Wednesday, November 9, 2022

Bibi: My Story - A review

 

As you might know Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ("Bibi") released his memoires in the midst of Israel's most recent election campaign.  He wrote the book himself in longhand over the course of the year and half or so of being the leader of the opposition in the Israeli Knesset.  I couldn't resist picking up a copy and comparing it to the other books on Bibi that I have read and reviewed.

As you might recall, I wrote this review of the book "Bibi" by Anshel Pfeffer and this review of Ben Caspit's book The Netanyahu Years.  I have not yet read any other reviews of Bibi's book but I did go back and look at my reviews of these other two books to compare.

For starters, I have to say that I quite enjoyed reading the book.  Netanyahu is a very skilled communicator.  The book flows well, is very readable and contains some very interesting stories and antecdotes.

I would say that it is structured like a legal argument rather than a true biography.  It is presented as an argument for Bibi's legacy.  Netanyahu asserts that he, almost singlehandedly, reformed the Israeli economy from a socialist leaning, old style economy to a modern capitalist society and moved Israel from a developing country to one that is fully developed and closing in on a AAA credit rating.  All of this as a result of Bibi's work as Israel's Finance Minister and subsequently as Prime Minister, where he continued the work that he had started.

A second theme throughout the book is that with Bibi's background, having obtained his undergraduate degree at MIT, he was keenly aware of the power of technology and made technological development a priority throughout the course of his tenure as Israel's Prime Minister, leading to Israel's recognition as a true technological powerhouse.

A third theme is that the key to Middle East peace is bypassing the Palestinians, since they aren't really interested in a deal anyways and developing peace with other Arab countries first as a precondition to resolving the whole of the middle east conflict.  I will come back to this shortly.

A fourth theme is that the focus of Bibi's foreign policy efforts since 1999 or even earlier has been to see Iran as the real threat and focus on containment of Iran and prevention of the Iranian development of a nuclear bomb.

A fifth theme is to raise the profile of his father, his wife Sara, his sons Yair and Avner and brush away or deflect any criticism of any of them.  From the descriptions of Sara that Netanyahu has provided, it is hard to imagine a kinder, more perfect, more gracious, more supportive spouse than Sara.  But,of course, perhaps this is all in response to the various other Bibi books including those by Caspit and Pfeffer that strongly suggest otherwise.

So how does Bibi fare with these arguments?

Interestingly, he starts off by saying that a good lawyer, when appearing in court, often leads by diffusing the strongest arguments that opponents might present.  Bibi's first parts of the book deal with the tragic death of his brother Yoni in the course of the Entebbe raid, his own academic accomplishments, which are indeed impressive, and his analysis of the history of Israel, Zionism and the importance of a strong, militarily capable, home for the Jewish people.  

Bibi puts forward arguments for the importance of a strong free market economy and traces his Zionism back to the Zionism of Jabotinsky and his successors, many of whom became Likud party members, as opposed to the more socialist bent of the Labor party that dominated Israeli political life for so many years.  

Much of this analysis is cogent and convincing.  But these are certainly the strongest points that Bibi would have to put forward and they are what he tackles first.  That might be due to chronology but I note that he starts with his brother Yoni and then goes back in time.  This is a particularly deliberate choice, which partially responds to some of the criticisms made by Pfeffer and Caspit about the cynical use of Yoni's legacy by Bibi and his family.

As the book moves on, a few things became particularly interesting.

One thought I had was that a great deal of the book is "Bibi's spin" on different historical events irrespective of how accurate that spin might be.  The other thought I had was what was left out as opposed to what was included.  This is certainly not a "comprehensive" book even though it is 650 pages long.  

Certainly Bibi's contributions to the change in Israel's economy are significant. Israel has become a booming modern country with skyscrapers galore.  At the same time, the cost of living has skyrocketed, the gap between the wealthy and the poor has increased dramatically, and wealth has become ever more concentrated in the hands of very few.  No comments from Bibi about these issues, other than some platitudes that suggest that everyone is now better off and would not have been if Israel had followed different policies.

Many political figures, industry leaders and others contributed to the change in Israel's economic structure and I am somewhat skeptical that Bibi's role is as singularly definitive as he asserts.

Having read many other books about how Israel has become a technological superpower, I find it very difficult to give Bibi as much credit as he would like to take in this area. For example, steps taken by Shimon Peres to develop Israel's Air Force and other military technology were dramatic as were many taken by Ehud Barak.  Moreover, many different private companies as well as private-public consortiums have focused on technological development.  Although Bibi clearly appreciates all of these developments, I find his efforts to take credit for them less convincing.

Bibi's recount of his dealings with the Palestinians is a whole different story.

I found Bibi's analysis of dealings with President Bill Clinton quite interesting.  Although he recognizes that Clinton was well intentioned, he accuses of Clinton of buying the "Palestine first" narrative and focusing all of his efforts on persuading Israel to accept a deal rather than pushing the Palestinians.  Here, there is a reasonable argument that Bibi's version is sound.  Even Clinton in his later writings noted that despite all of the concessions that he was able to wrangle out of the Israeli side, Arafat was still not prepared to accept the deal.  And that is Bibi's thesis, that Palestinian rejectionism is, primarily, what has led to the current situation.  That being said, this does not, in my view, mean that the resolution of Palestinian issues is of a much lower level of importance, even if it is extremely difficult to attain.

Bibi also spends a great deal of time on his relationship with President Obama.  Bibi is somewhat more deferential than I had expected, particularly given the relationship between these two.  He points out Obama's decision to "recalibrate" the relationship in the Middle East after first becoming President by visiting a host of Arab countries but not Israel.  He also discusses the failed policy of bolstering the "Arab Spring" and the disaster that occurred in Egypt when Morsi took over.  That being said, Bibi outlines some of the differences of opinion and concludes that Obama was probably the "toughest opponent he had ever faced."  In fact, in reading some of the discussions and arguments that Bibi recalls having with President Obama, it is not clear to me Bibi's position is the more convincing one.

Bibi goes out of his away to try and explain away all of the different incidents in which he was accused of trying to embarrass and humiliate President Obama.  Here, I didn't find him that convincing.  Although he claims that it was all about the Iranian threat, the Israeli interests and his commitment to remaining bi-partisan, I just don't think that meshes with the manner in which events really played out.  He highlights that his differences with Obama were all about "POLICY" (which he puts in capital letters).  But in my view, other historical accounts are far more convincing - suggesting that Bibi deliberately set out to humiliate Obama and tilt Israel policy towards the Republicans. 

Moving on to Trump, I would say that, reading between the lines, Bibi is much less complimentary of Trump.  Although Trump was a "committed friend" who was willing to give in to Bibi on a whole range of issues including moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan and putting together a proposed peace deal with the Palestinians without any Palestinian input, there is little true respect shown for Trump, perhaps deservedly show.

The one area where Bibi does show appreciation for Trump is in the development and negotiation of the Abraham accords, though the book suggests that these are all really Bibi's creations, which he was able to foist onto Trump as a priority.  On the other hand, Bibi claims that Trump had promised to recognize Israeli sovereignty over much of the West Bank and has some very harsh words for Trump over the U.S. decision to back out of this commitment, even though some have argued that this was all used as a smoke screen to make progress with the UAE and Bahrain.

Ultimately, even with Trump, Bibi still had to deal with the U.S. (and worldwide) position that Israel needs to come to a political solution with the Palestinians.  Whether it is the Clinton Plan, the Obama Plan, the Saudi Plan, the Trump Plan, or anyone else's, if it is to be a viable solution that also protects Israeli demographic interests, there will need to be a Palestinian State, or some form of separation of the two peoples, with a Palestinian territory being the one that can address any Palestinian refugee claims.  

But Bibi has no time for this argument.  I was waiting to see what he might outline, in the book, as his proposed solution.  What is the Bibi plan? Perhaps, I thought, he was a "Jordan is Palestine" proponent (given that more than 70% of the Jordanian population is Palestinian).  No, he explicitly rules that out as dangerous in no uncertain terms.  Maybe he supports a population transfer and/or incentives to the Palestinians to relocate?  No suggestion of that as a policy, even though he is now entering a coaltion government with 14 coalition members from the Religious Zionist Party that support that approach.  Two state supporter?  Well even though he accepted that in principle after much arm twisting from past U.S. Presidents, he leaves little doubt that he opposes a two state solution in this book.  

Ultimately, the best I could discern, to use hockey terminology - his preference would be to "rag the puck" (i.e. just to kill time).  He favours a continuation of the current status quo with only minor changes to the way things have been going with the hope that one day, the problem will just go away.  This just does not seem like a viable long term solution.  If Israel moves to annex large amounts of Judea and Samaria, as now requested by the Religious Zionist coalition, we will be closer to an apartheid type of regime, unless when Israel annexes these territories it also grants full and equal citizenship for all of the people living in the territories irrespective of religious background.  If it simply de facto annexes these areas, Israel will continue on with a smouldering situation, trying to control a hostile population of millions of Palestinians.  Ultimately, Bibi fails to propose any type of viable solution for the current conflict with the Palestinians and even castigates all of those leaders who have tried to resolve it.

That is not to say that there is an ideal solution.  There is a great deal of historical truth to Bibi's assessments of Arafat and Abbas (both as two-faced liars and terror supporters) as well as his assessments of past U.S. Presidents including Clinton and Obama (both of whom naively thought that the Palestinian leadership would agree to a deal).  However, there is also something to the thesis argued by Caspit and Pfeffer.  Bibi had a golden opportunity with a sympathetic U.S. President in Trump, a powerful domestic political position and even a solid relationship with Putin and other European leaders, while at the same time, developing ties with a range of other Arab countries.  He could have tried to use this position of great strength to come up with a viable solution, even if it would be difficult to sell to the Palestinians.  Perhaps he could have obtained worldwide support to impose a solution.  There is little to show, from Bibi's account, that he made any such efforts or that he has any vision that he is willing to share about how to resolve the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

On the Iranian policy side, Bibi spends quite a bit of time dealing with his battle with President Obama on the COJPA and his fight to stop the agreement or have it shredded.  He outlines many of the flaws with the agreement and it is hard to argue with him that the agreement would have done anything other than delay Iranian nuclear armaments by 10-15 years.  He characterizes this whole issue as existential, perhaps one of the most existential threats that Israel has ever faced.

However, now that he "succeeded" in shredding the agreement, what did he accomplish?  Trump refused to bomb Iran's nuclear program or even threaten to do so.  Iran is moving ahead with its program at breakneck speed.  Perhaps Bibi is simply laying the groundwork for justification of a pending Israeli military attack on the Iranian nuclear program.  I guess we will see.  But from what I have read from various sources, there are a whole host of concerns about that option.  It may lead to large, wholesale war that would cause enormous loss of life in Israel.  The U.S. may oppose this type of attack - as might a range of allies.  Israel may not even have the full military capability to reach these underground nuclear sites and destroy all of them.  And ultimately, this may only set the program back by a short period of time and may lead Iran to redouble its efforts.

Overall, there may well have been other options, including different approachs with Obama and Trump that may have led to a better deal that would have actually stopped the program, with a combination of threats and incentives.

With respect to Bibi's attempts to rehabilitate the reputations of his family members, including Yair and Sara, in particular, his words just don't sound credible, especially given the multitude of stories about incidents involving these two.  For example, he dismisses the fact that Sara pled guilty to criminal charges by arguing that it was all trumped up and the plea bargain was done to end the matter and avoid any further publicity and hassle.  Here, again, the actual facts suggest otherwise.

Bibi devotes a short part of the book to dismissing all of the charges against him as "trumped up," "sewn together" and purely political.  I guess it remains to be seen what will happen with his trial.  Suffice it to say that the initial evidence was deemed as so overhwelming against Bibi at the preliminary stages of these proceedings, that even his political allies refused to dismiss the charges against him.  Of course his new governing coalition may find other ways to end Bibi's trial but that won't really prove that the charges were ill conceived in the first place.  But getting back to Bibi's initial comments, he took the absolute weakest part of his legacy and buried it near the end of his book with a tone of dismissal and indignation, something that legal counsel might do with an argument for which they don't really have a great response.

One other thought I had was that Bibi says very little, throughout this book, of the compromises that he has had to make with the ultra-orthodox to remain in power.  Over Bibi's tenure as president, he has successively provided larger and larger amounts of money to the ultra-orthodox and has granted them with greater and greater power over a range of aspects of Israeli life.  

Although Bibi argues so passionately for the power of education and particularly scientific education, he has presided over the growth of an ever increasing number of religious institutions that refuse to teach basic secular subjects.  Although he argues for the Republican philosophy of "pulling yourself up by the bootstraps," working hard and saving your money, he has presided over a massive growth in the number of Haredi families that look to the state for their income and remain outside of the labour force.  And although he appeals to many aspects of secular culture, including literature and theatre, his deals with co-coalitionists have led to a gradual erosion in the number of public performances and presentations that include an equal gender balance and have led to ever increasing rifts with liberal Jewish communities inside and outside of Israel, including rifts with non-Orthodox Jewish communities which will surely be exacerbated under this new governing coalition.  

Bibi has very little to say about the divisiveness that he has created in Israeli society.  Although Israel has always been a country in which 2 people have 3 different opinions, the ascerbic nature of public discourse has increased exponentially, fuelled by some of Bibi's political campaigns.  He does take credit at points in his book for tactics used in this regard.

Ultimately, this book is well written, entertaining and filled with selected but interesting antecdotes.

But I have many doubts about its veracity and I have arguments with many of the different conclusions that Bibi draws.   I guess Bibi can take notes over the coming four years in preparation for adding a few more chapters.  I suppose that the jury is still out on his legacy.  Perhaps we will have a bit of a better picture when his political life finally comes to an end.



Wednesday, November 2, 2022

Bibi's Victory Margin has Grown

We have had several election updates today from the Israeli election authority.  More than 90% of the ballots have been counted.  However, the remaining ballots may not be fully tabulated until tomorrow morning - or even early Friday.  My discussion of the early results appears in my previous blog and not much has changed.  But here are a few key points.

1.  The Netanyahu bloc is now sitting at a very comfortable 65 seats.  That breaks down to 32 for Likud (Bibi's party), 14 for the Religious Zionist party, 11 for Sha'as and 8 for the United Torah Judaism Party.  This is the "fully right wing government" that Bibi's supporters have dreamt of.

2.  The growth in the size of the Netanyahu bloc has come at the expense, partially, of Meretz, which is now sitting at less than 3.25% and unlikely to pass the electoral threshhold.  Although there is still a chance that this leftist secular bloc could pass the threshhold, most analysts have suggested that it looks unlikely given the make up of the remaining uncounted votes.

3.  The Arab party Bal'ad is also below the threshhold.  They are also unlikely to pass.  

4.  The Labour party is apparently very close to the threshold (just over) and is facing the possibility of falling below - which could strengthen Bibi even further.  They seem likely to scrape through but it will be close.

If Meretz and Bal'ad were to both pass, which seems highly unlikely, the Likud-led bloc could fall to as low as 61 seats.  That would still leave Likud and its bloc with a majority.

What's Next?

Bibi will now have 30 days to cobble together an official coalition.  Although there will definitely be in-fighting over key cabinet ministries, it seems likely that this bloc will be able to put things together within the alotted month.  There are lots of egos here, lots of likely demands and lots of disagreements.  But compared to past coalitions that Bibi has formed, this will be relatively easy.

Among the priorities and likely steps to be taken by this new government:

1. The appointment of a new Justice Minister, some new judges and some type of steps to be taken to end Bibi's trial.  The Religious Zionist party floated the prospect of introducing legislation to remove the criminal offences of corruption and breach of trust for sitting government members.  If passed, this would effectively end Bibi's trial;

2.  Elimination of the special tax on sugary beverages (coca cola etc.,) and non-resusable plastics and other disposable materials.  The ultra-religious have complained about these taxes which were introduced by the previous government. They claim that these special taxes were directed at them since they are the highest users of these products.  The tax on disposable goods was clearly implemented as an environmental measure.   The tax on sugary beverages was imposed as a response to growing obesity among young people.

3.  Significantly increased police presence in Arab-Israeli areas and increased army presence in Palestinian areas - in an effort to reduce violence in Arab-Israeli communities and in an effort to stop the current wave of Palestinian terror attacks.

4.  Immediate legislation or special measures to significantly increase the budgets (state funding) for Yeshiva students, ultra-religious organizations, and settlement/settler organizations.

Medium Term:

I think that it is reasonable to expect that we will see government action taken in a number of areas:

1.  I expect that the Religious Zionist party will push for widespread expansion of settlement activity throughout Judea and Samaria (the "West Bank").  The government is likely to offer low cost housing, incentives for young families (especially Orthodox and Ultra-Orthodox families) to move to these areas.  This will enrage Palestinians and may well bring about a third (or fourth) "intifadah."

2.  Increased power for the ultra-orthodox Rabbinical establishment including increased funding.  This could reverse the changes that were made previously to demonopolize Kosher supervision, it could lead to a complete ban on any non-Orthodox activity at the Kotel (the Western Wall) and it could make conversion to Judaism even more difficult.  I would think, for example, the "Women of the Wall" are going to be in for a very rough time.

3.  A much more boisterous and aggressive foreign policy.  We could see an increase in attacks on Hezbollah bases in Lebanon and Syria and quite possibly, increased action taken against Iran.  It is unclear how this government will position itself with respect to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.  Netanyahu has always had a good relationship with Putin and Israel may be reluctant to become involved in any way in support of Ukraine.

4.  Coalition members of the incoming members have called for widespread "judicial reform."  Aside from filling the benches with right wing judges, I'm not sure what else they have planned here.  They may want further changes to the Israeli "Basic Law" to place more of an emphasis on the "Jewish" character of Israel and less of an emphasis on the "democratic" nature of the state - or on the principle of equality.

5.  If even some of these changes start to take place, Israel may well begin to face all sorts of criticism and international pressure - not only from other democratic countries but from Jews from around the world as well.

In the medium to longer term, if this coalition holds up, the Religious Zionist party will make more demands that will create tension between their party and Bibi.  Among its campaign platforms, the RZ party has, over the years, called for capital punishment for terrorists, government payments to "encourage" emigration of Arabs and Palestinians, significant changes to the Israeli legal system and other steps of the type that far right wing governments typically take.  I expect that some of the Likud members are likely to be uncomfortable with some of the demands made by the RZ coalition partners.

As an educated, westernized, English speaking politician, Netanyahu would probably be more comfortable forming a government with Gantz, Sa'ar and some of the other generals in Gantz's party, even Bennett, as opposed to a bunch of utra-orthodox and extremist politicians.  However, given his current legal troubles, and the bridges that he burned over the years with all of these people for different reasons, this was not an option so he is left to do the best with what he saw as the most promising opportunity.

Overall, Bibi ran a masterful campaign even though he and his party actually wound up with only 30-31 seats, which is lower than the numbers that they have had in the past.  The two big winners here are the Religious Zionist Party and Sha'as.  

The RZ party soaked up all of the votes that Bennett had in the past.  Bennett had run as a right wing leader but wound up in a coalition with centrist and leftist parties.  His voters were furious.  His party, which is now led by Ayelet Shaked, was eviscerated in this election.  The Shas party, despite having a leader who has been convicted twice of criminal offences, including a 2021 plea bargain deal, (or perhaps because of this) still managed to collect 10-11 seats.  That's an astounding number for this ultra-religious party but full credit to its leader, Aryah Deri, the certified fraudster.

There are several losers on the other side.  The biggest loser so far is Meretz, which may not even make the cut-off.   Their former leader, Nitzan Horowitz, served as the minister of education.  He resigned after the government fell.  Meretz brought back its past, less compromising leader, Zehava Gal'on.  She was obviously not the right choice. The Labour party and Lieberman's party are close to where they were previously though Lieberman has, in the past, reached numbers closer to 7 or 8 seats.  

For the Arab parties, the results are a disaster.  They disbanded their unified party and wound up throwing away four seats.  Having a total of only 8 or 9 Arab Israeli Knesset members is a major loss and will leave Israeli Arabs with a significantly reduced voice in state affairs.

I would also say that this was a disaster for Yair Lapid.  Although his party picked up 24 seats, which was an improvement, his move to the left probably contributed to the decline of the Meretz party - as well as to the increased strength on the right.  Lapid made several mistakes as election day approached.  His speech at the U.N. was ill-considered and made without a proper mandate.  His decision to sign off on a gas deal with Lebanon just weeks before an election was ill advised.  And his campaign, generally, was lacklustre.  While Bibi was running around the country visiting people in their homes and holding rallies, Lapid was much less visible.

In my view, to retain legitimacy, Lapid needs to open up his party to "primaries" and turn the party into a democratically functioning party rather than a one-man party.  He needs input from others towards developing medium and long term strategies and those strategies have to be formed with the equal input from a range of party members or new blood.  Even the leadership of the party should be contestable.

All of this being said, there may well be quite a bit of backlash once this new government eventually falls and the centre and centre-left will need a strong alternative to Bibi ready to jump into action and run an effective campaign.

Interesting and challenging times are ahead but, as I mentioned yesterday, Bibi is firmly in the driver's seat and everyone knows he is the boss.  He can't blame any government problems on anyone else at this point - he will have to take full responsibility for any actions that his government takes.  In effect, we will now get to see the "real Bibi."  

I will provide one more update once we have the absolute final results in, especially if anything changes.  At this point, however, there is a good chance that nothing will change dramatically.