Showing posts with label Abbas. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Abbas. Show all posts

Thursday, October 29, 2026

Israeli Election Results 2026: Where do we go from here?

Inside Israeli Election Station 

    We flew back to Israel just in time to vote in this        year's Israeli elections.  This was one of the most        convenient flights I have taken in the past two years     between Toronto and Tel-Aviv - since I was able to     book the whole flight on one Air Canada ticket -         even though Air Canada is not currently flying             direct.

    The Flight

    We flew from Toronto on Air Canada to Vienna.          We had a scheduled 1 hour 45 minute changeover         in Austria.  Since it was all on an Air Canada               ticket  - we were able to send our luggage straight      through (yes we checked bags - there are many things that are considerably cheaper in Canada than in Israel - still...).  Our flight was about 1 hour and 10 minutes ahead of schedule - so we even had time to visit the Austrian Airlines lounge in Vienna.  It wasn't bad - but nothing super exciting.

The flight from Vienna to Tel-Aviv was packed with Israelis eager to get home and vote.  The flight was smooth and on-time - but I have to say that on this route - Austrian is competing with the low-cost airlines rather than the standard airlines.

The seats do not recline at all.  Food and drinks are only available for payment - even coffee - goes for 5 Euros a cup.  On the other hand - it is only a three hour flight.  It left on time and arrived on time - and we landed safely (okay there was a very loud thud when we landed....) but we arrived - in time to vote.

We had been concerned that the government would try to close the airport - or come up with some reason to delay flights - or that something else would happen.  But we made it. We had lots of time to stop at home, drop off our stuff, and then head over to the polling station.

Voting

In Israel - election day is a national holiday.  The trains and intercity buses are free for the day so that people can get to their designated polling booth. Outside the polling booth - there were representatives of the various campaigns - playing music, singing songs, and sitting at booths -  available to answer questions.  It wasn't a pressure campaign of any kind just an atmosphere of celebrating election day.

There was no line up or wait of any kind in Ra'anana - which, as it turned out, saw approximately 71.5% of its eligible voters show up to the polls. That was a bit lower than some of the nearby cities - Herzliyah, Hod Hasharon, Ramat Hasharon - some of which were closer to 80%.

In Israel, when you show up at the polling station, you show your ID to a panel of three or four supervisors - who each review it and check you off the list.  You then receive an empty blue envelope.

You go into the voting booth -  and inside the booth - you have a huge box with various compartments - each with pieces of paper with different party names on each piece.  You pick the piece of paper with the name of the party that you want to vote for and you put it in the envelope and then seal it.  If you put a blank piece of paper (an available option) or no piece of paper - or multiple pieces - your ballot is officially spoiled.  

You then go and stand in front of the three supervisors and put your sealed envelope into the big blue voting box.  And that's it - you are done.

No filling  in circles - or other format that would enable quick electronic counting.  In fact the system is a system that probably could have been used several hundred years ago - and the post election counting continues to take just as long.

As a sidebar - I have to note that the system  in Canada, by contrast, was an easy, effective modern system.  You get your ballot, you fill in the  circle for the candidate (or party) that you would like to elect, you put it into an envelope and then deposit it into a computerized ballot counting system.  You therefore have an efficient way of counting ballots and a way to recount - if required.

My vote in Toronto didn't help the disastrous results for the Toronto Jewish community - since the City of Toronto re-elected a mayor who is extremely antagonistic towards Israel and towards the Jewish community in Toronto - which is very unfortunate.  I received the results while I was on the airplane flying from Toronto to Vienna. But this is all a big digression.

Waiting for the Results

People in Israel are glued to their TVs or computers at 10 p.m. when the polls close.  But they do not start getting real results. Instead the various national networks release exit poll results - and the "experts" start analyzing the results of the election based on these exit polls - which, over the years, have become increasingly inaccurate. There are also four different TV stations releasing four different sets of results. One station, Channel 14 (think Fox News in the US), released a poll showing that Bibi had won 31 seats and that his government would get to 61 seats overall. All of the others put the Likud at closer to 23-26 and estimated that the Likud Bloc would get to 52-55 seats, short of the 61 needed to form a government.

We watched for a while - and I think it was only after 12:30 a.m. that actual real results started appearing.

The various leaders all gave speeches - but of course - the speeches are all based on scant information and incomplete results.  Nevertheless, each party leader seemed to claim victory of sorts, culminating in Bibi speaking at about 3:45 a.m. and, of course, claiming victory.

The Actual Results

And now - what you have been waiting for - the actual results - based on more than 95% of the counted votes.

Out of  120 seats in the Knesset - 5,641,300 votes counted out of a total of 5,695,682 total ballots (including a large chunk of spoiled ballots)

Government Bloc

Likud: 27

Yehadut Hatorah (Ashkenazi Ultra-Orthodox): 7

Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Power - far right Ben-Gvir Party): 7

Hatzionit Hadatit (Religious Zionist Party - far right Smotrich): 6

Shas (Sephardi Ultra-Orthodox): 6

Total Likud Bloc: 53 seats.

This leaves the current government 8 seats short of being able to form a government with a total loss of 14 seats from their position at dissolution of the Knesset and 11 less than the number they won in the 2022 election. 

Opposition Bloc

Yashar (Eisenkot - Centre Right): 21

B'Yachad (Bennett/Lapid - Centre Right) 12

The Democrats (Left - Golan): 8

Israel our home (Centre Right - Lieberman): 7

Total Opposition Bloc: 48

Quite disappointing for the opposition bloc - which had been forecast to be in the range of 53-55.  Poor showing, relative to expectations, for just about every constituent bloc member.

Arab Parties

Ra'am (led by Monsour Abbas - Conservative, Muslim party - but willing to work with Zionist parties):  8

Joint List (A combination of parties including communists and avowed anti-Zionist members): 11 seats

Total Arab Parties: 19

Very significant results for the Arab parties - which are now in a position to have major influence over the future government. The big winners of this election - measured by the improvement in position.

Specific Areas:

Before I get into my interpretation of what all of this means - and in case you are  wondering about how regional the results are in Israel - here is a snapshot of a few different places in Israel:

1. Ra'anana: 

In Israel - the political map uses Red for the opposition,  Blue for the Likud-led government - and different shades for different  mixtures  Ra'anana was a shade of red  - though the "least red" of the Sharon region cities.  65% of voters supported the opposition bloc, while 35% supported the government. Eisenkot received 26.5% of  the vote, Bennett 20.6% and Bibi 18.6%. The surrounding cities of Hod Hasharon, Ramat Hasharon and Herzliyah received closer to 75-80% opposition support.

2. Tel Aviv:

Nearly 76% opposition, nearly 24% government support.

3. Rehovot

52%  opposition, 48% government.

4. Netanya

59% government, 41% opposition

5. Jerusalem

75%  government, 25%  opposition. 37% of all voters voted for the two ultra-religious parties.

6. Beer Sheva

63% government, 37% opposition.

7. Kiryat Eqron

75% government, 25% opposition

As you can see, the political map is divided on a very regional basis - much like the U.S. map -  even though Israel is a relatively small country.  Rehovot is the closest to being considered a "bell weather" area - split almost evenly between the different blocs.

What Does all of this Mean?

At the time of writing, it is unclear what is now going to happen. Going into the election, if you read my previous blog, you would recall - that I did estimate that a "stalemate" was the most likely result - at 50% plus.  For  now - this looks like a stalemate.  However, it can also be a bit like trying to solve a Rubik's cube.  There are various alternatives  out there - if the various constituent members want to form a government.  I am going to run through some of this now.

1. Options for Bibi

Even though Prime Minister Netanyahu has won the plurality of seats - a total of 27 seats - which is more than any other party - he lost 5 seats compared to the 2022 elections.  More importantly, his coalition members also lost seats. Shas went from 11 to 6. Overall, Bib's coalition went from 64 to 53.  

The real challenge is that Bibi, almost certainly cannot simply add parties from the opposition to this existing right wing coalition.  None of the current opposition parties are likely to join it.  So what options does Bibi have?

A. "Rag the Puck" - and Wait for New Elections

This is almost certainly Bibi's preferred strategy - since these results are very disappointing for his coalition.  It could have been worse, for sure.  He could have lost outright and the the opposition could have gotten to 61. That would have been a complete disaster for Bibi.  

The President of Israel, Yitzchak Herzog - will push for a "unity government" in which Bibi joins and /or leads a government with some or all of the opposition parties. But the only way that this could occur would be if Bibi were to abandon some or all of his coalition partners - the far right - and the ultra-orthodox and this seems unlikely.  Part of the reason is that this would damage his chances for the next  election. A "unity government" would almost certainly be fragile. As soon as it collapses a new election would be scheduled and if Bibi had abandoned his allies - he would have even bigger problems for a next round. So I do believe that his preferred strategy will be Trumpian - attack the legitimacy of the elections (as of the time of writing he has already started doing this), vilify the elected Arab Knesset members (he has started doing this) and claim that he will agree to a "unity" government if the opposition parties will simply join his governing coalition. They will not do so - which means that the best option for Bibi will be to do everything to force another election -  while making it look like it was not his preferred goal.

B. A True Unity Government

There is probably some kind of constellation in which Bibi and his Likud party could try to create a genuine "Unity Coalition." However, Bibi would  not be able to take all of this partners into this type of government - and he would need to make genuine, significant concessions. This could include agreeing to a National Commissions of Inquiry to investigate the events of October 7 (Bibi really opposes this), a law enlisting all of the Ultra-Orthodox or virtually all  to the army (Bibi opposes this because of the political fallout), a law freezing the "Judicial reform", and other possible laws.  Moreover, Bibi would need to install several of the Opposition Knesset members as Ministers in his cabinet.  

Of course the elephant in the room - is that this type of unity government would not cancel or end Bibi's trial or assist him with it. Unless a pardon - was a term of the unity government.  

Israeli politics can be very unpredictable so I do not think we can rule anything out at this time. But if Bibi decides that this his best route for preserving what is left of his legacy, ending his trial and making the best deal possible - this could be an option.  Overall, I am betting against it.

C. Some Crazier Options

i. Work with the Arab Parties

With 53 seats, theoretically, Bibi could make a deal with Ra'am, the Arab party that joined a Bennett led government.  Ra'am leader Monsour Abbas is a very practical leader - and with the right offer, he might consider a deal. The problem is that Bibi's coalition partners, in particular Ben-Gvir and Smotrich are very unlikely to agree to a coalition with any Arab party members. I am not sure that Bibi could pressure them into joining or that he would even try.

ii. Resign in Exchange for a Pardon

As crazy as its sounds, Bibi might calculate that this is the time to make his exit - even though he won 26 seats - and cut a deal with the President and the Prosecution - whereby he could get out of his criminal proceedings, leave politics and free his Likud party - to make a deal with some of the opposition members.  Sounds crazy - but see my comments above.  

Overall, given Bibi's level of hubris, I believe that he will do everything he can to push for a new election, while trying to make it look like it wasn't his fault.  

That is all Bibi's side of the equation.  However, given the numbers, he is not really in the driver's seat at this point.

2.  Options for the Opposition:

Eisenkot and the opposition parties - suffered a significant defeat, especially when compared to their anticipated results.  With only 48 seats, they are not in a great position to form a government.  But they do have some interesting options - especially since this is, after all, Israeli politics.

A. Propose a Genuine Unity Government

As discussed above, this is not a preferred option for Bibi. But perhaps there is some kind of proposal that the opposition can make - that will serve different purposes. First of all, if it is a genuine compromise proposal -  it could benefit the interests of the majority of Israelis and create some level of stability  If  the proposal fails - the fact that it was made, in good faith, could help the opposition in the next election.  This type of proposal would have to include an enlistment law for the ultra-orthodox, together with a law that reduces funding for institutions that do not teach secular subjects, significant ministries for the various opposition leaders, perhaps a pardon for Bibi and the end of the government led attacks on the judicial system. First of all, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to convince all of the opposition parties to join  this type of government. For example, I don't think that the Democrats would join under just about any conditions.  Further it seems unlikely that Bibi  would agree. Though perhaps the dangled pardon would be the incentive he needs. 

B. Entice the Ultra-Orthodox to Join

This one sounds strange as well.  But there are 13 ultra-orthodox MKs.  If they suddenly joined the opposition, that would bring the opposition to 61 seats.  In my view, neither the Haredim nor the Opposition are likely to agree to this.  Golan and Lieberman are strongly opposed to making any concessions to the ultra-religious and all of the opposition parties ran on promising an "enlistment law."  The Haredim could not join without significant concessions. They are certainly willing to make deals that will preserve their sources of funding and power.  They have done so in the past with left wing governments in Israel.  However, at this point, the gap between the opposition and the Haredim seems unbridgeable to me.

C. A deal with the Arab Parties

This is starting to look like the opposition's best strategy.  There are significant challenges here.  Eight of the Arab MKs, lead by Mounsour Abbas - are willing to support Israel as a  Jewish, Zionist state. Abbas has served in the government previously -  with Bennett.  Even though Lieberman, Bennett, and Eisenkot have also said that they would not sit with Abbas, I believe that they probably would.  However, even with Abbas' eight seats, that would only take Eisenkot to 56, still five seats short.  So he would then either need to add on an ultra orthodox party, some Likud members, some Joint List members - or Smotrich or Ben Gvir.

Both Smotrich and  Ben Gvir have sworn that they will not sit with any Arabs - even Abbas. And the opposition members would not really want to set with Ben Gvir or Smotrich either.  Though some opposition members - Lieberman and Bennett perhaps - might  prefer Smotrich and Ben-Gvir over Abbas.

The ultra-orthodox are a wild card and might  join for the right promises - but the opposition members  do not want to make those promises.

So that still leaves the opposition short by 5 seats.

The Joint List has 11 seats.  But these members included communists, pro-Hamas, Pro-PLO members.  Some of them are outright antagonistic towards the state.  Effectively, they are worse than having the Bloc Quebecois as part of a National Government in Canada.  So there are all kinds of problems with this idea.

It would be politically disastrous for the opposition bloc for the next elections - and it would be politically unpalatable, even for members within the opposition (other than Yair Golan perhaps).

And it could endanger Israel's security.

So an outright deal, that allows the opposition to form a government with the Arab parties seems unrealistic and unlikely. 

D. A Partial Deal with the Arab Parties

This is starting to look like a very real possibility. The Knesset could be sworn in and could start passing laws -  with the support of more than 61 members of the Knesset - even without having a formal government in place. Not sure how this would work yet - but the first step would be voting to replace the current speaker of the house, the interim Prime Minister - and perhaps to pass a number of other laws - for example  - setting up a National Commissions, putting in place and enlistment law, passing certain budget bills.  

It is hard to say what this will do.  It might send some opposition supporters to the right - for the coming elections -  and may  hand the Likud a victory the next time around.  Or it may give hope to many people who felt that their votes were being ignored and could create a sea change in Israeli politics.

There would be all kinds  of uncertainty here, and this type  of government is not likely to last very long.  I think the opposition members are going to need to think very carefully about how they approach this.  But it is starting to look like a serious option that we may see over the coming months.

iii. Options for the  Arab Parties

The two big voting blocs of Arab parties received their largest number of seats ever (so much for the arguments  about Israel as an "apartheid state.") But that still leaves the question - what can they do with this support? Can they translate it into real political gains?

A. Options for Ra'am

Ra'am is led by Monsour Abbas, a Muslim Israeli, a licensed dentist, fluent in Arabic, English and Hebrew - and a very skilled politician.  His party enlisted a Jewish Israeli as its number 2 candidate in this year's election - and he sat in the Bennett government in the past- and by all accounts made significant contributions.

Ra'am and its supporters would like to participate fully in the political process and are willing to make deals with the opposition parties and /or  even the government coalition.

Certainly there are elements in several parties - both the government and the opposition - that would  like to avoid any kind  of deal with Arab Knesset members - especially after October 7.  

But I think the majority of opposition members will view Ra'am as a legitimate partner and will view Abbas as a stable, helpful ally for forming a government.  

I believe that Abbas will push for Ra'am to be involved either directly or indirectly in any new government  led by the opposition and that he may well wind up being a Minister in any such government - whether now or as a result of some future election.

The challenge is that even with Abbas, the opposition still does not have enough to form a government. 

B. Options for the Joint List

Several of the Joint  List members, as  I have discussed above, are anti-Zionist, anti-Israel Knesset members.  As a result, they do not want to serve in government - even if they could do so.  Some of them are in politics to try and bring about the demise of the state of Israel.  Much like BQ members in Canada,  it would obviously be impractical, politically suicidal and unstable to rely on these members.

However, the Joint List has said that its goal would be to help the opposition get rid of Bibi's government and might support various laws -  even without being part of the government.  In other words, there could be some sort of minority government, supported externally by the Joint List - that could get the government to 61+ seats on most  issues.

This could benefit Arab Israelis across the  country - who could get significant benefits from supporting  the government - as a condition of their support. This could be very interesting for a period of time.

Conclusion

I could leave all of this blank - since I believe I have  gone through most of the possibilities but I am not in a position to make predictions yet.  My main prediction - is that Bibi will do his best to push for new elections, keep his role as interim Prime Minister - and attack the opposition and the Arab Israeli community at every opportunity as illegitimate and disloyal.

However, since his coalition lost the election, he may not be able to have his way - especially if Eisenkot turns out to be tougher politically than Benny Gantz was. This remains to be seen.

Other Comments

The weather is  beautiful here - 27C (about 81F) and sunny.  Air Canada  is expected to start flying direct to Tel-Aviv from Toronto on November 30, 2026 (let's see if that happens).  

Baseball season is over (I stayed up very late to watch the Brewers win the World Series - it was the only game I saw). Interestingly, the Israeli TV  stations broadcast NFL  football, NBA basketball and NHL hockey - but no baseball generally.  So I had to stream it.

We are of course in the month of "Mar Heshvan" - the "bitter" month of Heshvan which has no holidays or celebrations -  so I guess that means it is the opportunity to get lots of work done.  But for a political news junkie like me - we have several weeks of fascinating Israeli news coming up, the American mid-terms on Tuesday - and the very fragile situation here in the Middle  East.

I will write more soon - but I wanted to get this out with some thoughts and analysis of where we are at  now.  I note that there are all kinds of people circulating false, misleading information - or trying to twist the results into something that they are not.  My hope is that this analysis is all perceived as a reasonably objective analysis of the actual situation and what is likely to happen - rather than a propaganda column of the type that some well known bloggers are spreading (I won't name names).  

As usual, I am happy to discuss all of this or respond to comments.  Stay tuned for interesting, surprising and perhaps very unexpected developments.




Sunday, September 5, 2021

The Netanyahu Years by Ben Caspit: A review

 

Over the past week, I read Ben Caspit's book on former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, The Netanyhau Years.  It was a quick and interesting read, primarily covering the time period between 1999 and 2015.

Caspit is an Israeli journalist who writes for Ma'ariv, a slightly right of centre publication.  The book was translated by Ora Cummings.  I would say that the translation was quite choppy at times and probably needs a number of edits.

This is not a classic historian's biography with footnotes, references and details of sources.  Rather there are a great deal of unattributed quotes, anonymous sources and even references to "rumours" and "urban legends."   For  example, after Netanyahu was caught cheating on his current wife, Sara (his third wife), he and Sara lawyered up and reached an agreement on how they would continue their relationship.  According to some sources, there is a written agreement that spells out in detail how everything is supposed to work.  Caspit refers to the existence of the document as an "urban legend,"  though in this case, his assumption is that the document exists. No further sources or details are provided. 

I should also note that the book only covers the period up to the end of the Obama presidency.  There are a good few chapters to write about Netanyahu during the Trump years  and about  the developments with Netanyahu's criminal charges and about Netanyahu's political moves all since 2017, the time of the book's original publication in Hebrew.  

Overall, as someone who avidly follows politics and history, I enjoyed reading the book.  It was at times repetitive, and the organization was a bit disjointed.  Some of it was written chronologically and other parts were written thematically.  So the last two parts of the book include a section on Netanyahu's dealings with the Palestinians and his dealings with Iran.   Earlier, the book flows in a more chronological manner, covering a year or two at a time.  

Caspit covers some of Netanyahu's background growing up, his relationship with his parents, particularly his father, his move to Israel and the devastating  loss of his older  brother Yoni, who was killed in the Israeli raid on Entebbe.  He also covers some of the details of Netanyahu's relationships with his three wives and the impact that  each of these women had on his career, his circle of friends, his motivation and goals.  These parts of the book flowed well and provided quite a bit of interesting background information.

But the majority of the book deals with Netanyahu's relationship with political rivals and friends, at home and abroad and Netanyahu's decision making processes over the years.  Caspit  covers the relationships that Bibi built up with wealthy American and Israeli donors over the years, his close relationship to U.S. republican politicians and influencers, his battles with fellow Likud members over the years and Netanyahu's primary goal of remaining in power at all costs, which is, more or less, one of the themes of the book.

A great deal of Caspit's focus is lost opportunity.  He asserts that Netanyahu had so much popularity for  a period of time, that he could have advanced a joint Israeli-U.S. peace process  with the Palestinians that would have created a  period of medium to long term stablity for Israel vis-a-vis the Palestinians.  Caspit also lays a fair bit of blame at the feet of Abbas, the Palestinian leader, for the failure of the peace process, so it remains unclear how, even if Bibi had made certain decisions, Abbas would have agreed.  Caspit outlines several "secret" tracks of negotiation that were taking place - the Peres-Abbas track, which he maintains was very close to a deal, the "London Track" which was also close to a deal and some other secret initiatives.  On balance, however, his conclusion seems to be that Netanyahu could have made a deal if he had really wanted to do so.  I'm not sure that this is accurate.

Caspit also maintains that if Bibi had taken a different approach with then President Obama, Netanyahu could have partnered with the U.S. to negotiate a much better Iranian deal.   Caspit's thesis here seems  to be that the U.S. was not prepared to create any sort of realistic military option, either its own, or an Israeli option as an alternative to the negotiated nuclear deal with Iran, especially since Israel was not willing to show any flexibility on other policy issues, such as peace initiatives with the Palestinians.  Therefore, the  U.S. was ultimately negotiating from a position of weakness and gave in, unnecessarily, to several Iranian demands  that saw the deal allowing Iran to develop nuclear weapons over a period of 10 years.  Caspit partially blames Bibi for this, since, he asserts, that rather than working with Obama, Netanyahu decided to attack the President at  every opportunity, support the Republicans, even publicly, and make it a mission to try and prevent Obama from winning a second term.  This was obviously a failed strategy in Caspit's view.

That is not to say that Caspit  blames  Netanyahu entirely.  With respect to Obama's mideastern policy, I think it is fair to say that there is little here that is very complimentary of Obama  and his team.  From the beginning of his presidency, Obama sent a very hostile message to Israel by visiting Egypt and Jordan and skipping Israel.  This right away limited U.S. credibility for a country trying to broker a peace deal by being a partial guarantor of Israel's security.  After that, over the course of an 8 year period, there were several snubs, humiliations and questionable political  moves, going both ways. Caspit details many of them. 

With respect to Israel, Caspit has some harsh  words for several U.S. and Israeli diplomats and politicians, including George Mitchell, Hillary Clinton, Martin Indyk, Rahm Emanuel from the U.S. side, Ron  Dermer, Gideon Sa'ar, and a number of others from the Israeli side.  I think it is fair to say that some of his harshest criticism is reserved for Sara Netanyahu.  Given her guilty plea to state criminal charges, her record of scandals and flare ups, much of this may be warranted.  But Caspit spends a fair bit of time covering mistakes and misteps by many political actors, not just  Bibi, that caused such a deterioration in the Obama-Netanyahu relationship, the disintegration of the peace  process and other outcomes.   Overall, there is "lots of blame to go around" and some of Caspit's analysis seems, perhaps, intended to justify some of the positions that Netanyahu took to ward off antagonistic or mistaken policies and proposals advanced by the U.S. that were not in Israel's long term interest.  

Despite these efforts at "balance," Caspit is extremely critical of a number of Netanyahu's moves over the Obama years.  Netanyahu's decision to accept a speaking invitation at the Capitol at the behest of the congressional Republicans and to go ahead and make a presentation there without even informing President Obama in advance was unprecedented and a serious violation of diplomatic protocol.  Netanyahu's decision to announce new settlements just as then Vice-President Biden was arriving in Israel for a  key visit was also quite a poke in the eye.  And the fact that Netanyahu kept President Obama and/or Vice Biden waiting for very lengthy periods for a several meetings was another example of Netanyahu's conduct that  bolster Caspit's conclusion  that Netanyahu went out of his way, on several occasions to try and humiliate Obama and Biden in a manner that was highly unstatesmanlike at best, and thoroughly inappropriate.  

Caspit does a great deal of editorializing.  He tries to write about what Netanyahu must have been thinking, his political and personal calculations, his massive ego, his messianic complex and his enormous sense of self-entitlement.  Those who are supportive of Netanyahu might view much of this as overblown, unsupported and much conjecture.  But since the writing of the book, with political events that  have taken place in Israel since 2017, including developments in Netanyahu's criminal trial, it seems to me that a great deal of  what Caspit has to say is probably not so far off the mark.

Here is Caspit's ultimate conclusion, which is, more or less, the thesis of the book:

"Netanyahu's story  is one of miserably missed opportunity.  Ever since David Ben-Gurion...Israel has never had a leader with the kind of unlimited credit given to Netanyahu....he could have done anything he wanted...."

"As time went by, the real objective of the Netanyahu regime was molded: to remain in power.  He failed to block Iran, he destroyed the peace process, contributed to the growing delegitimizing of Israel in the world, and was forever striving to the right, in a never ending chase  after the mythical electoral "base" that will enable him to remain in power one more  term, another year, longer and  longer...."

"Netanyahu could have gone down in history as a leader who influenced the future of his people, who brought Israel to a new place and burst  through the cul-de-sac into which the Jewish state was forced in the seventh decade of its life.  Instead...he...left behind nothing at all."

Now that last part may be excessively harsh.  There will certainly be those who will argue that Israel's  economy is in a better state than it was  when Netanyahu took office, that foreign relations have improved, especially with peace treaties with some  of Israel's neighbours (although these came into effect after the  book was written) and that there were other successes.  But in other ways, the final four years of Netanyahu's premiership, after the book was written would bolster Caspit's thesis even further.

Between 2017 and 2021, it is quite arguable that Netanyahu's  sole objective was to stay in power and avoid his criminal proceedings.  He was responsible for bringing Israel to the polls on four consecutive occasions and refused to propose or pass a state budget for  more than 2 years.  Few legistlative initiatives were passed or even proposed, other than those that would somehow help or assist  Bibi with his  ongoing issues.  The pursuit of legislated immunity from criminal proceedings seemed to be Bibi's overriding objective, but despite his four attempts, he couldn't seem to muster the majority require to implement it.  By contrast, since  the current  government has taken power, there have been a rash of legislative initiatives in areas including public transportation, the environment,  agriculture and a host of other areas.  

Ultimately,  if and when Caspit decides to update the book and add in a few more chapters, there seems to be very little that has taken place in Israeli  politics that will cause Caspit to change his thesis very much, if at all.  In fact, as the Netanyahu criminal trial continues, and evidence continues to emerge about Netanyahu's involvement in a wide range of very questionable activities, Caspit will probably double down on his thesis.

I plan to read Anshel  Pfeffer's  book as well - Bibi - The Turbulent  Life and Times of Benjamin  Netanyahu.  I would be suprised if Pfeffer's ultimate conclusions are  very different  but  I'm sure it will bring a different perspective.  Stay tuned for my "compare and contrast" blog once I have read that book.   



Wednesday, March 9, 2016

Latest Terrorist Attacks in Israel and Pew Study Link

We have been enjoying some unseasonably warm weather in Israel while dealing with a spate of Palestinian terror attacks.

Yonatan Azarihab, who was stabbed in a terror attack in Petah Tikvah on March 8, 2016, speaks from the hospital (Channel 2 screenshot)
Yonatan Azarihab
Yesterday, as U.S. Vice President Joe Biden was visiting Israel, Israelis fought back three different terrorist attacks in three different areas.  One attack occurred in Petah Tikvah.  The victim, Yonatan Azarihab, was stabbed several times in the shoulder and neck by a Palestinian attacker.  Though seriously injured, Azarihab pulled the knife out of his shoulder and used the knife to fight off the attacker.  The attacker, a 20 year old Palestinian, died of his wounds.  Azarihab is being treated at an Israeli hospital.


In another attack in Jaffa, a 21 year old Palestinian man ran down a a beach promenade stabbing several people in his path.  He injured twelve people and killed one.  Six of the injured were hospitalized, at least one of whom is in critical condition.  A local busker sprang to action by using his guitar to hit the attacker and slow him down before police arrived on the scene and shot the attacker.  The attacker killed an American student, Taylor Force, a U.S. military veteran, who was visiting Israel.  The Fatah website, which represents one of the strongest factions of the Palestinian authority, praised the attack as the work of a "martyr."

In a third attack, a Palestinian on a motorcycle opened fire on a police vehicle near the Damascus Gate in Jerusalem.  One officer was killed in the attack and a second was seriously injured.  Police eventually caught up to the terrorist and killed him.

The current wave of attacks has been ongoing since September 2015.  Hundreds of Palestinians have attacked Israelis across Israel. Although many of the attacks have been knife attacks, there have also been shootings, car attacks (where the attacker purposely drives into a group of civilians) and other incidents.  Many of the attackers have been killed by nearby bystanders, police forces or others arriving at the scene to fight off the attacks.

The attacks have generally not been condemned by the Palestinian leadership or even by Israeli Arab Knesset members.  Many of the attacks have been celebrated and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas has praised several of the attackers as "Martyrs."

One has to wonder about the end game for the Palestinians.  If they are of the view that the use of this type of violence will push Israel to make significant peace concessions, that would seem to be a mistaken assumption.  If anything, the Israeli political landscape has been shifting to the right as a result of these attacks.

A Pew Research Center study released this week reported that close to 50% of Israelis would now support a policy of transferring Israeli Arabs out of Israel.  To where?   Well maybe that is a corollary of the Palestinian position that the Palestinian state as part of a "two-state solution" should be emptied of its Jews.  If a "two-state solution" means that each people gets its own state, many interesting questions arise.  If each state has a minority of the other state's people - and provides full rights for that minority (as Israel now does for the Palestinian population), then it seems doubtful that many Israelis would push too hard for the expulsion or transfer from Israel of the Palestinians to the nascent Palestinian state.

But if it is a negotiated condition of a two state solution that Israel uproot any Jewish communities in the territory earmarked for the new Palestinian state and provide the Palestinian state with territory completely free of any Jewish residents, it is understandable that many would view the corollary to be a logical extension of the same premise. 

This is the position taken by Israeli Knesset Member Avigdor Lieberman of the "Yisrael Beitenu" party, which is currently not part of the governing coalition.  Lieberman would argue that this is what President Obama has referred to as "land swaps" where Israel would trade areas within Israel that have primarily Arab populations for areas of the West Bank that have primarily Jewish populations.

Funny enough, the Palestinian Authority view is that Israel should empty the West Bank of Jews as part of a territorial compromise and agree to accept Palestinian refugees into Israel itself rather than their new proposed homeland.  Obviously this makes no sense at all.  The whole purpose of a "two-state solution" would be that the Palestinians could resolve, completely, the issue of refugees within the borders of their new state.  Netanyahu and Lieberman have been criticized for taking this position as racist and intransigent.  But it is neither to accept that a two state solution means two states for two peoples.

Some 50% of Israelis apparently reject the premise of a "transfer," according to the study.  After all, Israeli Arabs comprise some 20% of Israel's population and are involved in all facets of Israeli life.  It is probably also incorrect to interpret the poll result as suggesting that Israelis who claimed to support a transfer would want to deport Arab Israeli citizens, proactively, outside of some type of political deal that created two ethnic nation states with a negotiated population exchange mechanism.

But this latest round of violence has impacted Israeli opinion. As the number of terrorist incidents on civilians within Israel continues to increase, Israeli attitudes towards Palestinians, Israeli and non-Israeli, continue to change for the worse.

Perhaps Palestinian leader Abbas figures that this is the way to force Israel into a deal and to gain international support.  But it seems to me that the current round of Palestinian violence has pushed things in the opposite direction.