonance, says Harari, but religions have served an important purpose, even if the underlying basis for most of the beliefs is demonstrably false.

Harari argues that true religious belief died a few hundred years ago, and gave way to versions of Humanism. He describes different versions of Humanism and concludes that Humanism, like Deism, is destined to run its course.  Humans have no "soul" or purpose and are really a collection of algorithms, he argues.  In fact, he provides a detailed argument as to why humans may not even really have free will.  Their decisions are based on genetics, randomness or particular stimuli.  I'm not going to elaborate on these arguments further at this point - you will have to read the book if you are interested in these discussions.

The most interesting part of the book is the final third in which Harari discusses alternate new belief systems and ideas around which sapiens are likely to coalesce in the future if they are not already doing so.  Chief among these concepts is "dataism" - the recognition of the importance of data accumulation, analysis and application.

I could not possibly attempt to summarize the book and its various concepts in such a short review. But I wanted to set out just a few of the types of ideas that are raised to provide a flavour of the discussion.  Hopefully the reader will have sense of the types of topics that are covered from my discussion above.

By way of another example, one section discusses the future of various professions as one looks ahead 20 or 30 years from now - or more.  Harari suggests that a significant majority of the professions that people practice today and the jobs that people have will be obsolete.  Computers and artificial intelligence will do many of today's jobs more efficiently, accurately and economically.  Harari also examines topics like AI creation of art and music; the ever increasing use and significance of DNA research; the worldwide drive towards self-driven vehicles; and many other issues.

By the conclusion of the book, the predictions are somewhat grim.  For example, "humans will lose their economic and military usefulness."  But Harari has not put forward his predictions and analysis without careful thought and analysis of current scientific discoveries and trends.  He draws from a variety of disciplines but comes, fundamentally, from a scientific perspective.  This means that he is prepared to point out areas in which we are not able to draw conclusions at the present time.

Like with the first book, that is what makes Harari's books so readable and engaging.  He approaches most questions with a degree of scientific humility.  We may not know the answers to certain things - but we know, almost certainly, which things are wrong, even demonstrably wrong.  We also have theories about what might be right and some of them are very compelling.  Others are less developed.  But the idea is to raise the topics, provide information and context about where we are and then use that to suggest where we are heading.

There are certainly many ideas here that would face quite a bit of resistance.  I can't say that I agreed with everything in the book.  But that is really what makes the book so interesting.  The arguments are well constructed and they develop controversial but stimulating discussion points.  Anyone who reads this book honestly will certainly have a great deal to think about.  Some of the arguments are not easily refutable and some may be unsolvable.  Some are issues about which different people may never agree.  But all of that, for Harari, is almost certainly the measure of  his success.